

*The Soviet Experiment:
Challenging the Apologists
for Communist Tyranny*

DEDICATION

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for Communist Tyranny*

By MATTHEW RAPHAEL JOHNSON, PH.D.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS



STILL FIGHTING

Please pardon my self-indulgence here, but the period of time in which I wrote these essays was the most traumatic and painful of my life. I lost a marriage, a home, a job, regular contact with my children, financial solvency, my extended family, all my friends, my social life and all expectations for the future—overnight.

After four years of agony, bankruptcy and depression, this book emerges to prove I'm still fighting. It proves that the corrupt legal system, feminism, the plagiarists, the conformists, my family and academia failed to break me. As the White forces went into exile in 1921, I went into exile to Johnstown, Pennsylvania. As the Russian Orthodox Church functioned underground for decades in Russia, my writing, far out of the mainstream, nevertheless continues to draw the scorn of court historians worldwide.

It took a few generations but, apparently out of nowhere, the Soviet system collapsed—as all lies do—and Russia, under Putin, was reborn. I personally see light at the end of my own misery tunnel for the first time. I, too, am entering into my “Putin” phase of rebirth while the forces of darkness stand exposed.

So who stood by me during these last few years? Too few. I

dedicate this book to these few brave souls. I will forever be grateful to you all.

First and foremost, I dedicate this book to my son Michael. I raised him and introduced him to everything he now loves. I gave him life and today, he's given me mine back. An A student, an athlete, bassist and nationalist activist, he continues to amaze me. He is a phenomenal boy and will grow into a strong, independent, clear-thinking man very, very soon. Unlike most fathers, I am actually proud of him for real, objective reasons, not because I'm supposed to be. He's my greatest contribution to the world.

Second, I want to thank my producer Sven Longshanks and webmaster Matt Parrot. I came out of my period of inactivity when Mr. Parrot asked I relaunch my radio show. They lit the fire under me and got me going again, even paying for my website, www.rusjournal.org. When I was told that so many of the ideas of the Traditionalist Worker Party come from my broadcasts and texts, I was amazed. I have never been so honored and moved. I emerged from my shell an elder statesman. They have become my new family.

Third, my listeners, readers and supporters who assisted me financially through this struggle. I was forced to appeal for money on my radio show, something I thought was beneath me. I usually give everything away for free. It was the most humiliating thing I've ever had to do. Yet, when a large number responded, I realized just how significant my words have been to them, people I never knew existed. They all told me that I "changed their worldview," "revolutionized their lives" or spurred them to "convert to Orthodoxy." I was again dumbfounded. I had no idea I had this sort of following. I had no idea I mattered. I had no idea my university lectures in podcast form would actually work anywhere. You guys proved me incorrect.

Fourth, my former boss, Willis A. Carto. His importance for Revisionism is immense. For me personally, he gave me my career starting in 1999 as editor of *THE BARNES REVIEW* and made it

possible for me to have a family. He gave me generous time off to be with my boys when they were infants and for this, I'll be everlastingly grateful. He is greatly missed and there seems to be no one to take his place. There would be no nationalist movement in the U.S. without him.


These people, and a few that I've failed to mention out of laziness, are the reason I've not given up on life. In different ways, you kept me from the pits of despair and depression that had surrounded me for so long. Dedicating this set of essays to you all does no justice to what you've done for me.

—DR. MATTHEW RAPHAEL JOHNSON

Johnstown, Pennsylvania

July 17, 2018

100th Anniversary of the Murder
of the Russian Royal Family



Caption: 75 words.

INTRODUCTION



JOHNSON' LAW

Historians have one purpose: to destroy the vague, fuzzy and imprecise semi-knowledge of the common person. It needs to be replaced with the truth independent of the self-interest of the writer. The ignorance of the pretentious, the faux-academic and the pseudo-intellectual should be swept away with utter contempt. The level of pretension in the West is shockingly high. At no time in history has so much data been available to the common man. It is overwhelming even in the most limited, specialized fields. Yet, the level of rational discourse, factual understanding and wisdom has not only stagnated, but has gone backwards. People are ignorant because it's easy.

Some years ago, while doing research for a long paper on the Burmese military government, I came to a surprising realization: in obscure areas, nations almost entirely unknown even to educated Americans, there are no incentives for journalists to scrupulously tell the truth. Since there is no one to correct them, they have no real inducement to write strictly in the realm of fact. Then, after that, another lightning bolt struck me: In obscure regions of the world, it is much easier for even well-intentioned writers to err, since they are more apt to just impose familiar patterns on the unfamiliar. I termed this, modestly enough, Johnson's Law, and it has the two formulations above.

This book is a set of essays on various facets of the Soviet Union. The overarching arguments made are several:

First, the Bolsheviks never, not for a split-second, cared about "labor" in the sense that "labor" refers to the working people of the empire. The Bolsheviks defined "labor" so broadly that it became meaningless. They held actual workers in utter contempt. A "worker" was a supporter of the system, an ideological comrade. A member of the "working class" was a Soviet totalitarian, not someone who works in a factory.

How do we know this cosmopolitan, urban, elite Red movement cared nothing for labor? When the Reds took power, they destroyed all successful socialist forms of economic production in Russia. One would think that, if labor was their primary concern, these would be preserved and promoted. This too has never been mentioned by Russia scholars pulling down six figures in American universities. The Labor Brotherhood of the Holy Cross, the peasant commune, the Old Believer villages, the Cossack *Krug*, the urban *Artel* and almost all monasteries are all wondrous examples of successful socialist, communitarian economic life. Not only were they destroyed, they were also called examples of "capitalism" and "reaction." This proves that such terms are code words, not descriptive terms.

Yugoslavia is another example. The attempt to create workers' councils and employee control over labor was condemned in the most shrill, violent terms by the USSR. Yet, this sort of empowerment lies at the root of what they claim to be doing. These two things cannot be true at the same time. While Tito's example failed, it was far more humane than anything the other Soviet-based states did. It is not an accident that the number of Jews in the Yugoslav model were far, far fewer than elsewhere. This is not an insignificant fact. The point remains, however, that Tito's workers' council was the reason Moscow lost its ideological mind to the point of contemplating an invasion. If this does not convince the prejudiced and dogmatic, then few other things will.

The church is, by its constitution, a socialist institution rejecting the private ownership of capital. The patristic witness to

this is overpowering. Why, then, was the church seen as an enemy to “socialist reconstruction”? Even after the 1918 *sobor* where the monarchy was rejected by the modernist bishops in Russia, they still all went to prison in huge numbers. Why waste such tremendous resources to do this?

All the Reds had to do is claim that they were bringing the Gospel to fruition—or rhetoric of a similar kind—and they would have had a large, popular social institution as an ally. This is yet another question no one has thought to bring up in almost a century of scholarship. The reason is that the Old Bolsheviks were Jewish, and this ingrained hate created a distorted element in their thought. This was not a rational movement.

Second, the purpose of the revolution was to use trite ideological phrases solely for their own enrichment. The USSR was never an ideological empire. In brief, their regime, backed by extreme violence, was nothing more than a transmission belt delivering all productive capital into the hands of the new ruling clique. Despite their name, the Bolsheviks were a tiny, urban group of Jewish intellectuals who had no ties with the people they were soon to rape without mercy. Soviet legislation never favored labor, banned all unions and ruthlessly exploited the proletariat. This means that Marxism and Leninism are not about labor as normally defined.

When a country has a totally planned economy, the obvious implication is that country’s ruling class owns and controls all productive capital. If they can plan it, they must own it and can do as they please with it. This conception has never, not once, penetrated the mind of American intellectuals on the USSR.

Central planning means that everything—all property—is under the direct control of the ruling class. It is both their personal and institutional property. The Soviet ruling class was by far the wealthiest ruling class in the world, and they held the daily lives of every single person in the empire in the palm of their hands. Worse, Western intellectuals and media covered for them and took their slogans at face value.

Third, *Trotsky, Lenin and Stalin were of one mind on all things,*

until the Jewish question, personified by Trotsky, became explicit. This by no means requires a belief in Stalin's "antisemitism." It remained a capital crime in the USSR under his rule. The Old Bolsheviks, almost exclusively Jewish, were the target—not Jews as such. Jews were a privileged group in the "new Russia" and synagogues were not normally the target of the anti-religious campaign.

Fourth, nationalism—of all types—was banned throughout the Soviet Union without exception. Western "accusations" of Stalin's "nationalism" are absurd exaggerations. Several examples of what Western academics think "nationalism" is will be shown below. Bolsheviks were not Russians. Russian culture, exclusively Orthodox, was violently banned by the System from 1921 to 1988. "Soviet Russia" is a misnomer.

Fifth, the Western world was never anti-Bolshevik (even to the extent that the Western ruling class had any idea what "Bolshevism" was). The West backed the Reds during the Civil War. Many times could the British have smashed the Petrograd Soviet, but each time they were held back. Trotsky's connections with Jewish capital are proof enough of this. Regardless, it was a rare find to discover an American that had any idea what "Leninism" was to any great extent.

Finally, not only did the Western capitalists not fear the USSR, they built it. The U.S. and Western elites created the Soviet Union even during their own Depression. The U.S. and the Western world created, financed and supported the USSR without fail throughout its existence for many reasons that will be detailed below. Any harsh words between the U.S. and the USSR had nothing to do with ideology, only that the Soviet empire was getting too large. *Any* empire that large would be a threat. The Cold War was a myth.

The point of this is to show that all common claims about the USSR are false. The Party cared nothing for "socialist reconstruction" since such communities already existed in parts of the Russian empire. There must be an external, non-ideological reason for the pathological, obsessive torture and murder of thousands

of Orthodox clergy, none of whom were members of the upper classes and were often—almost always—highly sympathetic to labor. The primary reason was that the Reds were overwhelmingly Jewish and hated the church (as well as gentiles in general) from a cultural and mythical aspect of their being.

The idea that the USSR was not “true socialism” is a maddening claim that makes no logical sense. Marxism took almost the identical shape no matter where it has been found. Yugoslavia’s differences are appreciated, but not radical enough to be a totally different system. If the USSR is “not true socialism,” then one can say that the U.S. is “not true capitalism.” The Soviet mind operated through the dishonest vehicle of comparing the ideal of theory to the dirty life of daily politics. Capitalist reality was contrasted to Marxist theory. The moment Marxist reality is compared to the capitalist reality or any other, it falls to pieces. The entire ideological movement is based on fraud. It’s just another Jewish shtick.

It is a myth that Marx thought Russia an unsuitable place for socialist experimentation. His letter to Vera Zasulich states quite the opposite: Russia had a strong socialist tradition. I’ve already mentioned this. Yet even Karl himself had no interest in labor. When Proudhon’s followers demanded that actual workers be represented in the First International, Marx’s neurotic temper tantrum response led to their expulsion from the movement. He was outraged. Eyewitnesses, Bakunin among them, described Marx as red-faced with rage. Then, the anarchist leader said something startling about this event:

Himself a Jew, Marx has around him, in London and France, but especially in Germany, a multitude of more or less clever, intriguing, mobile, speculating Jews, such as Jews are everywhere: commercial or banking agents, writers, politicians, correspondents for newspapers of all shades, with one foot in the bank, the other in the socialist movement, and with their behinds sitting on the German daily press—they have taken possession of all the newspapers—and you can imagine what kind of sickening literature they

produce. Now, this entire Jewish world, which forms a single profiteering sect, a people of bloodsuckers, a single gluttonous parasite, closely and intimately united not only across national borders but across all differences of political opinion—this Jewish world today stands for the most part at the disposal of Marx and at the same time at the disposal of Rothschild. I am certain that Rothschild for his part greatly values the merits of Marx, and that Marx for his part feels instinctive attraction and great respect for Rothschild.

This may seem strange. What can there be in common between Communism and the large banks? Oh! The Communism of Marx seeks enormous centralization in the state, and where such exists, there must inevitably be a central state bank, and where such a bank exists, the parasitic Jewish nation, which speculates on the work of the people, will always find a way to prevail (Bakunin, 1871).

Now, today's anarchists, at least those few that have ever heard of Bakunin, pretend he never said this. Anarchism, never a serious ideology, imposes a harshly uniformitarian ideological code on its adherents without irony. Bakunin's statement was a very common one to make at the time. This fact about Marx, equally applicable to the CPSU in the 1920s, is the reason the USSR was such a strange place; it was an empire, ostensibly dedicated to "the working class," cared nothing for labor. An empire at war with capitalism while being constructed and financed by it. An empire dedicated to "socialist reconstruction" of society making sure, with great effort, that all forms of socialist reconstruction be destroyed as quickly as possible. Only the 20th century can create such a monstrosity.

The final two essays are on Russian and Ukrainian resistance literature. The first, from Solzhenitsyn and the second, from his Ukrainian counterpart, Vasyl Stus. They round out this collection by providing an up-close understanding of the Soviet system, as both men served many years in the camps. These essays are mostly about overarching theory and policy. That is the

education and background of their author. However, it makes sense to explain how this was manifested in personal life as well. Literature attempts to make that as plain as possible.

All of these themes are to be found in the present collection of essays. The master theme is that Russian and Soviet history, as it's taught in the USA, is almost entirely mythology. The history needs to be reconstructed from the ground up, but the present crop of university professors is simply not competent enough to think this through critically.

All translations found here are mine and mine alone.



Caption:40 words

CHAPTER ONE



MARX & LENIN ON THE EUROPEAN REVOLUTIONS OF THE 19TH CENTURY

Marx did not think that the failures of 1848 were due to a lack of terror, though terror was a well-known aspect of his early poetry. There was plenty of violence, as there was in the English and French Revolutions. Both England and France had revolutions that developed into oligarchy and authoritarianism. Cromwell in England and the French Directory showed the trajectory of all revolution regardless of its aims.

Marx did, however, take one lesson from the problems of 1848: that Western parliamentarian was a failure. In Marx's mind, there was now no question as to the significance of liberalism's failure and Engels held that the failed revolutions were against liberal democracy as he writes, "Our age, the age of democracy, is breaking. The flames of the Tuileries and the Palais Royal are the dawn of the proletariat. Everywhere the rule of the bourgeoisie will now, come crashing down, or be dashed to pieces."

While both Marx and Engels held publicly that the movements in 1848 were against the bourgeoisie, they were not. Socialism, often of a Proudhonian sort, was only a small fraction of the

movement. Much of it was basically reformist and the only lesson that could have been taken from these earlier revolutions is that the existence of a disciplined “vanguard” was essential.

In Marx’s writings concerning the following generations of violence in 1871, a similar view is heard as he states:

If you look up the last chapter of my *Eighteenth Brumaire*, you will find that I declare that the next attempt of the French Revolution will be no longer, as before, to transfer the bureaucratic-military machine from one hand to another, but to smash it, and this is the precondition for every real people’s revolution on the Continent. And this is what our heroic Party comrades in Paris are attempting.

Unfortunately, Marx had no real mechanism for this. The future was vague, which seems odd for a political ideology of such systematic fervor. Marx stated elsewhere on 1871:

The Commune was formed of the municipal councilors, chosen by universal suffrage in the various wards of the town, responsible and revocable at any time. The majority of its members were naturally working men, or acknowledged representatives of the working class. The police, which until then had been the instrument of the Government, was at once stripped of its political attributes, and turned into the responsible, and at all times revocable, agent of the Commune. So were the officials of all other branches of the administration. From the members of the Commune downwards, the public service had to be done at workmen’s wages. The privileges and the representation allowances of the high dignitaries of state disappeared along with the high dignitaries themselves ... Having once got rid of the standing army and the police, the instruments of physical force of the old government the Commune proceeded at once to break the instrument of spiritual suppression, the power of the priests ... The judicial functionaries lost that sham independence... they were thenceforward to be elective, responsible, and revocable.

And again:

If the political struggle of the working class assumes revolutionary form, and if the workers set up their revolutionary dictatorship in place of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, they commit the terrible crime of violating principles, for in order to satisfy their wretched, vulgar everyday needs and to crush the resistance of the bourgeoisie, they give the state a revolutionary and transient form, instead of laying down their arms and abolishing the state (All quoted from Lenin, 1917).

These quotations show several things. First, that violence and dictatorship were required for any revolution. Dictatorship, of course, was to be temporary, as the remnants of the old order were swept away. No one knew how this was to be “temporary.” If the adherents of non-socialist movements were substantial, then even tighter centralization was needed to smash them. Marx says above that it is not so much the state that matters, but rather the people who control it.

Police are needed, but not those who serve the present government that is allegedly opposed to him. In other words, while there is some vaguely stated anarchist rhetoric above, Marx holds that the true revolution removes the present bureaucratic establishment and replaces it with one of their own choosing (Lenin, 1918).

To smash the bourgeois system requires discipline, a strong military force, ruthlessness, centralization and violence. This is the very definition of authoritarianism and the last set of qualities one would desire in a ruling class. Therefore, it is clear that there was nothing special about the October Revolution in Russia since it followed the same pattern (Lenin, 1921). The revolutions of 1848 and 1871 were similar in that they took in mutually contradictory demands within the same movement and used violence, or so it seemed, to paper them over. The middle classes wanted free trade and an end to the nobility once and for all. Some factions of labor wanted better working conditions, while citizens in general wanted more voting rights, and basic freedoms (Dowe, 2001). This is the idealization, ho-

wever, as proof of these clear “demands” is lacking.

But even if the above were not true, it remains that in both failed revolutions, violence was liberally used, a vanguard, of sorts, took over, and, at least for a time, revolutionaries ruled in an authoritarian manner, even despite themselves. At a minimum, some kind of authoritarianism was needed in order to defend the movement and destroy its enemies. The same occurred in 1789 and 1688. No lesson was learned, and the socialist movement was successful in making their views mainstream, diverting attention from its ethnic flavor, destroying the many idealistic, older forms of socialism and importantly, developing strong ties to the London banking establishment.

Socialism has a long history but was only accepted by the Western establishment when God was purged and it became an ideology of atoms-in-the-void. Prior to that, it was agrarian and pro-family as in Gerald Winstanley or PJ Proudhon. Each and every church father was communal and socialist in his economic understanding. That Marxism and socialism are the same has no foundation, and the same could be said about Bolshevism. These are three distinct ideologies.

Since Bolshevism had no interest in labor and had little ideology to guide its policy at all, any means to destroy, humiliate or liquidate Christianity or agrarianism was accepted. That remains the only consistent idea in Soviet history.

The revolutions of 1848 and 1871 were inherently authoritarian for several reasons:

- There is no way to know how many enemies the commune might have, and these enemies were not going away soon.
- Many workers are simply not ready to exercise any authority. This was the root of the nasty fight between Marx and Bakunin, but it also suggested that, again, the vanguard can rule indefinitely.
- The revolution of 1871 was run by a vanguard movement of intellectuals and the upper classes (often of Jewish origin) and were exclusively urban. Workers were rarely to be seen.

- Given that Marx was working for *The New York Times* (suggesting the bourgeoisie's real feelings about socialism were ambivalent, if not positive), he was quite aware that the commune was made up of petty bureaucrats, tradesmen and intellectuals.

- A materialist holds that the human person is a bundle of nerve endings which register desires in a chaotic manner. Therefore, human life is not sacred. Man is a machine that produces goods that he needs and anything beyond this is "mystification." Killing for the sake of revolution is a moral act

As far as its application to 1918-1921, Lenin states:

You must not forget the bourgeois character of this "democracy," it's historical conditional and limited character ... The dictatorship of the proletariat alone can emancipate humanity from the oppression of capital, from the lies, falsehood and hypocrisy of bourgeois democracy—democracy for the rich—and establish democracy for the poor, that is, make the blessings of democracy really accessible to the workers and poor peasants, whereas now (even in the most democratic—bourgeois—republic) the blessings of democracy are in fact inaccessible to the vast majority of working people.

Trotsky said the same and, along with Lenin, was responding to Karl Kautsky's contention that socialism requires some level of democracy and basic liberal freedoms. In fact, Trotsky advocated the selective use of terror to shock the middle classes. The fact that Trotsky wrote an article called "The Defense of Terrorism" should prove, by itself, that Lenin's dictatorship was quite intentional.

Marx himself wrote: "There is only one means to shorten, simplify and concentrate the murderous death throes of the old society and the bloody birth pains of the new, only one means—revolutionary terrorism."

G. Zinoviev writes, justifying this approach:

The fact that we now face a titanic struggle, that now the hour really has struck when the sword speaks against the

bourgeoisie, gives us cause to say, in relation not only to the national parties but also to the International: "We need a centralized organization with an iron military discipline." Only then will we achieve what we really need. In this respect, we must learn from our enemies. We must understand that, in this extremely difficult situation, we can only win if we are really well and tightly organized. We will speak about this in more detail when we come to work out the Statutes of the Communist International and have to discuss the question on an international scale (Zinoviev, 1920).

There is a single authoritarian and terrorist strand from 1688 to Khrushchev. A true revolution is one that overturns the existing order—not merely the existing government. Therefore, to do this, revolutions must be violent and centralized. The facts, however, strongly suggest that this was not a "worker's movement" and that the Jewish, urban, financial and elite elements in this mainstream movement had much to hide. Bakunin made that clear.

Writers such as E. Carr have a tendency to romanticize Lenin, as do the bulk of American university professors. The centralization of power in Moscow was not a reaction to theoretical debates over the Commune, but a realization that European revolutions were not forthcoming, he claimed, echoing the mainstream. Germany and Hungary were exceptions, but these were short-lived. If anything, these post-war movements had more of an impact than 1871, and both were highly authoritarian. Kuhn's Red terror in Hungary certainly is proof of that. Yet, Carr states, it was precisely at this time that the NEP was instituted. This was a temporary measure to a) gain the support of the peasants, b) rebuild the economy, and c) imitate a "capitalist" period in Russian history so as to remain faithful to the uniformitarian historical view of Marx (Carr, 1985). The cynicism here is unmistakable.

To hold that Marx did not think a Russian revolution possible is belied by a letter Marx wrote to the famed Vera Zasulich, Marx writes:

There is one characteristic of the "agricultural commune" in Russia which afflicts it with weakness, hostile in every sense. That is its isolation, the lack of connection between the life of one commune and that of the others, this localized microcosm which is not encountered everywhere. . . . Today it is an obstacle which could easily be eliminated. It would simply be necessary to replace the *volost*, the government body, with an assembly of peasants elected by the communes themselves, serving as the economic and administrative organ for their interests.

Thus, not only does Marx see the possibility of a Russian revolution, but that Russia is well positioned to have one soon. For their part, the Old Bolsheviks held that the 19th century revolutions were not to be imitated. Lessons cannot be taken from them because they were merely prefatory stages, the process of politicizing "progressive elements" into a more or less coherent single party.

There have been different interpretations of the prehistory of Leninism in political theory. Hannah Arendt was famous for holding that such revolutions are inherently bloody because of the tremendous range of what was to be transformed. If all life is influenced by capital and that capital was to be transferred to the party, then there is no aspect of life that is not in the hands of the revolutionary elite. Why this elite would not merely take their loot and live as they pleased was never addressed. Violence and centralization are inevitable under these circumstances.

Michael Oakeshott argues that Bolshevism demanded a state of affairs to which the Russian people were either hostile or indifferent. There was a huge gap between the reality of Russian life and the ideals of the Bolsheviks, since so many were not Russian. This gap needed to be filled, and the centralized state and GULag were the means to fill it.

Richard Pipes argues that the centralized state of Lenin was a means to defend the seizure of power as well as to destroy the remnants of the old system. Of course, this too had to be authoritarian, since the overwhelming majority of Russians were

opposed to what, later, the Communists revealed as their true agenda. While Lenin used the cynical slogan “peace, land, bread,” the party he headed neither desired nor supplied any of those. War was a continuous state within the USSR, providing a cover for the collectivization of agricultural land. Peace was never planned as a goal; in fact, the party thrived on and required constant social tension to justify itself.

All land was collectivized. The party controlled the land while the peasantry had controlled 97% of farmland in the old empire. Finally, bread was the property of the state. Therefore, given that this policy was known beforehand, the Reds deliberately created this shtick to convince the world they were humanitarians. As always, the world took them at their word without reason or criticism. Pipes’s analysis is particularly useful because he only deals with the centralization and violence of Lenin’s era.

Orlando Figes makes the claim that Bolshevism was authoritarian from the start. Using primary source documents from 1891 onward, the mass slaughter of religious people, middle-class peasants, royalists and others was on the table from the beginning. Lenin was no less bloody than Stalin; Lenin just lived under his own system for four years. Even in that time, Lenin’s body count was impressive.

Alexander Solzhenitsyn argues that revolution, regardless of the source, is violent and authoritarian. Violence means that the most ruthless will take over. It means that whoever kills his way to the top will not take kindly to competition. Revolution does not bring prosperity, but more poverty and, finally, it kills off the best in the local population.

Solzhenitsyn also reminds the reader that the Bolsheviks faced numerous uprisings against their rule. Peasants rioted against the seizure and closure of churches. In Tambov province in 1920-21, peasants armed with clubs and a few older rifles attacked a detachment of Bolshevik party officials and soldiers. They were cut down with machine gun fire. Western Siberia, where land was free, saw a revolt of the free Cossack population.

In Tambov the rebellion held out for eleven months, being joined by many sympathetic peasants from elsewhere.

This was the Russian version of the Commune, though this time it was religious. Solzhenitsyn argues that these uprisings were the justification, not the cause, of centralized power (Solzhenitsyn, 1993).

The above were mainstream scholars, but these were not the majority. The elite in the West were enamored with Bolshevism almost to the extent they knew little about it. Skocpol was more mainstream in her assertion that Marxism was about “labor”; worse, that the USSR built an industrial regime from almost nothing.

One glaring problem with the entire charade was the lack of a class basis for Bolshevism. Another was the fact that the USSR did not create an industrial powerhouse. Soviet industry, mining and oil production came from the West, its alleged enemy. This is probably the best kept secret of world politics. The U.S. built the USSR from the ground up (See Section V below). GE provided Russia’s electric grid under Lenin and Early Stalin, Ford built Russia’s trucks from Ukraine, oil was pumped by several Alaska oil firms and the USSR’s credit came from France and Germany until 1936 (Levine, 1974; Dienes, 1971; Erickson, 1991; Carley, 1997; Lonsdale, 1960).

Russia was in no crisis before 1905. It was doing so well that the British financed any and all anti-Russian movements from the Mountain Turks to the Japanese. Skocpol is incorrect that Russia was in debt; she was not. Agricultural productivity skyrocketed rather than being in decline. Grain production increased by about 500% between 1900 and 1914. Skocpol is woefully misinformed about the condition of Russia in 1914, but such misinformation is necessary for the official story to “work out.”

Skocpol is correct in asserting the Petersburgian bureaucracy was separate from Russia, or hardly Russian at all. She does not reach the necessary deduction, however, namely that the Tsar no longer ruled, but the administration. True, peasant problems could be severe. They were, however, aimed at the *zemstvo*, not

the monarchy. They were certainly not pro-Bolshevik, since they wanted additional land, a universal desire of all farmers. Nikolai II responded by cutting taxes and ending all redemption payments (Phillips, 2003).

The myths of Marxism and Communism can fill hundreds of volumes. The papers "Russia under Western Eyes" (RR, 1957) and "40 Years under Soviet Communism" (RR, 1958) show that neither Marxism or Bolshevism was "against inequality." The USSR rejected all forms of labor control over enterprises and no freedoms whatsoever were granted to worker unions or the workers themselves. In addition, "The Russian Revolution" (RR, 1942) makes it clear from primary documents that the rhetoric of the party was to have no relation to the reality.

In "10 Fallacies of Soviet Communism" (RR, 1953), it is clear that the Reds were erecting an oligarchy where the new ruling class would not just "use" the state for their own purposes, but to actually become the state. In that article, the Western love of Marxism is shown by the citations of hundreds of newspaper articles praising the new "free Russian government." The fact that both Marx and Trotsky worked for American capitalist newspapers seems strangely ignored by Western writers, then and now. The uncomfortable truth is that Marxism in the USSR depended on aid from the U.S. to function. It was never meant to manage an economy or "represent labor." It was only a wealth transfer in that Marxism had nothing to do with labor and was entirely about the party's ownership over all capital. Partial proof of this is the total destruction of any other, non-Red socialist movement anywhere. National communist movements like the Borotbists' Christian Socialist communes, old peasant communes or labor unions were liquidated with extreme violence. This is odd behavior from a faction dedicated to "labor."


Wages plummeted, all independent labor action was violently liquidated and most of the actual workers in Russia were silenced. This did not stop Lenin from issuing his "Declaration of Rights of Working and Exploited People," which includes private property in land and "worker's control." As it was being

written, plans for its liquidation were already in motion. “Workers’ councils” in factories had to be chosen from party members.

This suggests that their purpose was to streamline and micro-manage the transfer of productive capital to Lenin, Sverdlov and Trotsky. If that was not the case, then labor as such would be on the councils, not party intellectuals, most of whom had never worked. This system soon was called “War Communism.” This was a play on words; it was a war on labor and the capital it created. Some interpret it as communism that took place during World War I, but the war had already ended. That Lenin took power against the proletariat is one of the more ironic elements of Russian history. Immediately upon taking power in a coup, Lenin shut down all independent labor unions.

It was these unions—that is, labor itself—that served as Lenin’s primary opposition. On July 7th of 1918, Lenin telegraphed Stalin: “We retain hundreds of hostages from the Left SRs. Everywhere you must ruthlessly suppress these pitiful and hysterical adventurers who have become a tool in the hands of the counterrevolutionaries. . . be ruthless against the Left SRs.”

Several observations are required here: First, comments like this effectually end the debate on whether Stalin was different from Lenin. Second, that since the Left SR was the labor party with a similar (public) agenda to the Bolsheviks, there is no interest in creating a mass party or a labor dictatorship. All Cadets, anarchists and Mensheviks were banned, regardless of their views on socialism. The Red oligarchy resurrected the death penalty and banned all newspapers, especially those put out by labor collectives. Nothing here makes sense. Its almost complete absence from historical treatments of the era is curious.



CaptionL: 40 words

CHAPTER TWO



UNRAVELING THE MYTHS OF GREGORY RASPUTIN

*Revolutionary Lies, Academic Fraud
and the Provisional Government's
"Emergency Commission of Inquiry"*

THERE IS NOT A SINGLE article (to say nothing of books) where Rasputin's life is described consistently, historically, on the basis of critical analysis of primary sources. All existing books and articles about Rasputin simply repeat in various combinations the same historic legends and anecdotes (with the revolutionary accusations), most of which are made up or fabricated just as false memoirs by Vyrubova or shorthand reports of proceedings against "enemies of the people" from the 1930s. In fact, they created a myth about Rasputin with the only purpose being to blacken and discredit Russia, the spirituality of its people, which, as we will see later, Rasputin represented to a certain extent. And this incredible rage coming from the pages of the yellow press targeted against Rasputin completely gave away those devilish firemen which were capable of getting what they wanted only by enormous and all-around heat (—OLEG PLATONOV, 1994).

Few things in Russian history are as mysterious as the relations between the last royal family and Gregory Rasputin. Most historians will claim the following, usually just repeating the majority opinion: first, that the Tsarevich was sick with hemophilia, and Rasputin had an ability to heal him; second, that he was no monk, but a charlatan; third, that Rasputin was a devious man playing on the Tsar's piety to worm his way into the family's life; fourth, that Rasputin had some influence over policy, often tremendous and unwarranted, which is one of the things that led to the fall of the crown; and finally, that Rasputin had little control over his libido, making him lecherous and possibly a rapist. He was killed, or so it was thought, for the good of the state.

There seems to be no reason to deny this set of propositions. After all, the police who were sent to spy on the fallen monk said that he was a drunk and a womanizer. Yet, since most things about Russia are distorted and misunderstood in the West, why should this one be any different? The fact is that it is not. This paper makes no claim that Rasputin was a saint. It merely states that the propositions above are, to one extent or another, false.

Under Alexander Kerensky, the Provisional Government convened the "Emergency Investigation Committee for Misuses of Former Ministers and other Chief Executives" (EIC). One would think that this would be a treasure-trove for historians. It is not. A good reason exists to explain this fact. The point was to uncover crimes and corruption in the old imperial bureaucracy. There is a good reason why this almost never gets mentioned in Russian history texts: because they admitted there were none. Little corruption and no abuse of power was uncovered by the revolutionaries. Having every incentive to justify their recent bloodletting, the commission discovered nothing. It was swept under the rug. In 2016, it is still there.

Rasputin, too, was exonerated from all charges of corruption, drunkenness or serial fornication. No records have ever been found of his being wealthy or even having a bank account.

There is not a shred of evidence that he was ever the member of the Khlysty sect or any other bizarre group. The EIC, consisting of members who spread these rumors a few years earlier, said Rasputin was not pro-German and had no influence over foreign policy. Further, Tsar Nicholas II himself ordered an investigation into Rasputin's character lest his family be taken in by a charlatan. Again, no evidence of wrongdoing was ever found.

The EIC stated:

19 July 1917:

This testimonial delivered to Mikhail Mihailovich Leibikov certifies that not a single indication of Gregory Rasputin's political activity was disclosed by the High Commission of Inquiry. The inquiry into the influence of Rasputin on the Imperial Family was intensive but it was definitely established that that influence had its source only in the profound religious sentiment of their Majesties. The only favor Rasputin accepted was the rental of his lodging, paid by the personal Chancellor of his Majesty. He also accepted presents made by the hands of the Imperial Family, such as shirts, waist-bands, etc. That Rasputin had no connections with any foreign authorities. That all pamphlets and newspaper articles on the subject of Rasputin influence and other rumors and gossip were fabricated by the powerful enemies of the emperor. This statement is given under the signature and seal of the Attorney General of the High Commission.

—VM Rudnev (signature)

The fact is that the provisional government, set up after the formal abdication of the Tsar in 1917, had full access to all the private and public papers of the Tsar, the Duma and all government ministries both private and public. Never has such an exhaustive commission into the form, behavior, structure and functioning of the royal government ever been attempted, and certainly, can never be again, given the full access to all records the commission had (much of which was destroyed by the Bolsheviks for obvious reasons). They found not only no moral problems with Rasputin, but also that the Imperial government

maintained the highest standards in personal dignity while holding office. And all this from the sworn enemies of the Imperial government.

In his 1922 work on the matter, A.F. Romanov (no relation to the royal family), stated: "The Extraordinary Commission of Inquiry investigator Rudnev made a written statement on the results of the Commission's work, which could not find literally anything to compromise Nicholas II and the Empress." This is extraordinary.

In the text of the EIC itself, the conclusion reads:

It turns out that the supreme power in the last months of the old regime itself gradually delegated parts of their sovereign rights in the hands of ministers or senior officials. ... All of us, comrades, lived under the old regime, and we all knew what was being done. We all think something terrible is happening in the police department. You know, in all fairness, it should be, not as it is in the depraved imagination of the Russian people, but what was really there. ... In front of me a document which is the Magna Carta of the police department as to its lawlessness. This document is called the "Instruction on the organization and conduct of internal supervision in the gendarme and investigative offices." Entire generations, who gave themselves to the police had a hand in the creation of this manual. All of them gradually perfect this system.

This, given to a revolutionary audience, means that they could find nothing in the police department worthy of legal prosecution. This suggests that the new government was interested in the truth of the matter rather than revolutionary slogans. It also suggests that the new state did not trust the ramblings of the media, utterly distasteful and slanderous as it was. It is an admission, loaded with all manner of revolutionary jargon, that they were wrong. The commission is kept out of history textbooks in the West for a reason: The judicial inquiry of the revolutionary government showed that there was little if any corruption in the Russian system. And this with so much incentive

to discover it! This takes a few moments to sink in.

Rudnev continues further:

We began our committee's work, perhaps you will join in this respect to us and say that we were right, at this point of view we consider as a whole, to grasp a general picture of the past months and years of the fallen regime. This is from a certain point of view: we conducted extensive investigative work; the other part of our commission is engaged in the [actionability] of these crimes, namely, to gather the evidence objectively so as to detail the offenses committed by officials as to whether they come under criminal law. Those crimes they have committed are to be punished. If you pay attention only to the concluding lines of future indictments, you will be disappointed. You might say that it will merely be the usual abuse of power and the overexertion of state authority. That conclusion would be false, my comrades!

Bringing this up here is to say that the "facts" of the corruption of Rasputin, ministers, bureaucrats, the court or policy was nonexistent. This means the entire history of the era has to be rewritten. None of this, however, should be surprising to the prescient reader. Tsar Nicholas was personally impeccable, and his personal stamp is felt all over the governing structure. The government in Petrograd was small, especially when compared to Europe, and its duties were well delineated. The bureaucracy was highly professional and ranked according to military ascendancy. In other royal states, serving in this capacity was a sacred trust before God. At a time when that was taken very seriously, the foibles of the Petrograd state pale in comparison to the mass slaughters of the 20th century to come.

One element that did penetrate the noble classes was Masonry. This doctrine was largely political and bound the elite together in a liberal order against monarchy. The payoff was brotherhood and camaraderie, but ultimately, it was absolute power. The Decembrists were overwhelmingly members of the Lodge, and the Craft was at the root of all pre-Bolshevik elite

revolutionary action.

The doctrine of Masonic orders whether Anglo-American or Continental is not the subject of this essay. It is significant to it, however. Manley Hall's *Secret Teachings of the Ages* and J.S.M. Ward's *Freemasonry: Its Aims and Ideals* are essential texts in understanding the ideological goals of the Craft. In addition, the famed *Morals and Dogma* by Theodore Pike, the "Bible" of Anglo-American Masonry, as well as *Coil's Masonic Encyclopedia* are also critical. In *Secret Teachings*, we read: "I hereby promise the Great Spirit Lucifer, Prince of Demons, that each year I will bring unto him a human soul to do with as it may please him, and in return Lucifer promises to bestow upon me the treasures of the Earth and fulfill my every desire for the length of my natural life" (104).

There is no question as to the religious doctrine of the Craft, especially in the French-style lodges in Russia that were even more radical. Oleg Platonov writes:

Earlier Freemasons planned the assassination of Nicholas II. Freemason Duke Bebutov who hosted such meetings in his home wrote in his memoirs that he gave Azev 12,000 rubles to assassinate the Tsar. Later they adopted the plan to discredit the Tsar's family by creating a fabricated, evil and mysterious image of Rasputin. Their plan was heinous but effective. The Mason Guchkov began Rasputin's persecution in the State Duma and was constantly promoting it. Masons such as Kerensky, Lvov, Nekrasov and Hessen were Guchkov's active supporters. They were not alone. At least a half of the most influential deputies of the State Duma were members of the Lodge. In the Tsar's chambers, constant intrigues against Rasputin were led by Dukes Nikolay Mikhailovich and Aleksandr Mikhailovich who were also Freemasons. Deputy Minister of the Interior, Governor General Dzhunkovsky, another member, had been fabricating police reports against Rasputin for many years (Platonov, 1996).

The Lodge in Russia is admitted by mainline historians to have been particularly powerful. *Russian Freemasons and the Rev-*

olution, by B.I. Nicholas (1990) is just one example. He argues that the assault on Rasputin was an essential pillar of the Masonic Lodge's drive to delegitimize the emperor. Another is Solovyov's (1994) *Russian Masons from the Romanovs to Berezovsky*. (Both are in Russian).

Deriving from the radical Grand Orient lodges of France, it was purely Jacobin at its most moderate. Platonov cites the number of public Masons in charge of the Russian state:

Masons were all over the Russian court. They included the Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich, and Alexander, Dmitri Pavlovich and General Mosolov, Chief Minister's Office at the royal court. Among the king's ministers and their deputies we see at least eight members of Masonic lodge: Polivanov (War), Naumov (Agriculture), Cutler and Bark (Finance), Dzhunkovsky (Interior) and Fedorov (Trade and Industry). In the Council of State were several Masons: Guchkov, Kovalevsky, Moeller-Zakomelsky, Gurko and Polivanov. Treason entered in the Defense Ministry, under the Mason Polivanov.

The Masonic lodges including the head of the Russian General Staff Alekseev, representatives of top generals such as Generals Ruza, Gurko, Krymov, Kuzmin-Karavaev, Teplov, Admiral Verderevsky and lower officers such as Samarin, Golovin, and Colonel Manikovsky. Royal diplomats who were Masons included Gulkevichi von Meck (Sweden), Stakhovich (Spain), Poklevsky-Kozell (Romania), Loris-Melikov (Sweden, Norway), Kudashev (China), Shtcherbatsky (Latin America), Zabello (Italy) and Islavin (Montenegro). At the head of the city administration of Moscow stood the Masons mayor NI Guchkov (who was AI Guchkov's brother), Chelnnokov and Aster.

The media contained major masonic owners in Russia, *Russian Morning*, *Stock Exchange News*, *The Russian Gazette*, and *The Voice of Moscow* (Platonov, ch. 10).

Clearly, the Tsar did not rule absolutely. This brief listing of public Masons suggests that a secret cabal, one dedicated to the Jacobin ideals of 1789, was operating in Petrograd while the

crown was still in power. This alters how historians need to see policy at the time. It has not even affected their views.

The dismissive claim uttered by the corrupted academic class over this states that because the Tsar was so “oppressive,” the Lodge was the only real way to build civil society. That most Russia-specialists pulling down six figures in American universities have not even a cursory understanding of Masonry with this level of penetration is inexcusable.

While their claims are laughable, it forces the Regime’s writers to see the Lodge as an important part of Russian life. After all, Peter I and Peter III had been members, as were Lord Biron and his gang of criminals. The dark 18th century in Russia is littered with the Craft.

Masonry had penetrated the nobility and is the main reason that this increasingly irrelevant group had abandoned the Tsar and Orthodoxy for Jacobinism. As the noble class abandoned their mortgaged estates and moved into the cities, they took up bourgeois careers. They believed that they were unjustly cut out of power, and thus, the Jacobin idea became important to them. The result is that the Craft grew in size.

Mentioning Masonry is essential in this book and all like it because the Lodges, with no exception, sought to overthrow the monarchy in Russia. Part of their operation was to attack the royal family by using Rasputin. Nicholas remained popular, so attacking him directly was never a good idea. Therefore, they attacked them indirectly. Many of the stories, therefore, on Rasputin come from the Craft and their powerful presence in Russian life and media. Rasputin was a victim of revolutionary politics from without and anti-monarchist palace intrigue from within.

Until recently, revisionist material in English on Rasputin was very scarce. He is universally seen as a force of evil and has taken almost an archetypal presence in the Western mind. In 2005, Life and Liberty Publishing in California released a small book on the life of Rasputin from one who actually knew the man. Dr. Elizabeth Judas was the wife of Alexander Ivanovich, an officer in the Tsar’s secret service. Her uncle was a major

figure in the imperial government. For years, this manuscript, called today *Neither Devil Nor Saint*, has lain rather undisturbed, out of print for decades and completely ignored by mainstream Russia scholarship.

Through a series of very interesting events, events that themselves tell much of local politics in the early part of the 20th century, the author, as a young child, made the acquaintance of Rasputin while living in Siberia, where she had many relatives. She knew Rasputin long before the Tsar did. It was the author's uncle, Dr. Lebikov, who first suggested to the royal family that this charismatic wanderer from Siberia be brought to the palace to pray for the ailing Tsarevich, Alexei. Rasputin was not a priest, nor a monk, nor did he ever have a desire to be ordained or tonsured. Now, the Tsarevich suffered from acute pains in his stomach, but this was never diagnosed as hemophilia, nor is there any evidence of this serious disease in his medical records, or even within the correspondence between Nicholas and Alexandra.

The distracted royal couple had no difficulty in permitting this Siberian religious man entrance into the palace, though his appearance, with long hair and beard, wearing traditional Russian peasant dress, did cause a stir among the nobility at court, many of whom were incensed to find such a commoner at the palace. Keep in mind that Russian dress and appearance was forbidden in the public square by Peter I, though that Enlightenment-era prejudice had long subsided. So foreign was he to Petrograd that the very appearance of Russian dress filled the court nobles with anger. Tsar Nicholas II sought to temper this substantially. The nobility remained followers of Peter while Nicholas looked to his father for inspiration (both Peter's father Alexei, for whom the Tsarevich was named, and his own).

Rasputin probably arrived in St Petersburg in the Fall of 1904. He went to the St. Alexander monastery there to stay. He met with the Archimandrite Hermogen. Given that this was a powerful institution, he met the famed theologian Bishop Theophan of Poltava who was quite taken with his knowledge. This friend-

ship led to his meeting the Countess Sophia Ignatieva who, in turn, introduced him to Milica of Montenegro and her sister Anastasia. From here, he met the Tsar in November of 1905.

One great flaw in Nicholas's reign was his inability to control the powerful and obnoxious nobility (including other members of the extended Romanov clan). To be fair, this was no easy task. Not only did Nicholas have certain familial responsibilities towards them, but they also were possessed of political power in their own right, as well as access to substantial fortunes. Nicholas's illustrious father, Alexander III, succeeded in controlling this element, which is in part explanatory as to why terror activity and revolutionary politics substantially subsided during his reign.

Of course, Alexander was very different from his son. Being much larger and more intimidating, Alexander personally often used physical coercion to control the more restless members of the clan. Nicholas was not of this temperament, being more refined than his father, but he eventually paid for his lack of a hard line in this matter. Nicholas wanted a court (and society at large) that relied less on violence and more on the traditions of Old Russia. This is manifest in his disarmament papers distributed to the old allies of the Holy Alliance.

Furthermore, Nicholas was a Slavophile: This means, in a nutshell, that Nicholas believed that Russia's strength was in her peasant tradition, her agriculture, the commune and the church, all of which Nicholas was attached to not merely as a political figure, but also as a Russian man. The nobility, by and large, had long abandoned these. To Nicholas, Rasputin represented the best in the Russian peasant: hardy, simple, pious. Rasputin made a powerful impression on the royal couple. This also meant that the schism between the nobles and the Tsar, a very significant rupture in Russian history, was growing by the moment.

Rasputin was religiously opposed to the use of hypnosis or any sort of "mesmerism" in religious life; he made this clear to Dr. Judas on many occasions. There is no evidence that he was a part of any sect that used these techniques, nor is there any

proof he was even aware of their techniques apart from reputation. Rasputin was able to calm Alexei during his times of physical pain, and it was in this that his services were important. Rasputin did not cure Alexei of anything, but through prayer, was able to soothe the nerves of the young heir.

He never took any credit for his services, saying only that God is responsible for the alleviation of Alexei's pain. Nor did Rasputin seek any reward for his services, and he was very quick to leave the palace when he was no longer needed. In fact, it is worth nothing that Rasputin routinely left the company of the royal family with intentions to go back to Siberia. It was only through the pleading of the royal couple that he returned. This is rather curious behavior from someone who was "power mad." In fact, twice, Rasputin packed up to leave for his native land but was enticed back by Alexandra who clearly needed Rasputin to soothe the Tsarevich. Consulting eyewitnesses, there is no evidence that Rasputin had any political agenda whatsoever.

However, he was close to the royal family, but this should not be exaggerated. He was far from a perennial presence, but it did not take long for Rasputin to make enemies. The first sin he committed was to foil an assassination attempt on the heir to the throne. Apparently, several members of the palace nobility were ordering one of Alexei's nurses to rub a certain powder on his rectum. The nurse was told that this was a medication brought back from the Middle East to treat Alexei's condition. Rasputin, suspicious, asked that it be analyzed, only to discover that it was poison. As soon as this concoction was no longer applied, the Tsarevich's illness disappeared (Judas, 102-103). There is no question after this, in Rasputin's mind, that there was a cabal in the palace against the young heir. Rasputin's days were numbered, and he knew it. But it was this incident that sealed the bond of trust between the royal family and Rasputin.

It didn't help matters when a certain Prince Felix Yusapov approached Rasputin, asking him to intercede with the royal family for the oldest Romanov daughter's hand. Rasputin, after being offered a bribe, refused. Eventually the story began to circulate,

and Prince Yusapov moved to England to avoid further embarrassment. From there, Yusapov began to circulate stories about Rasputin in the English press. Among his accusations was that Rasputin was a Jew, that he had an out-of-control libido and that he was an alcoholic. From this time on (about 1909), the stories about Rasputin began to circulate with fervor. Always looking for something, anything, to discredit a rapidly growing Russia, the British press put this garbage on the front page.

Returning to the EIC, it reads concerning Rasputin:

This testimonial delivered to Mikhail M. Lebikov certifies that not a single indication of Rasputin's political activity was disclosed by the [EIC]. The inquiry was intensive, but it was definitely established that his influence was only in the profound religious sentiments of their majesties. The only favor Rasputin accepted was the rental of his house, paid by the personal chancellor of his majesty. He also accepted presents made by the hands of the imperial family such as shirts, waist-bands, etc. That Rasputin had no connection with any foreign authorities [is established]. *That all pamphlets and newspaper articles on the subject of Rasputin's influence and other rumors and gossip were fabricated by powerful enemies of the Emperor.* This statement is given under the signature and seal of the Attorney General of the High Commission (Quoted from Judas, 189, emphasis added).

This paragraph alone means that the history of early 20th-century Russia needs to be rewritten. That "newspaper articles" were fabricated is a potent admission by such a body, since it means that this was a normal way for important political issues to be described by the press. What else was fabricated by powerful forces?

It is normally told that Rasputin was killed after nearly every conceivable form of killing had failed: from poison to bullets to drowning to beatings. Rasputin was murdered by a group known as the "Mad Gang," a group of extremely high ranking but also very amoral nobles and politicians who sought the eventual overthrow of Nicholas (and the monarchy in general) and their

own installation in power, among whom was Duma president Rodzianko, Vladimir Purishkevich and Prince Yusipov.

Apparently, according to later police reports, Rasputin was aware of the reason the liberal Prince Yusipov wanted him at his house, though the cover story was to pray for his ailing wife. In several confessions from Yusipov, he said that he first wanted to poison Rasputin, but he refused to eat the cakes especially prepared for him, nor drink the wine, all of which was poisoned. Eventually, he simply shot Rasputin and eventually dumped his body into the river Neva, where, according to the autopsy, he died of drowning. It was a rather quick affair, bereft of the drawn-out will to live so popular among cinematographers.

Much of the upper nobility in St. Petersburg was frankly being converted to liberalism as the 20th century got started. Many of them resented the traditionalism of the emperor (though a traditionalism strongly tinged with practical good sense), and certainly, the presence of an “uneducated hick” at court. It might be mentioned that Rasputin was not uneducated, though he certainly had strong peasant roots. He appeared only when Alexis needed him and very rarely at other times. He was not a perennial sight there.

Many of the nobility threw their weight behind the liberal reformers, and, slowly but surely, the upper reaches of the nobility were turning against Nicholas. The emperor was surrounded by turncoats and traitors, each viewing himself as the future president of a republican Russia, or even as the next emperor. It reached a point where, except for a few trusted intimates, Nicholas was unsure who he could trust. Ultimately, it was Rasputin and Alexandra.

Significantly, Dr. Judas reports many of the spiritual teachings of Rasputin. He never sought disciples, but he certainly attracted them, and one of his most ardent was the author. Now, here is where things get sticky. Though there is no direct evidence that Rasputin was ever a member of one of the small sects that dotted the Russian landscape, some of his teachings are eccentric in the context of Russian Orthodoxy, a view the royal family

was certain he espoused.

In short, this book is a well-done revisionist understanding of Rasputin from one of his ardent supporters and disciples. There is every reason to believe her most important points about the man and his enemies, largely because they derive solely from eyewitnesses and police reports. For this reason alone, it is an extremely important book. It will not be taken seriously by scholars in "Russia studies," for it proves one of the major points made by monarchists, then and now: that the nobility in St. Petersburg was anti-royalist and viewed "parliamentary democracy" as merely a means to gain power under the ubiquitous slogan of "human rights." Dr. Judas clearly, and through firsthand accounts solely, bears this age-old contention out. The peasants were right after all: The Tsar was good, his bureaucrats and nobles, bad. This refrain is to be found in peasant folk songs and dances from the 15th century onward, and Dr. Judas shows they were not too far off.

The police were not of one mind on Rasputin. For example, officer N. Prilina stated that Rasputin was always sober (January 4, 1910). There is a theory that Rasputin was hired to heal the schism with the Old Believers. The murder of Rasputin was to be the first stage in a revolutionary coup. Rasputin was a means to "desacrilize" the monarchy without attacking it directly. His Eminence, Archbishop Ambrose (Schurov) in 2002 at the Royal Orthodox Conference held in Ivanovo on May 18, said: "Rasputin suffered many attacks from the enemies of Russia. The press created a hatred of the crown so as to cast a shadow on the royal family" (quoted from Platonov, 1996).

Three saintly elders at the time, Jerome (Verendyakin), Kirill (Pavlov) and Nicholas (Guryanov), all revered Rasputin for his righteous behavior. However, the first attack on Rasputin, printed in 1910, came from the Supreme Council of the Russian Freemasonry through its organs *Slovo* and the *Russian Word*. Masons VA Maklakov, IV Gessen, M. Vinaver and twin brothers princes Dolgorukys were its owners and backers. B.I. Nicholas's book *Russian Freemasons and the Revolution* strongly implicates the Su-

preme Council of Russian Freemasonry as a major player in the fight against the crown using Rasputin (Platonov, 2006).

M.V. Rodzianko, the chair of the Duma, admitted that it was the Masonic congress in Brussels that led him to begin attacking Rasputin (Rodzianko, 1990). A newly published version of his memoirs affirms the role of the Lodges. It should be noted that the Russian Baptist J.S. Prokhanov stated that with Rasputin gone, the “Reformation of Russia” can proceed (Multatuli, 2011).

The English wanted to see the Tsar overthrown, as Russia was quickly becoming the most important threat to global British dominance. The BBC aired a documentary in 2007 called *Killing Rasputin*, suggesting that a member of the MI6 killed him. According to the press service of the BBC, retired Scotland Yard inspector Richard Cullen and historian Andrew Cook conducted a new study of the death of Rasputin. They found that Rasputin was most likely killed by an agent of the British Secret Intelligence Bureau (then known as the Secret Intelligence Service MI6), Oswald Rayner, who was then working at the imperial court in St. Petersburg. Masonic Provisional Government not only immediately after his accession to power destroyed the tomb and remains of Rasputin, but also created a special commission of inquiry, to witness the sabotage activities of Rasputin’s Russia.

Andrew Cook said that Cullen studied the official medical documents about the death of Rasputin, postmortem photographs of his body and the crime scene. Attentive British investigators saw a bullet-hole in the center of the forehead, one clearly seen in postmortem photographs. He was shot with some skill from a short distance. Certainly, being an opponent of the war, England desperately needed Rasputin out of the way and his reputation destroyed:

Although Rasputin is constantly accused of debauchery—wrote A. Vyubova—it seems strange that when I started my role on commission of inquiry, there was not a single woman in St. Petersburg, or in Russia, who would make accusations against him. ... A photograph was found

that appeared that he had finished lunch or dinner. There was a table with food residues, unfinished glasses which then depicted Rasputin and some priest with some laughing women. Behind them there was a band that gave the impression of revelry. On closer study, this picture shows that the two male figures were etched: one between Rasputin and standing beside him as a nurse, and another between the priest and standing next to him a lady. Later it turned out that the picture was taken in the hospital after breakfast. (Abbot Seraphim, Orthodox Tsar-Martyr, Spiritual Mission, Beijing, 1920).

Another investigator of the ECI, V.M. Rudnev, exposed yet another myth about the alleged wealth of the man. It turned out that after his death there was not a penny in savings. He was poor. His friends stated to the commission that Rasputin was not a heavy drinker. In fact, the only time anyone observed him drinking was during any travel, and the drink was some sort of sweet wine. He fully supported Nicholas's decision to ban alcohol during the war. In 1910, the police tail in Siberia observed him in his own village totally sober all the time.

The Special Investigation Committee also peered into his alleged mistresses and orgies. Vladimir Rudnev headed this part of the Commission, and his final report notes that no reliable witnesses could be produced that showed any of this to be true. In fact, the main "mistress," Anna Vyrubova, was specially examined and was found to still be virginal.

Rasputin's contemporaries said that the empress and Rasputin controlled Russia together at the expense of Nicholas and "the people." Many who actually knew Rasputin said that he had no interest in politics and did not seek power. Vladimir Rudnev, again working for the commission, interviewed many witnesses and could not find any clear reference to any sort of "control" over political life or the court.

Bishop Alexis of Tobolsk, formerly the Exarch of Georgia, thoroughly studied the investigative file of Gregory from this same Provisional Government inquiry. He went to Tyumen in order to

interview others who knew Rasputin. The bishop came back with no evidence that Rasputin was a sectarian, and, in addition, established that he was a firmly grounded Orthodox monk.

In addition to his personal impressions according to this case, Alexis interviewed the clergy and council of Intercession Church in Tyumen. He was informed that there was little sectarian activity in the region and the property owned by Rasputin's family was never known to be anything other than Orthodox. As a form of expiation for the slander of Rasputin, the bishop then donated 500 rubles for the construction of the temple in the village, a new gold altar cross 84% solid gold, four silver gilded lamps and a large golden table to house the icon of Christ.

This sort of evidence throws a very different light over the Rasputin issue. The English saw the Russians as their greatest threat, especially after the expansion of the Baku oilfields. Rasputin was a thin end of a wedge forged by the old nobility who demanded power at the expense of tradition, the crown, the people and the church they had long abandoned. Attacks on Rasputin would delegitimize the monarchy, which would bring an oligarchy to power easily tempted by the massive wealth of the Bank of England.

Rasputin had little effect on policy, was not particularly close to the royal family (except where the Tsarevich was concerned) and was not a drunk, a womanizer or a sectarian. These are carefully stage-managed slogans of a global ruling class just beginning to exercise its power. "Backward" regimes like Russia needed to "get with the times" and go into debt with London. That, after all, was the "rational" way to finance growth. Russia had found another way, and this was intolerable. Rasputin was one prong in a well-financed strategic attack on Tsarist Russia that was poised to rule an entire continent.



Caption: 40 words.

CHAPTER THREE



THE ALLIED INTERVENTION IN THE RUSSIAN CIVIL WAR

The Myth of Western Anti-Communism

The White armies in the Russian Civil War received not a cent from the West. Not a shell, not a rifle reached any faction of the White forces from the West. The West was not anti-Bolshevik.

Furthermore, the Western powers actively supported the Red forces during and after the Civil War. While the Western financial and technical support for the building of socialism has been treated in another paper, it begins with the subject of this one: the Western backing of the Red forces consistently from 1918-1921. The sole and exclusive reason for Western intervention was to ensure that no aid would ever be given to Germany from Russia and that assets owned by Western powers would not fall into the hands of Germany.

Henry Wickham Steed of *The London Times*, wrote about Colonel Edward House, the main adviser to Woodrow Wilson:

That day Colonel House asked me to call upon him. I found him worried both by my criticism of any recognition of the Bolsheviks and by the certainty, which he had not previously realized, that if the President were to recognize

the Bolsheviks in return for commercial concessions his whole "idealism" would be hopelessly compromised as commercialism in disguise. I pointed out to him that not only would Wilson be utterly discredited but that the League of Nations would go by the board, because all the small peoples and many of the big peoples of Europe would be unable to resist the Bolshevism which Wilson would have accredited (quoted from Bolton, 2010).

General William Graves was the commander of American forces in Siberia and a firm backer of the Red cause. In an excellent article on the subject, Kerry Bolton states that Graves and many others actively sought to destroy the White movement. He refused to deliver 14,000 rifles ordered and paid for by Kolchak. Another 15,000 rifles were blocked from the White Cossack forces by this same general. Most of all, Graves, in full communication with the economic elite in the US, had the Japanese stand down from their attacks on Red forces in the east.

In November of 1918, the Allies signed an agreement with the Reds for full support in exchange for financial concessions. While the Allies initially sought only Russia's continual action in the war, their attention soon wandered. Once the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed, the West permitted the Reds to re-organize old Russian debts, open Russia to world grain markets and, as the treaty stipulated, hand over the more industrialized parts of Russia's West. Kolchak countered by also accepting old debts, initiating a Constituent Assembly and guaranteeing the independence of Poland. It was rejected. The famed White General Denikin refused to sell off Russia in exchange for aid sealed his defeat (Foglesong, 2011).

Both Woodrow Wilson and British Prime Minister Lloyd George recognized Trotsky as the "legitimate" Russian government. Since the Red was the only alternative to the "Tsarist Whites," they were recognized. George stated that a unified Russia would be the "greatest threat" to the British empire. Gen. Denikin states in his memoirs that their sole source of supplies were those taken after Red defeats. Red officers had regular salaries and a

full staff, strongly suggesting Western aid (Gardner, 1976).

The mission of William Bullitt, the chief negotiator at the Paris Peace conference and first ambassador to the USSR, led to an agreement with Lenin and, as always, a total rejection of the Whites. The memorandum asked for the lifting of all embargoes on the Soviet government and for its immediate recognition. Full free trade with the Soviets was also demanded, with the final and most important proviso that all debts to the West be paid (Thompson, 1966). Western newspapers spoke harshly of the Whites, equating them with landlords and "reactionaries," something coming from Bolshevik propaganda. Great Britain sank the Black Sea Fleet while the French, in the memoirs of Kolchak, fought the Volunteer Army. Yet, even with their shortages of ammunition and basic supplies, the White armies fought the Reds to a standstill and began routing them by the Spring of 1919. However, the West had made up its mind. Kolchak had to go (Bolton, 2011).

The White armies during the Civil War confuse many. The common myths are that they were royalist and served the "landlord" class. Few royalists were part of the White forces, and the "landlord" class were the peasants themselves, who by the start of the war owned almost 95% of all Russian land. A false conservative-radical dichotomy is drawn. The Whites were largely loyal to Kerensky and the Assembly. They were hostile to Cossack autonomy and Ukrainian separatism. The "unified Great Russia" was one of the few slogans they all agreed upon.

General Graves was a spokesman for the American ruling class. His work on the situation at the time shows not only his support of Bolshevism, but that of the U.S. government. Few had any idea what "Bolshevism" was.

About as many knew what "Marxism" was. Today, educated people have a vague idea of these concepts. Back then, it was just as dark and void as the rest of Russian life. Graves writes in his memoirs about what he wrote to the State Department about Admiral Kolchak:

The Kolchak Government cannot possibly stand and if the Allies support him they will make the greatest mistake in history. The Government is divided into two distinct parts, one issues proclamation and propaganda for foreign consumption stating that the Government favors and works for a constituent assembly, other part secretly plans and plots a restoration of monarchy. This is perceptible only to those who are part of the Government. It is a hypocritical government which attempts to convince the peasants that their cause is being fostered and yet looks for the psychological moment to restore monarchy. Kolchak has surrounded himself with old regime officers whose only salvation for future existence depends on restoration of monarchy (Graves, 1941).

None of this was true, and Graves knew it at the time. Immediately upon reading this, one is struck by the fact that insisting on the restoration of monarchy was sufficient to destroy the moral nature of Kolchak's cause in Washington. Second, this alleged desire is only "in secret," so it cannot be verified. Finally, since there is no evidence of such a desire anywhere, the need to impute it to him begs the question.

In 1918, there were three centers of battle:

First, the southwest where the Volunteer army worked with the Cossacks against the purely urban, Jewish Red forces. The newly formed Polish army, Ukrainian Rada militia and the Makhno organization made this the most complex theater of the war. The Polish forces were quite effective, and at a crucial moment where the Red forces would have been destroyed, Pidsulsky turns against the Volunteers and saves Trotsky from destruction. The key moment was the massive war between Wrangel's 350,000 men and Trotsky's 200,000. As Denikin had abandoned the cause and left Russia, the confusion in the high command and the use of Makhno from the rear caused a major White loss. A massive force of 150,000 Whites escaped to the West from Crimea.

Second, the Siberian republic. This was a successful political

unit from 1917 to 1922 under the command of Kolchak. The press, often portrayed as state-controlled, was highly critical of the Whites. Its economic growth was impressive and local governments were active. His military force was equally impressive, consisting of 35,000 Cossacks and 80,000 Japanese. The total force was over 400,000.

Third, the northwest under General Yudenich, including an Estonian army of 10,000. Britain promised him some aid only under the condition that Estonia be declared independent. Britain, however, became the primary enemy of Yudenich's army as it threatened St. Petersburg. The Red government, threatened for the first time, saw total inaction from the British troops at Arkhangelsk.

The problem was that these three centers were commanded by generals of different political opinions and strategies. There was no overarching command in the way Trotsky centralized control over the Red forces. Egos, ideology and attitudes towards the monarchy all created fissures in the White movement of such severity that it can hardly be called a single movement at all.

In the Russian-language work of Valery Shambarov, the condition of the White armies is made clearer. Just prior to the beginning of the Civil War, the Reds emptied the prisons, promising prisoners freedom in exchange for terrorizing the White and local peoples. Crime had been very low under Nicholas II, but soon shot up 500% by 1917.

Contrary to myth, very few of the White officers came from the old nobility, and almost all had no landed property. About 15% of the total had some noble ties or acquired property of any kind. Once Brest was signed, this meant that the Reds were *de facto* allied with Berlin. Britain sought a White-Red alliance to continue the war. When the Whites refused, Britain abandoned them, calling them "extremists" and, worst of all, "nationalists."

In July of 1918, M.A. Morav'yev defected from the Red camp and brought 10,000 men with him. Yekaterinburg fell to the Czechs. Panicked, the Reds sacrificed the Tsar and his family in exchange for the promise of victory from demonic powers. Kap-

pel's men penetrated as far as Kazan, where he captured Russia's gold reserve worth 50 million rubles. Unfortunately, nothing was for sale. With this immense fortune, the West was unwilling to sell weapons to the Whites. Food aid and weapons, not to mention tremendous "loans" from the Schiff clan in New York poured in for the Reds (Shambarov, 1999, original text in Russian).

The Whites never developed a firm chain of command and, even worse, the Cossacks had no interest in integrating with regular White structures. Kornilov sought the possibility of a military government, earning him the eternal hatred of the West. More than anything else, the West rejected the idea of a strong, unified Russia. Anyone promoting this was rejected without consideration.

The White governments had little real power. The staff of the high command was almost non-existent. The Northern Army had roughly 25,000 men with 600 offices. Because of the total lack of Western aid, they were forced to live at the expense of the local population.

The lack of any real identity or ideology of the White movement was one of the essential flaws in it and a major cause for its defeat. Part of this was made possible by the dogmatic belief that a "Constituent Assembly" would be called upon the defeat of the Reds and all pressing social problems would then be addressed. In the meantime, only the military situation mattered.

The urban wealthy were almost to a man dedicated to the Social Democrats and Kerensky. This included the oligarchs Lv'iv, Guchkov, Ryanbushinsky, Konovalov and Tereshchenko and, once Kornilov rejected Kerensky, these elites rejected the White Armies.

The West blocked all White radio transmissions to the public and the Red forces had miraculous recoveries after each defeat. Both Kolchak and Denikin realized that any aid from the West meant the sale of Russia and the plundering of her natural resources. Trotsky was willing to do this at the behest of his banking contacts. The Whites would not. The result was the comment of William Bullitt, head of U.S. intelligence in St. Petersburg,

that Trotsky was “our man” in Russia. The French assistant military attaché in Russia, Captain Jaques Sadoul, was firmly in Trotsky’s camp (Munholland, 1981). He was also a founder of the International and a communist. Eventually, he tired of this intellectual fad and abandoned the ideology in 1919.

Herbert Hoover saved the fledgling USSR with generous food aid while American companies developed the first five-year plan for the Soviet Union. In 1917, declassified papers from the U.S. Department of State clearly demand that American media outlets stop referring to the Reds as “enemies.”

In Ukraine, the sole hope for stability was the Cossack Chief-tain Pavel Skoropadsky (1873-1945). Universally rejected by Western historians, his record was impressive. Though ruling only from April to November of 1918, the Reds feared him, and Petliura, a high-level occultist and a member of the same Lodge as Trotsky, was mobilized to fight him. Skoropadsky was pro-Russian but did not believe in being a part of the empire. In his short reign he reformed the armed services, limited land ownership, clipped the landlord class and lowered taxes. Achieving recognition from the Vatican, Austria, Denmark and more than 30 states, Ukrainian independence had finally become the norm worldwide. Suspiciously, the “Ukrainian nationalist” movement fought him (cf Sagaydak, 2011).

The Hetman was supported by Bishop Nikodemus, labor and the peasantry in general. Imitating the policy of Emperor Alexander III, he chartered the peasant land bank, making it easier to buy or reclaim land. Each peasant family was assured a minimum of 25 hectares that no debt could remove. Grain prices were fixed so as to avoid market fluctuations. Domestic demand was given priority and hard currency was earned with about 35 percent of all grain exported. Yet this miracle, an independent Ukraine in close union with Russia, was intolerable.

Skoropadsky is the unsung hero of the White idea. Dismissed with almost no consideration by Western historians, he proved himself a political genius under the worst of circumstances. Liberal constitutionalism was a suicide pact under the unsettled

conditions of war, moral degeneracy and foreign occupation. As Pavel was a distant relative of the Hetman Ivan Skoropadsky (1646-1722), it is fair to say that the Hetmanate had been legitimately restored with his accession.

With almost no money, he succeeded in creating eight army corps of competent fighting strength. Strangely, the Rada state failed to even begin this process. The socialists, not even approaching the fairness of the Hetman's land policy (even in theory) launched a war against him. This same group that refused to create a military force under the Rada suddenly had the ability to field an army against the Hetman (Kaganets, 2007).

Within Austria-Hungary, the Hetman had multinational and multi-confessional support. The German army was in negotiations with the moderate left as the Hetman took over and had no interest in supporting Skoropadsky. At the time, his enemies said that England, not Germany, was his sponsor. His opponents approached Germany to fight the Hetman, not support him. His land reform was to benefit small landholders, a group he considered to be essential to rebuilding. He was in the process of putting together a representative ruling council at the time of his absurd dethroning (Kalynchuk, 2013).

The artificial and forced nature of the socialist and "nationalist" opposition to Skoropadsky was such as to bring them to levels of absurdity. He advocated gradual Ukrainization of the military and government services. This was ignored by Petliura. His cabinet contained such luminaries as Doroshenko, Kistakovsky, Nauhenko and Stebnytska, but all of this was deemed insufficiently Ukrainian (as Petliura made an alliance with Poland).

During his short reign, his moderate pro-Ukrainian stance converted many Russians nationals living on the territory. Ukrainian independence, achieved both *de facto* and *de jure* by Skoropadsky, was permanently destroyed upon his overthrow. Vasylypkyvsky and the Hetman were allies, and he successfully mediated a reconciliation of the UAOC and the ROC on his territory. He sought a fully autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church with its own patriarch. His successes were so sudden and so sig-

nificant that he even received Uniat support, given that he was the best hope for stability in the region in Vienna's opinion. Living in Germany after the war, Skoropadsky refused all offers to cooperate with Hitler's government. He was a man of rare principle in a violent and unsettled age. There is no excuse for the awful treatment this man has received from historians, and the attacks on him from Petliura and the Poles should strongly place his support for Ukrainian independence in doubt.

It goes without saying that, in the West, all myths created by the Red forces about the Hetman were believed without criticism. Without regard to any facts, he was referred to as a German partisan and hence totally impossible for the Allies to support. A strong Ukraine, anti-communist yet independently pro-Russian, would have been an immense help to the anti-communist cause.

The West did everything in its power to ensure the Red takeover of Russia. It had its tentacles into the major banking houses in New York thanks to Trotsky. It was an atheist and thus materialist movement that saw men as nothing more than matter in motion; hence, mass killing had no clear or obvious sanction against it. The Red armies were falling apart in 1918, Skoropadsky was creating a prosperous Ukrainian government in Kiev and Kappel had a fortune that could maintain the White forces indefinitely. None of this assisted the Whites (Bunyan, 1976).

The American financial community demanded a centralized, materialist and Jewish Russia and this they received. Today, Vladimir Putin is threatened with World War III on a daily basis. Sanctions seek to strangle the Russian economy. This is because Putin is a nationalist. Nothing like this was ever imposed on the USSR. Nationalism, especially the nationalism of a country as large as Russia, was the primary enemy of the banking elite then and now. This is the sole reason the Reds won the Civil War and had the liquidity and investment to continue in power once it was granted to them. There is no farce more saddening than the history being written for pay in American universities.



Karaullov caption: 50 words

CHAPTER FOUR



GEN. PYOTR NIKOLAEVICH KRASNOV & ATAMAN MIKHAIL KARAULOV

The Doctrine of Cossack National Socialism During the Russian Civil War

The Russian and Ukrainian people lived under a Judaic, faux-socialist government for many decades. The result is an anti-communist literature the establishment has been suppressing for years. Some of the best nationalist, national socialist and traditionalist ideas remain untranslated and even unknown to Russia specialists in the thought-control universities. This article features some of the work of General Pyotr Nikolaevich Krasnov, the Ataman (warrior monarch) of the Don Cossack Host during the Russian Civil War. A firm social nationalist, his writings come from the heart of one whose life was on the line: not just his own, but civilization as a whole. He was a veteran of World War I and was used by the Provisional Government to stop the Bolshevik coup that led to the Civil War. The Kerensky-Krasnov Uprising was an effort by Alexander Kerensky to regain political control after the infamous coup.



Krasnov Caption: 50 words

Once the coup was successful, Kerensky appointed Krasnov to destroy the Reds and retake Petrograd. Unsuccessful due to Allied support for the Reds, the Provisional Government was no more. Kerensky went into exile and political oblivion.

For his part, Krasnov fled to Germany where he founded the Brotherhood of Russian Truth, serving as both a guerrilla network within Russia as well as a foreign publishing house telling the world about the nature of the Red forces. He wrote continually in both fictional and non-fictional styles for the rest of his life.

As World War II neared, Krasnov saw Germany as the last hope for Russia. Rejecting the organization of General Vlasov, he maintained his support for the German invaders acting as a guerrilla army against Soviet regulars and irregular partisans in the countryside. Operation Keelhaul, the single most egregious display of slavish support for Stalin by the Allies, sent Krasnov back to the USSR. He was sentenced to death by a military court for his actions, and he was executed in January of 1947.

Krasnov died a committed Orthodox Cossack and National Socialist. His legacy is one of cutting insight, his doctrine of resistance to the Reds and his defense of Old Russia. He was a literal martyr to Russian Orthodox civilization and fought to the death against the same forces that have destroyed Western civilization as well.

His counterpart in the Terek Cossack camp was Ataman Mikhail Karaulov, whose doctrine differed slightly from Krasnov, but was substantially similar. The Terek Cossacks initially were Ossetians, but very Orthodox religiously. Both camps caused the Reds endless trouble. Their well-known combat technique specialized in being always outnumbered, so guerrilla tactics, secrecy and surprise were and are a large part of their martial legacy.

Karaulov was from a wealthy family, making him quite different from Krasnov. He served as a royalist deputy in the last (or fourth) Duma under Emperor Nicholas II. His political views were more detailed, and his mission was more "party-oriented" than the more artistic Krasnov. Their similarities, however, far outweigh their differences.

Both men believed in a separate Cossack identity within Russia. They both saw Bolshevism as Jewish. Krasnov lived longer than his Terek counterpart and was a full supporter of the Third Reich up until his death right after the war. On the other hand, Karaulov was killed by leftist assassins in 1917. It should surprise no one that not even specialists in this field have ever heard of these two writers and soldiers. Their political vision was fully social nationalist and, with Karaulov, strongly anarchist, which is a strong tendency among Cossacks in general. Orthodox Christian anarchism was important in the White war against the Reds, with Sts. Andrei, Bishop of Ufa and Valentin Svetsitsky developing such a view.

General Krasnov wrote the following in 1927:

The Bolsheviks, with the ideas of Karl Marx, seek to replace the national principle with the class struggle. They believe that class consciousness plays a far greater role in history than the national. To prove this, they shamelessly manipulate the data of experience. Detailed evidence of the falsity of such statements would lead us too far astray. Note one thing: economic materialism as a comprehensive interpretation of history and is the basis of Marx's teaching. It has failed to make sense out of the world; Marx takes one part of what is happening in human social life and makes it the entire process, thus excluding from its field of view of vast areas of life that are non-economic. There is no doubt that in the modern era capitalism internationalized the world' class struggle becomes essential. But we can say with certainty that class is not enough incentive to move the masses to struggle against any external enemy. Bolsheviks themselves clearly demonstrated the inadequacy already in 1920 during the war with Poland. Lenin had to appeal to Patriarch Tikhon and General Brusilov to make this fight a national character (Krasnov, 1927).

This is an essential doctrinal statement. The point is that capitalism has forced the entire world to see reality through the prism of money. Everything is standardized under its rule. For

this reason, the Marxist analysis is correct about modern oligarchs. The problem is that they refuse to see the ethnic and religious components of experience. Rather than being a “social science,” leftism in general is a superstitious prejudice that makes an idol out of money’s power. He continues:

If we carefully look at the course of world history, we easily see that the emergence of forms of human social collectives corresponds (in its highest development) with national social life. In the ancient and medieval eras we find civic associations. These societies certainly were created without the “masses” because only with the invention of printing could a broad communication among people exist without the need for close proximity. The full development of civil society was only possible from the time of the French Revolution, which caused an extraordinary growth of the press. The development of technology which has given the means of rapid and extensive communications such as railways, ships, cars, telegraph, mail, and now aircraft, has also given in the 19th and 20th centuries the impetus to an intensive development of civic associations in all areas. The role and the penetration of this form of association in great cultural states can move the mass into a real society (Krasnov, 1927).

Here, Krasnov states that the truly national forms of life were only possible when modernity made mass communication and mass media a reality. While ethnic claims and nationalist discourse were common in Ukraine, Russia, Poland, Ireland and Scotland in the middle ages, the claim here is that its full political potential was only unleashed when technology developed such that communications among all nationals was made very easy. Hence, he argues eccentrically that nationalism, while always in existence, was only possible fully in the modern world. It is the end of history in terms of political ideas.

Krasnov, in this same vein, was interested in the creation of “crowds,” that is “masses” that can be manipulated. On the one hand, he saw its positive manifestation as the state mobilized

the people for nationalist goals. On the other, it can be used to destroy peoples as well.

Typical signs of a psychological crowd is its susceptibility to suggestion and ease of imitation. To live and act under the influence of suggestion, as a hypnotic, does not require the direct influence of the hypnotist. Modern culture makes it possible to influence the feelings of people in myriad ways. Leaflets, newspapers, books, meetings, debates, theater, cinema, wireless telegraph—all this has expanded the concept of the mass and has “massified” human life. ... Fashion enslaves man. Fashion makes him lose sight of true beauty, neglect social hygiene and acquire disease. Fashion owns humanity. Almost the whole world is dressed in the jacket and tie—representing the gallows—while they forget the beauty of the national costume. ... Fashion has captured the theater and the arts—fashion has become the disease of the century (Krasnov, 1927).

It is clear that he is not defending mass society, but rather condemns it. While mass communication has great potential, it is being misused to dumb-down Western peoples. Solzhenitsyn was to make an identical claim several decades later. Concerning Russian Cossacks in particular, he writes in 1922:

Today, Russia is not monolithic. It was, with nobles and peasants, all serving God, before the war of 1812. Today, next to the peasants has arisen a huge army of urban workers. This is a whole class of people who do not have any property; this is the proletariat. Modern peasants and workers, the proletariat, all have the usual characteristics of psychological crowds: imitative, easily suggestible, irritable and impulsive (Krasnov, 1922).

Modernity did not bring progress. Mass society showed that the existence of mass communication was, to say the least, a mixed blessing. When people are severed from the land and herded into the cities during industrialization, they lose themselves. The city is the destroyer; it recognizes only money and

social pretense. They lose themselves ethnically and religiously because they are almost physically attached to inhuman factory conditions serving only for the profit of the elite. They become machines themselves.

The Cossacks were and are an antidote to this mechanization. He writes: But never, throughout a little over four hundred years of its existence, the Cossacks did not consider themselves and not think otherwise than with undivided Russia. ... The Cossacks have always sought, however, to keep their old Russian customs, their ancient liberties. The heavy hand of Russian central power aspired to such an extent to centralize all that in places like Novocherkassk one could not put on the street lamps without permission from Petersburg. This they rejected. They are often riled up against rulers who were trying to curtail traditional Cossack liberties (Krasnov, 1922).

Cossacks are not strictly Russians. They are Russian royalists and nationalists, but remain a separate, autonomous political community within the empire. State centralization is the political form of mechanization. Just as the machine strips man of his humanity and identity, the state, when insisting that all social life be politicized, destroys both regional and national identities. It rules either in its own interests or those who finance it. In the above passage, he is referring to the destruction of the Cossack *Sich* (or a guarded and inaccessible fortress) by Catherine II (the Great) who sought to centralize the Russian empire in Petrograd. Unfortunately, the emperors of the 19th century did not undo this crime.

Before his death from the American Operation Keelhaul, Krasnov wrote his final letter from Lefortovo Prison. There, he was executed with Gen. AG Shkuro, Sultan Giray Klich and several other White military leaders. Krasnov's grandnephew Nicholas Krasnov preserved his final testament to the world. Nicholas Krasnov's papers contained a copy of this final Testament.

Written just days before his execution from the dungeons of the KGB, the Cossack wrote:

... If you survive, fulfill my will: Describe all that you will experience; all you see, hear, and about all you meet. Describe how it was. ... Do not lie! Write the truth even if it will prick someone's eyes. The bitter truth is always more valuable than a sweet lie. ... Now, to deal with the Reds we need other means, and not only words. ... Whatever happens, do not dare hate Russia. No, it is not the Russian people who are the perpetrators of this immense suffering. No, it is not from the Russians this misfortune has sprung. Treason was the cause. It is not enough to love your homeland; those who love her were also required to protect her. They can kill millions of us, millions more will replace us. They will not destroy us. ... The resurrection of Russia will take place gradually. Not right away. This vast body cannot recover so quickly. ... Now, let's say goodbye, grandson. ... I am sorry, there is nothing here to bless you with; I have no cross, no icons. All were taken. Let me give you cross over in the Name of the Lord. Before it saves you.

Goodbye, Kolyunok! ... Do not think badly of me! Do not let this offend you. We are poor but still have a great responsibility. ... Goodbye! (from Nazarov, 2006).

He ended his resistance, not with despair, but with hope. Truly, Russia bled for decades, but such a great people will not be destroyed thereby. Treason, the enemy within, is the eternal problem. The Reds and their allies in the West have nothing to do with Russia. Russia is an indestructible idea rather than a place, and she will recover. That prediction has certainly come true.

Mikhail Karaulov (1878-1917) laid out the "democratic royalist" idea of his own band of Cossacks. He was elected to the Fourth Duma in Petrograd where he defended the monarchy (Smele, 2015: 552). He formed the Cossack Party defending their own vision of the royalist state. He stated:

Russia should be both democratic and royalist (that is, a state in which all citizens are equal in their rights before the law are protected) and headed by a hereditary emperor. Managing the state needs to be on the basis of clear and certain laws and being bearing the idea of justice and re-

affirming the state as its primary promoter. Laws should be passed by the emperor as well as Duma members and the State council. The cabinet should be appointed by the Emperor. ... The State Duma is to get control over foreign policy (Karaulov, 1907).

Basic democratic freedoms such as speech and religion are advocated. As far as national rights, he wrote that "each Russian nation has the right to national (but not political) independence: as the forced merger of nationalities (e.g., Russification or Germanization) is unacceptable."

National independence means that the regions of Russia (such as Ukraine or the Tartars) have full control over domestic policy, but in terms of foreign policy, they are part of the Russian empire. Empires are not nation-states. Empires are less centralized than states. Under the monarchy, Poland and Finland had their own constitutions. This is consistent with national independence, but in making alliances with foreign powers, that was far too high a risk to take.

In this vein, he writes: "Every area should have a broad self-government for the educational and economic issues (income, expenses, school, forestry, road building etc.). Organs of local government (regional or provincial, the Assembly of Representatives) shall have the right to budget due to local needs."

In economics, he wrote that "all the natural wealth of Russia exists for the local population. They offer opportunities for Russians, not foreign capital. Russia for the Russians!" This approach to democracy is far more representative of the working people than free international trade.

In terms of landownership, his views are original:

The land should not be nationalized, but brought under regional control. The wide municipalization of landownership should be brought to the individual regions, that is, placed in the hands of the population related by common origin, a common history and common, of course, economic conditions. A farmer in Arkhangelsk has nothing to do with inhabitant of the southern Russian provinces; and this belief

is evident in the population. The main thing is to guard against the destruction of the community, one with regional features but under the crown (Karaulov, 2007).

The democratic nature of the Cossacks was formed when all those who wanted to get rid of the tyranny of the nobles, those who longed for a free life, joined the Cossack Host.

General equality prevailed based on a courageous brotherhood. ... We must also not forget that the 16th century centralization of the Russian state in the Northeast also destroyed the free assembly of the Russian land in Novgorod, Pskov and elsewhere. Of course, the residents of these areas sought in the Cossack communities that same order ... neither the freedom nor equality of the Host changes the Cossack loyalty to the Russian monarch and does not change the Cossack defense of its natural sovereign (Karaulov, 2007).

This sort of regional identity is essential to the notion of Russia as a broad civilization rather than as a nation-state. Orthodox royalism and regionalism are the specific political nature of this civilization that was in the process of being destroyed long before the Reds. This regional identity of the southern Cossacks, the Terek Host, to be exact, is summarized by Karaulov in an earlier essay, "The Russian Cossack":

In front of soldiers who rebelled against the Tatar yoke, as the Falcons, broke free, flew the next heirs and direct descendants of the glorious once great heroes of Holy Russia—Cossacks. And all his subsequent activity Cossacks proved that they are firmly and steadfastly stand for the Faith, Tsar and Fatherland, for the honor and glory of the Cossacks, not yielding an inch of occupied land, not knowing the fear of the formidable enemy, undeterred flow rained blood. And around the world thundered Cossack glory, and to this day it has not faded, and one only the name of the Cossack, as is clearly proved by the example of the last days, makes the hearts of the enemies of the land tremble and Russian Orthodox King (Karaulov, 1916).

In December 1917, Karaulov arrived in Pyatigorsk on army business with a small entourage. A group of soldiers of the 106th Ufa Infantry Regiment (Bolshevik) led by one Zotov, were returning from the Caucasian front. Learning that one of the cars contained the Ataman, they demanded he come out. He refused. A shootout resulted, and Zotov's people dragged Karaulov from the car. They smashed in his head. In typical Red fashion, they sang and danced around his corpse like a trophy.

The legacy of these two men are precisely that of the Cossacks in general: sacrificial public service, strong religious devotion, incredible combat ability, personal inner strength and a devotion to the Russian crown. Like all Cossacks, they did not trust the bureaucracy in Petrograd and rightly saw the monarch as stymied constantly by this professionalized corps of middle-class functionaries.

Unfortunately for some Russian nationalists, most of the Cossack life had been fighting for its independence against Russia. Its main enemy had been the Catholic West, especially Poland, but demanding its autonomous life was a central pillar of the Cossack organization. Both men here pledge loyalty to the Russian crown on the condition that it respect Cossack independence. As a non-state organization with a strict law, they are a nightmare for any state system or empire. Unfortunately, one of the Russian crown's great mistakes was to mistreat Cossack independence over the centuries, especially in the 18th.

Nevertheless, as Russia's existence was at stake during the Civil War, the Cossacks became the very core of the anti-Red forces. The White armies lost precisely because they did not have the ideological unity of the Cossacks. The Whites ranged from the very liberal to the very royalist and everything in between. The Cossacks, as this paper has shown, were very similar in their national-anarchist and socialist vision of life, one that had been lived successfully for centuries.



Caption: 50 words

CHAPTER FIVE



SELF-INDULGENT HISTORICAL MYTHOLOGY

The Fantasy of Josef Stalin's "Anti-Semitic Russian Nationalism"

Almost without exception, American and Western historians paint Stalin as both a "Russian nationalist" and an "anti-Semite." The latter especially is believed without question. Stalin is presented this way because it allowed the Western left to oppose the USSR in good conscience. Nationalism was universally hated by the ruling class from campus anarchists to corporate billionaires. Hence, to recast Stalin as one is to make him non-socialist. Communism as a vague ideology was never a problem in the minds of the U.S. State Department or Western corporate capital. Obviously, since corporate capital built the USSR, socialism was part of the profit structure of American capitalism. Only nationalism was to be fought. Therefore, allowing Stalin to be hated by the left required him to be recast as a nationalist and anti-Semite. As with all American academic dogma, this is false.

The myth has been deliberately created. Jewish writers need the gentiles to believe that Hitler and Stalin were the same, lest

they be forced to admit that Jews in the USSR slaughtered Christians. By claiming that Stalin was anti-Jewish, they can blunt this claim and argue that the Jews were also targeted. The fact is that the USSR was largely Jewish, based far more on Jewish ethnic identity than Marxism (and certainly had nothing to do with labor). Stalin continued this trend and backed Jewish ethnic interests indirectly throughout his life.

STALIN AND THE JEWS

Stalin was a philo-Semite to the core. In his “Reply to an Inquiry of the Jewish News Agency in the United States” in 1931, Stalin wrote:

National and racial chauvinism is a vestige of the misanthropic customs characteristic of the period of cannibalism. Antisemitism, as an extreme form of racial chauvinism, is the most dangerous vestige of cannibalism.

Antisemitism is of advantage to the exploiters as a lightning conductor that deflects the blows aimed by the working people at capitalism. Antisemitism is dangerous for the working people as being a false path that leads them off the right road and lands them in the jungle.

Hence Communists, as consistent internationalists, cannot but be irreconcilable, sworn enemies of Antisemitism. In the U.S.S.R. Antisemitism is punishable with the utmost severity of the law as a phenomenon deeply hostile to the Soviet system. Under U.S.S.R. law active antisemitic persons are liable to the death penalty (*Pravda*, No. 329, November 30, 1936).

This was never eliminated in Stalin’s mind. The struggle against “cosmopolitanism” was due to the fact that Soviet science and culture developed since Peter I in admiration for the West.

Cosmopolitanism in Stalin’s mind refereed to the fact that there was one scientific technique that was universal in scope. For him, there was a socialist and a bourgeois science. This is true as far as it goes but has nothing to do with the Jews. This was one of Stalin’s preoccupations.

Stalin had three wives, all of them Jews. His first wife was Elizabeth Svanidze who bore Jacob. After that, Kadya Allevijah, also Jewish, had Basil and one daughter Svetlana. No one is quite sure how his second wife died. His third was the sister of Lazar Kaganovich, Rosa. It is worth mentioning that Svetlana married four times, three of them Jewish men. Molotov's daughter (herself Jewish from her mother) was engaged to be married to Basil Stalin (Sebag-Montefiore, 2005: 266-269).

Through the purges, Jews remained in control of the Stalinist system. Through 1934 to 1946, the secret police was made up of, ethnically speaking: Jews, 39%; Russians and Ukrainians, 36%; Latvians, Germans, Poles, 14%; others, 12%. Jews made up less than 1% of the Russian population of the day.

Even in absolute numbers, the Jews ... made up the largest group in the leadership of the Stalinist Secret Police. The Russian myth of the "Jewish NKWD" thus had a factual basis. The Nazis, who knew precisely of these facts, used it for their propaganda purposes of the Jewish-Bolshevik terror regime that they felt obligated to destroy (from Petrow and Skorkin, 1999).

While it is true that these numbers changed by the middle of the war, this has more to do with German killings and Soviet disorganization than anything else. Tens of thousands were captured as partisans and commissars, interrogated, and shot by the German *Einsatzgruppen*, who were created to pacify the areas conquered by the Wehrmacht.

Stalin was never an anti-Semite and never spoke in favor of it at any level at all. Throughout his life, Dzhugashvili fought for power in the party and was guided only by personal power interests and not the interests of the Jews or of any other nationality in the country. Even to the end of his life, Stalin did not become a Russian or Georgian nationalist, as evidenced by the destruction of those groups long before.

After the Bolshevik Revolution, about 90% of management positions were occupied by Jews. Therefore, any purge of the

party was automatically a purge of Jewish activists. The Central Committee of the CPSU in March 1939 showed an increase of Jewish representation compared with February 1934. In 1937-1938 there were 29,000 documented arrests by the NKVA, of which Jews were 1%, which is extraordinary given their dominance of the party. In Kevin MacDonald's excellent review of Solzhenitsyn's *200 Years Together*, he summarizes the writer's ideas this way:

Solzhenitsyn shows that there were fewer Jews in the party elite after the purge of Trotsky and his predominantly Jewish followers. However, the purge was "absolutely not anti-Jewish." There remained very powerful Jews, notably Lazar Kaganovich who played such an important role in the mass murders of the period. While comprising less than 1% of the population, Jews were around one-sixth of the Communist Party membership and around 33%–40% of top party positions. Stalin assigned a Jew, Yakovlev-Epshstein, to the top administrative position in charge of collectivization (labeled by Solzhenitsyn "the destruction of the way of life of the people"), and notes several other Jews who worked under him. After listing dozens of Jews with high-level positions throughout the economy, Solzhenitsyn concludes that "Soviet Jews obtained a weighty share of state, industrial, and economic power at all levels of government in the USSR." Similarly, in diplomacy, "Just as in the 1920s, diplomacy attracted a cadre of Jews, so it did through the early and mid-1930s." Indeed, even after the purges, when Molotov took over the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in 1939, he publicly announced during a meeting with diplomatic personnel that he "will deal with the synagogue here," and that he began firing Jews on the very same day (MacDonald, 2010).

The leaders of all the socialist countries of Eastern Europe created after the war were Jewish tyrants created by Stalin. The Romanian head of KP became Orthodox Jewess Ana Pauker, the head of the Czech party was the Jew Rudolf Slansky. The

chief of the Hungarian party became a close friend of Stalin and a Bolshevik internationalist, the Jew Matyas Rakosi (Rosenkrantz). His closest assistants were Zoltan Gera Vaz and Hérault (Singer), also Jews. In Poland, the unofficial dictator became a Jew, Jacob Berman, along with his three henchmen that ran the party, all Jews: Mink, Skryzhevski and Modzelev. Although officially Jews were only 3 percent of the population of Eastern European socialist countries, they took the majority of high-level bureaucratic posts and they became practically a privileged ruling caste.

A third of the Stalin Prize received the Jews in the postwar period. Among them: the writers Samuil Marshak (1942, 1946, 1949, 1951), Ilya Ehrenburg (1942, 1948, 1951), Emmanuel Kazakevich (1948, 1950), Michael Isakovsky (1943, 1949) and others; filmmakers Julius Reisman (1941, 1943, 1946 - twice, 1950, 1952), singer Mark Reizen (1941, 1949, 1951), actor Igor Ilyinsky (1941, 1942, 1951), the composer Dmitri Shostakovich (1941, 1942, 1946 1950, 1952), Reinhold Glier (1946, 1948.1950), the violinist David Oistrakh (1943), cartoonist Boris Efimov (1950, 1951) and many others. This is "Stalinist antisemitism" (Makarov, 2010).

In this regard, Solzhenitsyn writes:

No, the official Soviet atmosphere of 1930s was absolutely free of ill will toward Jews. And until the war, the overwhelming majority of Soviet Jewry sympathized with the Soviet ideology and sided with the Soviet regime." Indeed, he cites a Jewish source noting that "At the end of 1930s, the role of the Jews in the various spheres of the Soviet life reached its apogee for the entire history of the Soviet regime (Quoted from MacDonald, 2010).

The USSR had a decisive voice on the issue of the establishment of the Israeli state in 1948, and it was used again in favor of the Jews. In addition, the Soviet Union was the first country to recognize the new Jewish state and to establish diplomatic relations with it. The Soviet Union was the only country in the

world turns out to be a saving for the military aid to the Jews, not only a huge amount of weapons and military experts and volunteers.

On Stalin's orders, Molotov wrote:

"Our brotherly feelings toward the Jewish people are determined by the fact that they begat the genius and the creator of the ideas of the communist liberation of Mankind," Karl Marx; "that the Jewish people, alongside the most developed nations, brought forth countless prominent scientists, engineers, and artists [that undoubtedly had already manifested itself in the Soviet 1930s, and will be even more manifest in the post-war years], and gave many glorious heroes to the revolutionary struggle ... and in our country they gave and are still giving new, remarkable, and talented leaders and managers in all areas of development and defense of the Cause of Socialism (quoted from Solzhenitsyn, 2002: Chapter XIX).

This was Soviet policy. It was ingrained in the mythos of the entire empire. It is an admission that Soviet Marxism is Jewish and hence, is an ethnic rather than an economic ideology. Solzhenitsyn describes the nature of Soviet political institutions under the purges:

Out of 25 members in the Presidium of the Central Control Commission after the 16th Party Congress (1930), 10 were Jews: A. Solts, "the conscience of the Party" (in the bloodiest years from 1934 to 1938 was assistant to Vyshinsky, the General Prosecutor of the USSR); Z. Belenky (one of the three above-mentioned Belenky brothers); A. Goltsman (who supported Trotsky in the debate on trade unions); ferocious Rozaliya Zemlyachka (Zalkind); M. Kaganovich, another of the brothers; the Chekist Trilisser; the "militant atheist" Yaroslavsky; B. Roizenman; and A.P. Rozengolts, the surviving assistant of Trotsky. If one compares the composition of the party's Central Committee in the 1920s with that in the early 1930s, he would find that it was almost unchanged—both in 1925 as well as after the

16th Party Congress, Jews comprised around 1/6 of the membership. In the upper echelons of the communist party after the 17th Congress in 1934, Jews remained at 1/6 of the membership of the Central Committee; in the Party Control Commission—around 1/3, and a similar proportion in the Revision Commission of the Central Committee. ... Jews made up the same proportion (1/3) of the members of the Commission of the Soviet Control. For five years filled with upheaval (1934-1939) the deputy General Prosecutor of the USSR was Grigory Leplevsky (Solzhenitsyn, 2002: Chapter XIX).

Thus, there was no purge of Jews at all. Stalin's tyranny was not directed at the Jews but was content to permit their utterly improbable dominance in Soviet institutions from cinema to police to the army. In this legend the Jews were self-interested. They sought to create around themselves an aura of the persecuted so as to achieve free immigration to Israel and to make everyone forget about the role of Jews in the revolution and the subsequent management of the country. It is also worth noting that the most faithful ally of Stalin from the beginning of the '20s until his death remained a Jew, Lazar Kaganovich, remaining faithful to him even before his death in 1991. Stalin was a promoter of Jewish interests against the Orthodox people of Russia.

Stalin was anti-Russian, as were all Soviet communists. He was quite systematic and ideological in this. It was not a matter of policy convenience. Stalin's works are available to all in English, yet they are apparently little read. He writes concerning the "heritage" of "Russian dominance" in their own country:

This heritage consists, firstly, in the survivals of dominant-nation chauvinism, which is a reflection of the former privileged position of the Great Russians. These survivals still persist in the minds of our Soviet officials, both central and local; they are entrenched in our state institutions, central and local; they are being reinforced by the "new" Great-Russian chauvinist spirit, which is becoming stronger and stronger owing to the NEP. In practice they find expression

in an arrogantly disdainful and heartlessly bureaucratic attitude on the part of Russian Soviet officials towards the needs and requirements of the national republics. The multi-national Soviet state can only become really durable, and the co-operation of the peoples within it really fraternal, only if these survivals are vigorously and irrevocably eradicated from the practice of our state institutions. Hence, the first immediate task of our Party is vigorously to combat the survivals of Great-Russian chauvinism. National Factors in Party and State Affairs (Stalin, 1923).

Stalin's stupidity is staggering. He struggles as to why Russians would dominate political offices in Russia. Even in their own country they might not be sovereign! Further, how the New Economic Program can be held accountable for "Russian nationalism" (in their own country!) is a mystery. The primary issue in this chilling statement above is that Russians were to be purged and Russian nationalism was banned (as it was in 1921). Nothing in the above quote was ever altered or removed in terms of policy or rhetoric.

At the same time, Stalin's attention was concentrated on a far more extensive and important matter. The first was the case of the Georgian nationalist movement, which was smashed. The second, larger and more significant "Leningrad case" tried several Politburo members, including A.A. Kuznetsov (the military security chief) on charges of "Great Russian chauvinism." This was the eradication of the remnants of the Stalinist military of "patriotism" and "Russian nationalism." The total shot from the charge of "Great Russian chauvinism" were about 2,000 party leaders and many thousands were sent to the camps. Thirteen "doctors" versus thousands of Russian nationalists and yet the mainstream press without exception calls Stalin a "Great Russian nationalist" and "antisemitic."

Stalin also advocated for the slow development of a world state with a single language. At first, the socialist experiment could not hope to see this come about, but it will eventually. Stalin wrote in *Lenin and the National Question* (1929):

It would be a mistake to think that the first stage of the period of the world dictatorship of the proletariat will mark the beginning of the dying away of nations and national languages, the beginning of the formation of one common language. On the contrary, the first stage, during which national oppression will be completely abolished, will be a stage marked by the growth and flourishing of the formerly oppressed nations. ...

Only in the second stage of the period of the world dictatorship of the proletariat, to the extent that a single world socialist economy is built up in place of the world capitalist economy—only in that stage will something in the nature of a common language begin to take shape; for only in that stage will the nations feel the need to have, in addition to their own national languages, a common international language—for convenience of intercourse and of economic, cultural and political cooperation. ...

In the next stage of the period of world dictatorship of the proletariat—when the world socialist system of economy becomes sufficiently consolidated and socialism becomes part and parcel of the life of the peoples, and when practice convinces the nations of the advantages of a common language over national languages—national differences and languages will begin to die away and make room for a world language, common to all nations. Such, in my opinion, is the approximate picture-of the future of nations, a picture of the development-of the nations along the path to their merging in the-future (Stalin, 1929).

Ultimately, socialism would lead to common economic spaces that would, in turn, lead to a single language. Yet, “Stalin scholars” still insist that Stalin be depicted as a “Russian nationalist.” These same people also are aware that, throughout his rule, he was surrounded by a cabinet and Politburo almost 100% Jewish. This does not take away from their thesis that he was “antisemitic.” Genrikh Yagoda, a Jewish nationalist and one of Stalin’s closest murderers, was a long-time Stalin ally. Another, Lazar Kaganovich, is responsible for the slaughter of millions.

Since the West could not tolerate the notion of Jews killing Christians, the academic elite needed to invent the story that the “Jews suffered, too” under Stalin. The truth is that they suffered, as Jews, not at all. They were the most elite and privileged caste in the USSR.

In 1934, according to published statistics, 38.5% of those holding the most senior posts in the Soviet security apparatuses were of Jewish origin. Many of these were purged later, along with thousands of gentiles. They were no purged as Jews. This “antisemite” had almost half his government of Jewish background throughout his tenure. Far more gentiles than Jews were purged (Makarov, 2010 and Solzhenitsyn, 2002).

Leonid Reichman was the NKVD’s chief interrogator, which means in practice, he was the main torturer of Stalin’s “antisemitic” regime. This privileged caste was in positions especially that involved torturing and murdering Christians. Hence, the GULag system and the secret police saw a huge percentage of Jews throughout Stalin’s reign. In Western nations, oddly enough, it is rare to find Jews in these same professions.

Since the first generation of Soviet policemen were almost exclusively Jews, anyone can make it seem like he was attacking Jews as such. Hence, playing on public ignorance and the academic fear of believing the USSR was largely an ethnic enterprise, the Stalin myths continue. Academics publicly stating that the USSR was Jewish will lose their jobs. There is no “maybe” about that.

Connected with his alleged nationalism is the common claim that Stalin ordered the opening of many churches. Like all the other dogmas of the American academic, it is false. Mass executions of the clergy continued until 1943. In 1937-1938, 106,800 priests were murdered, but from 1939-1943, 5,000 total. This counts as the “resurrection of the church” by the American academic. By 1943, only four bishops were left alive (in the mainstream church) out of 200 (Makarov, 2010).

While it is true that Stalin created a tiny “Moscow Patriar-

chate" to counter the Vlasov organization and others, the persecutions continued. In fact, this laughably fraudulent "church organization" was just another, more sophisticated, part of the persecution. However, for the few who remained, the Moscow sect was as close to Orthodoxy as they could hope for.

As for the Soviet church, the pressure on it never ceased. Already in December 1944, the Regime began closing temples so that by 1949, 1,150 parishes were closed along with 16 monasteries. Stalin created the "All-Union Society for dissemination of political and scientific knowledge" in 1947 for the sake of brainwashing Orthodox people. From January 1, 1947 to June 1, 1948, 679 priests were arrested. By the end of Stalin's life he closed about 1,000 temples previously opened during the war.

Stalin's amendment to the Constitution of 1929 was on the prohibition of religious propaganda. This was also included in the Stalin Constitution of 1936, according to which the believers were deprived of the right to "freedom of religious propaganda," while preserving the atheistic propaganda. It was not abolished until his death. Lenin wrote:

It is now and only now, when the hungry localities eat people and roads strewn hundreds, if not thousands, of corpses, we can (and must therefore be!) Carry out the confiscation of church valuables with the most savage and merciless energy and do not stop in front of the suppression of anything resistance (Lenin 1922a).

Stalin continued his policy. Stalin said in a speech:

There were then such eccentrics in our party who thought that Lenin understood the need to fight with the Church only in 1921 (laughter), and before that time, he allegedly did not understand it. This, of course, is nonsense, comrades. Lenin and I understood the need to fight the church well before 1921. The point is to link a broad mass anti-religious campaign with the struggle for the vital interests of the masses and to lead it in such a way that it is understandable by them and soon, supported by them (Makarov, 2010).

Thus, Stalin and Lenin were identical. Not a single surviving order exists that says anything remotely about a revival of the church. Until the end of Stalin's reign neither the Bible and the Gospel nor any other little bit of religious literature was available. The only reason Stalin did not resume with full force the persecution of the church after the war was the onset of the Cold War with the West.

The "Soviet church" had a key and irreplaceable role in the communist propaganda and political influence abroad. That was the sole reason this "Moscow Patriarchate" existed (Makarov, 2010).

Acting as Stalin's PR adviser, FDR wrote to "Uncle Joe" and stated: "The Soviet image in the West would be improved, if they disbanded the Comintern and provided some evidence of religious freedom" (Kalkandjieva, 179). The result was that Stalin ordered his kept bishops to "Create your own Vatican" (ibid). The result was the Patriarchate and the institution called the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church (CAROC). The CAROC was the direct creation of Stalin with no input from any hierarch. Its purpose was to facilitate the connection between the NKVD and the ROC.

The bishop of York at the time was Cyril Garrett, who headed the mission to the USSR. Their reluctance to serve with Orthodox clergy did not come from any rejection of ecumenism, but due to the undying hatred of the English for Russia. However, his subsequent book, *The Truth about Religion in Russia*, was as idiotic as his motives were tainted. He argued that the only reason the church was liquidated in the 1920s was their support for the monarchy.

Now, under Stalin, the church is "reborn." The BBC aired this as well, creating a mini-series that romanticized Stalin as the "religious leader" of the Russian church. The MI6 also beamed it into Eastern Europe so as to prevent any rebellion against Stalin.

Adding greater insult to this farce, the soi-disant Patriarch of Alexandria wrote:

It must not be thought that the restoration of the [Moscow] Holy Synod is a political device imposed by circumstances. On the contrary it is due to an outspoken declaration of the national faith. Long before the dissolution of the Third International the Orthodox Church had assumed its rightful place (Kalkandjieva, 2015: 190)

Soviet documents clearly show that this was written by MI6, who controlled Egypt at the time. It also shows that there was never any “Cold War,” and the West, more often than not, served as the protector of Soviet interests. The emigre synod’s statement, condemned by some “mainline” organizations, was accurate in that it stated this “election” existed only for political purposes. Documents uncovered by Kalkandjieva show they were right. Worse, the entire “mainline” Orthodox world recognized Stalin’s church. This is a crime these jurisdictions refuse to address. Even worse was the fact that these bishops knew they were lying, but the subsidies paid from Moscow to the Middle East were large. It also created an isolated, corrupt clerical elite among the “Orthodox churches” of the Mideast and parts of Europe.

One of the important conduits of Soviet dominance over the other Orthodox sees was Princess Irina of Greece. On April 10, 1945, Stalin met with Patriarch Alexei and laid out a plan for capturing the Orthodox world. Using the “victory over Fascism” was a major part of this movement. In addition, the minutes of this meeting also show how Alexei was to use “canonical arguments” to take all authority away from Constantinople. Due to Stalin’s earlier directive, the “Orthodox Vatican” idea continues to be the Constitution of this abortion.

The CAROC was placed in charge of all efforts to bring “canonical” Orthodoxy over all the churches of the east. This was successful in Transcarpathia, Western Ukraine, Czechoslovakia and, unfortunately, in Poland. Soon, Finland and the Baltics were also to be forced under Moscow.

None of these actions has any canonical validity for many reasons, not the least of which is that it was merely Stalin’s foreign policy only incidentally related to the Church. This means

that the “recognition” of Stalin’s new sect was based almost entirely on financial pressure. Of course, Stalin spoke in lockstep with the MI6 in calling any anti-Soviet church “fascist.” The truth is that Western media was far more enthusiastic about this than even the Soviet media.

Whenever the “canons” or Church tradition got in the way of the ROC, the bishops would merely ask CAROC for assistance. They would then put “pressure” on the offending party or government, and quickly, fearing for their lives, did whatever Moscow wanted. Soon, the entire Orthodox world seemed “unified” around their Russian Marxist pope. Those dissenting were anathematized as “non-canonical.” This is the foundation of the “canonical” Orthodox Church in the 20th century (the documents are collected and indexed in Kalkandjieva, 2015).

It gets worse. Metropolitan Dionysus of Poland is one of the new-martyrs of the Soviet yoke. He was also in Hitler’s camps. This bishops condemned Stalin’s new sect and the bishops that were Stalin’s men in cassocks. These men claimed that Polish autocephaly could only come from Moscow, thus the 1924 tomos creating this Church was null and void. The argument is nonsense, of course; there is nothing that suggests that Moscow can or should declare autocephaly, let alone this parody of the Church. It does show the crude process of the Church that Stalin built. Dionysus was a victim of CAROC, in that they began spreading rumors that he was a “Nazi agent” regardless of the fact that he did time in Dachau.

In 1949, the Polish Minister of Justice, G. Swentkowski, was summoned by CAROC to Moscow. The plan was then hatched that the Polish Church, which was actually the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church, would have its tomos revoked, then be granted a new one from Moscow. Of course, the Church was purged of “nationalists” and forced under Moscow, while still considered “autonomous” by “world Orthodoxy.” Patriarch Maximus V of Constantinople was given a check for 50,000 American dollars, which in 1949 was an immense sum. He then kept quiet (Kalkandjieva, 2015: 226-228ff).

Another example is that of Metropolitan Seraphim (Lukyanov), who became the successor to Metropolitan Evlogius, serving under the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Seraphim was a former ROCOR bishop that had been smeared with the “collaborationist” accusation. Of course, it was collaboration with Hitler, since collaboration with Stalin was universally seen as praiseworthy. Extremely sensitive to his smear, Seraphim was seen as vulnerable. It was for this reason that he was chosen by CAROC to be the next “leader” of the ROC in the West (245). This poor soul was forced to say the following:

The Orthodox ecumenical Church goes beyond national frontiers. Within this vast Orthodox ecumenical Church our Russian Church must occupy an honorable place as Mother of its people and Protector of other Orthodox Churches asking its support, especially the Churches of the Slav peoples who are near to us. ... While calling us to him, the Patriarch allows us all Christian liberty. We may believe and profess our faith freely. He binds us by no political obligations. We may be subjects of any country and live in it (Kalkandjieva, 2015: 246).

In exchange for this nonsense, Seraphim was assured that all accusations for collaboration would go away. It is worth noting that this meant that Western newspapers would also drop the accusation. How could that be? How could they have such influence in the Western media? Unfortunately for Stalin, the Paris Orthodox voted for Metropolitan Vladimir over Stalin’s appointee. Ultimately, this is what led to the failure of Stalin’s Church in Western Europe.

The point of this is to show several things: first, that the “Orthodox Church” under Stalin was neither Orthodox nor a Church but rather a political tool. Second, that the West, as was almost always the case, supported and backed Soviet interests in these areas and attacked anti-communists in their own countries who disagreed. No pro-Stalin collaboration was more blatant than the Western churchmen, especially the Anglicans. Finally, it goes far to show how much Stalin hated the Orthodox

Church. These were elaborate plans designed to destroy and discredit Orthodoxy not only in Russia, but in the rest of Europe as well. Also connected to this nationalism is the myth that Stalin was “resurrecting the cult of the Tsars.” In this argument, having a good thing to say about a Tsar once in a while makes the speaker a monarchist. The proof text states:

I want to say a few words which may not seem too festive. The Russian Tsars did much that was bad. They robbed and enslaved the people. They led wars and seized territory in the interests of the landowners. But they did do one good thing—they put together an enormous state stretching out to Kamchatka. We inherited this state. We Bolsheviks were the first to put together and strengthen this state not in the interests of the landowners and capitalists, but for the toilers and for all the great peoples who make up this state (Brandenberger, 22).

This is supposed to be the resurrection of the “Tsarist past.” It is clearly no such thing and re-emphasizes the party’s hatred of the royal office. Peter I was a self-described revolutionary that bulldozed the Church wherever he could. He was as violently anti-Christian as the Reds were.

Making positive reference to him proves only the point being made here. The proof of “Russocentrism” is supposed to be discovered in these scattered references to pre-revolutionary writers like Pushkin, references to Peter I and other such nonsense. Even titling an official school text “A History of the Peoples of Russia” is sufficient to convince the alienated dons of Stalin’s nationalism (Zalampas, 1993).

Lenin’s statement to the *New York Herald* in 1922 that:

[T]hose who intend to offer humiliating terms to the Russian delegation at Genoa are deeply mistaken. Russia will not allow herself to be treated as a vanquished country. If the bourgeois governments try to adopt such a tone towards Russia they will be committing the greatest folly (Lenin, 1922).

This sounds terribly nationalist, at least in the elastic Western definition of the term, and yet no one uses this to show that Lenin was resurrecting the cult of Ivan IV. He is a "Soviet Patriot" now that he has power, and as such, he will use the appropriate language. The motive, however, is clear: Awful men of history must have been on the "right of the spectrum" to use a contemporary distorting label. It also shows how readily the left, even its academics, believes and utilizes poor arguments when their ideological interests are at stake.

It is one thing to show Stalin was not a nationalist and was philosemitic. It is another to explain why these myths have been around for so long. Stalin's writings and policies were not secret. His works are available to all. The leftist mind eventually tired of the USSR and its misery.

A search for legislation that assisted the cause of labor will prove fruitless. It was never about the workers but rather the enrichment of a small, oligarchic elite that was overwhelmingly Jewish. The USSR could not be hated by leftists on these grounds, so other foundations were needed. If he could be depicted as "another Hitler" then not only would it be okay to hate Stalinism, but it would also give the left an excuse to say that "Leninism has never been tried."

Recently, the BBC has attempted to claim that North Korea is a fascist state rather than a communist one. When the icons of Marx and Stalin were taken down for cleaning and maintenance, it was said that they were permanently removed. The failure of Soviet economics is well known. The left could no longer milk the Russian population, nor could they cover over Soviet crimes. The only option left to them is to say that the Soviets were "fascists" and "Russian nationalists." The truth is that Stalin in no respect differed from Lenin or Trotsky. The only difference was the machinery they had at their disposal. Stalin's was far more advanced than Trotsky's so it killed more people. Otherwise, they are identical in all respects.



Skoropadsky Caption: 40 words

CHAPTER SIX



ALIENATION, TYRANNY & ETHNICITY

Notes on Ukraine Under the Revolutionary Yoke

Ukraine, as of 2017, is a nation with no stable identity, religion or purpose. Her independence is nonexistent, as the Kiev government is staffed by foreigners working for the country's large number of financial creditors. In the U.S., the private sector is drowning in debt, making any economic recovery impossible. Millions of white males, viciously marginalized by the system, are seen as an unruly army of potential resistance, similar to Ukrainian peasants in the 1930s. The elite's response in this era to the mass underemployment of white males has been mass immigration and feminism. Stalin's use of the "feminist" angle was used to overcome the labor shortage his own policies caused. The mass importation of Russians and others into Ukraine was another means to solve these problems. While not a perfect parallel, it seems that ruling classes are similar.

In the 1870s, Russia and Austria, the two colonial powers over Ukraine, failed to deal with a Ukrainian crisis marked by mass peasant impoverishment. Some in the literature make the

claim that this is the true genesis of Ukrainian nationalism in the political sense (as opposed to cultural traditionalism), in that a growing population, foreign landlordism and a scarcity of good land led to peasants becoming politically aware. The dynamic element of the economy was being run in the cities by Russians, Germans and Jews, both groups operating against the interests of the rural sector. Jews were by far the wealthiest and most hostile of the elite groups.

Ukrainian industry was developing rapidly at this time, though almost exclusively as a foreign monopoly, relative to its rather non-existent beginnings. Ukraine seemed to be developing the beginnings of a modern economy, though actual Ukrainians seemed to have nothing to do with it. Throughout the first third of the 19th century, there was a major gulf forming between “developed” Ukraine, urban, Polish and Jewish, and agricultural Ukraine.

Increasingly peasants, driven off their land or otherwise fallen into impoverishment through usury, were streaming into a handful of cities where their identity would undergo a major and radical change, a change that can be termed genocidal. Prior to that, the literate sector of Ukraine was not Ukrainian at all. It is this schism that permitted a robust sense of Ukrainian nationalism to develop, though in a distorted manner.

Near the end of World War I, the Central Rada began to develop as the first modern Ukrainian parliament. It was doomed to failure and disgrace. Again, the rural/urban divide is significant. Basically, Ukrainian liberal intellectuals, connected with a single Masonic Lodge (Poltava) came to control the political development of the nation, and would claim to represent it.

Like the British parliament under Charles I, what amounted to an urban, tiny, literate bourgeoisie will come to identify the needs of the nation with its own. William of Orange and the Orange Revolution is little more than a Freudian association. The Orange Revolution is yet another version of this deceit and is part of this same distorted social world.

As a matter of course, the Rada at this early stage was made

up of the Social Democrats and Social Revolutionaries, all Poltava members, who balked at any talk of collective landownership, or even to take drastic steps to redistribute land to increasingly hard-pressed peasants. Actual Ukrainian parties did poorly in the cities, where Ukrainian was rarely spoken, and former peasants, transformed into proletarians, began to speak the dominant languages of the city, yet another distortion that enters Ukrainian life, only to grow at a fantastic rate under Bolshevik control. From 1880 to 1917, a radical transformation of Ukraine had taken place.

The Rada satisfied nobody. There was no Ukrainian Cromwell to lead a military dictatorship and smash all dissent. As a small group of urban Ukrainians, frankly alienated from rural tradition, the Rada will be attacked from both the left, in their refusal to deal with peasant land hunger, and from the right, who viewed it as too republican and quasi-socialist. Ultimately, the Rada will be a complete failure, largely because of its refusal to deal with the land problem.

Making matters worse, there was an extreme shortage of Ukrainian-speaking personnel that were able to 1) run a modern economy, 2) control budgetary procedure and 3) to run any form of modern political or military apparatus. The Rada became more of a symbolic rallying cry than a functional institution. It is revered as more of a precedent creator than the actual executor of policy. Its alienation from the peasantry as well as its inability to initiate policy make it a failure. Already, the distortions in Ukrainian development will permit the vast bulk of the population to be ignored and increasingly despised.

By 1918, the Bolshevik Red Army had invaded Ukraine, and likely the last real act of the Rada was to declare a symbolic independence. The German invasion from the northwest saved much of Ukraine at the time, but the Germans soon were to wear out their welcome through a policy, soon to become familiar to all Slavs, of grain requisitioning, or the theft of grain from peasant stores to feed a large and tired army.

It is likely that it was only Makhno and later, the Bolsheviks,

who alone had any sort of positive program for Ukrainian reconstruction. Skoropadsky was actually rebuilding the country, and yet, those only promising to do so sought his overthrow. There is no sense to this, suggesting the causes lie elsewhere. The Directory then took his place, which turned out to be even less competent than the Rada.

By 1920, independent Ukraine, if it ever existed, was no more. The Rada had collapsed without a tear being shed and the Directory is today only a concern for historians. The Whites were routed by a well-financed Bolshevik army, and the paramilitaries, legitimate or not, were disarmed. It did not take long for the Red Army to pacify a nation so confused, so suggestible under the chaos of numerous wars taking place on her soil.

The Bolsheviks merely needed a mop-up operation to bring Ukraine completely under their control. As might be expected, the Communist Party functioned only in the cities, and promised the protection and promotion of Ukrainian identity as a means of gaining support.

At the same time, the Borot'bisti national-communists came into existence, something that few scholars have dealt with. This was a healthy, agrarian-style socialism that was to replace the purely urban based, mechanized style of communism so dear to Lenin and Trotsky. The Borot'bisti might easily be termed "national communism," for it blended national and ethnic solidarity with collective ownership of farmland (though not to be closely identified with state ownership), something absolutely necessary to rebuild the shattered economy. Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks in Kharkov rejected this "deviation" and demanded Soviet Marxism be imposed on the people.

This view, the Borot'bisti, however, was rather articulately defended by Mykola Skrypnyk, who later was to regularly clash with Stalin over the "ethnic" question. What Skrypnyk demanded was a Ukrainian Communist Party, rather than the norm, which was the Communist Party of Ukraine. Skrypnyk was instrumental in increasing Ukrainian literacy through the rather commonsense steps of promoting native literature to the

general population, something that earned him great distrust in Moscow. Nevertheless, while Lenin was declining, he permitted the creation of a Ukrainian speaking set of ministries attached to the state, specifically, those of agriculture, justice, health and education, but it became clear that these were merely palliatives of no significance.

Ultimately, Skrypnyk killed himself before being purged in 1933. What became significant under Skrypnyk's rule was that a connection was made between opposition to collectivization and the promotion of Ukrainian literature. The two were connected because the notion of "Kievan communism" sought to develop a plan of cooperatives outside the Stalinist model, based on the idea that Ukrainians had developed a more individualist culture than had the Russians, leading to a situation where Marxism needed to be imposed differently on different people, given these realities. In reality, only the Georgians were successful in creating some sort of "national Marxism."

It was not until the 10th Party Congress in Ukraine (1921) that it became clear that local problems needed to be dealt with through local agencies, though while still rejecting any kind of "national deviations." If Ukraine was to become a part of the USSR in more than name, it must be Ukrainianized. This was the Soviet Party platform. Local languages and (non-religious) culture needed to be strengthened and promoted, while party structures themselves needed to become more Ukrainian in outlook, but again, with directives originating in Moscow. The Russian party then proceeded to condemn, as Lenin had done, any form of "Russian nationalism," proving, time and again, that the Russian party was not "Russian," but "Soviet" in composition.

The period of "war communism" saw the centralization of all party and economic structures. In truth, "War Communism" was merely the imposition of a rationalized transmission belt to transfer the wealth of the country to party functionaries. Under this mentality, there was to be no regional differences, and the "New Soviet Man" needed to be created in its place. However, Lenin's declining years saw a greater degree of regionalization, despite

his own wish of investment equalization. This was especially the case in the regions of the empire that were more prone to nationalist resistance. Since Marxist mythology equated nationalism with regional stratification and regional inequalities, the party then concluded that by equalizing investment, nationalism would disappear. The absurdity of this popular position (it remains the dominant position in American academia) is proven by the simple fact that those parts of the USSR that were the most successful, Georgia and Armenia, were the most nationalist of all the Soviet nationalities, and successfully united ethno-communism to successful economic performance.

Under the early Stalin, the “kulaky,” or those peasants classified as “rich” by the party, were considered the creators of nationalism. The kulak class had no functional definition. Under Marxist mythology, only capitalism can create nationalism, and hence, if nationalism is a problem, then capitalism (sometimes reduced to mere “inequality”) must still exist within the USSR. This is a bizarre historical position to hold, since capitalism has—from its inception—been an internationalist idea.

The historical record says that the most organic and substantial forms of nationalism come to exist in small states long before any form of industrialization. Chief examples include Scotland, Ireland, Greece, Serbia and Ukraine herself. All of these were non-industrial, all of these were agricultural, and yet the strongest and most philosophically satisfying forms of ethnonationalism developed there. Large state nationalism never fully developed, and never was quite capable of assimilation to an imperialist agenda, including Russia, Britain and France.

The kulaky were an arbitrary category of Stalin’s revision to “war communism” in that very few were wealthy. Even the formal definition of kulak included only the ability to hire one extra laborer even part of the year. This definition includes peasants who were far from wealthy and was itself applied arbitrarily on the ground. Nevertheless, even if the party’s mystification was correct, the destruction of the “kulaky” would only eliminate the best and brightest of the farming class in Russia and Ukraine.



During collectivization (1929–30) the Soviet regime forcibly deported and resettled hundreds of thousands of kulaks from Ukraine to the northern regions of Russia and the Urals. In the 1940s, following the occupation of Western Ukraine by the Soviet authorities, large-scale deportations of Ukrainians to remote regions of Russia and Siberia also took place. After World War II nearly 500,000 Ukrainian inhabitants of the Sian region, the Kholm region, and the Lemko region were forcibly resettled in Poland or Soviet Ukraine.

Ultimately, all the agricultural failures of the USSR will be blamed on the amorphous “kulak,” and fresh persecutions would be launched. Party hacks at the local level will label “kulak” anyone who seems to dislike party directives, anyone in active rebellion against collectivization, those religiously inclined and those that the party simply did not trust.

The connecting thread here is that Leninism was not about labor and had no intention of justly ruling an empire. It was a means to expropriate the value of Russian and Ukrainian labor to itself. It takes quite a bit of diffing to find a single positive contribution to the lives of workers in this period. Historians are too quick to take the slogans of fashionably leftist parties at

face value. It should be noted at this point that the Soviet economy was completely propped up by Western capital. Few scholars dare to ask the most simple and obvious question of this period:

What was the source of food, industrial capital, finance, and money in a country without a functioning economy? The Soviet economy had no real specialists in industrial enterprises, and those who had potential were either dead or gone. They will not ask this question because the answer destroys the central tenets of both liberalism and Marxism, namely, that Western powers financially assisted the Bolsheviks and essentially consolidated their power in the USSR. After the Civil War, the United States and Great Britain sent large amounts of grain to the Soviet Union. Afterwards, the Red Cross sent mountains of medicine and foodstuffs to the USSR.

For the first several years of the USSR's life, it was almost completely dependent on food imports from the West, given the ravages of World War I, Soviet mismanagement and the Civil War itself. This pattern will occur time and again, where an allegedly "anti-communist" West will bail out a failing Soviet economy. This occurred under Lenin, and it occurred in spades under Stalin, where American imports rebuilt the Soviet economy after the war. It will occur again under Khrushchev, with the failure of his Virgin Lands program, which itself could have brought down the USSR.

Under Khrushchev, the USSR found itself facing massive crop failures and famine, while the U.S. government again, as well as the Canadian, fed the Soviet population. Ironically, it was Con-Agra and Archer-Daniels-Midland who brokered the deal between the U.S. and the USSR over food imports, who at the time they were propping up a failing Soviet economy, were actively destroying the American family farm. The myth that the U.S. was "anti-communist" should be put to sleep. It was not Marxism that the U.S. opposed, but nationalism, the idea that nations and peoples can control their own economic life outside of the dollar or Anglo-American regulation.

Regardless, the notion of “national communism” remained strong in the Ukrainian countryside, represented by the Borot’bist movement, considered a “bourgeois deviation” from the Soviet model. For the peasantry, the question was land ownership, subsistence and national tradition. It was a very conservative mode of agrarian economics born out of the experience of the traumatic Civil War, foreign invasion and ideological manipulation. This is why the Soviet model never took in the countryside, and the Soviet collective farm model led to uprisings, riots and other forms of refusal, ultimately to be solved by the liquidation of a sizable portion of agriculture in Ukraine by the 1940s. Again, the U.S. was on hand to take up any slack. The USSR was recognized by Roosevelt in the 1930s and was on the American dole from that time forward. With the West making up for any shortfalls, the continued absorption of all wealth and labor into the hands of the Leninist oligarchy could continue.

Ukraine was, so to speak, “put back together” by the constant bargaining between Skrypnyk and the “national communists” on the one hand, and the Soviet party apparatus in Moscow and Kharkov on the other. This was made possible by the fact that the urban, Jewish dominance of the party made manpower always short, forcing Moscow to temporarily give in to local demands.

The experience of rapid and artificial industrialization in the northern and eastern parts of Ukraine is another aspect of the reconstruction program. The landscape of the country between 1870 and 1930 became unrecognizable. Ukraine was forced into a Soviet dystopia of heavy industry, collectivization and tight centralization at the price of millions of lives. Ukrainian industrialization was peculiar in that it was directed from Moscow, with orders being sent to the party in Kharkov. It was artificial because it was so rapid, and so few Ukrainians had anything to do with it. It increased the number of Ukrainians in the cities, which created an alienated Ukrainian proletariat, some of whom began speaking Russian, or a pidgin Russo-Ukrainian dialect that only alienated them from their roots further.

It is for this reason that modern “Ukrainian nationalism” is

so shrill and aggressive. It is an artificial construct of the Soviet government, gradual "Ukrainianization" by the Soviet Party into a system that itself was a forcible program of rapid industrialization and urbanization run from GOSPLAN, not from Ukraine. The lack of a mature Ukrainian national and political tradition is the result of this artificial imposition. In addition, the continued urban/rural split helped destroy any sense of a united Ukraine and increased the intensity of the class nature of Ukrainian society. This is manifest today through Orange Ukraine, where a tiny, wealthy urban elite (this time Westernized rather than Russified) began to speak for the "whole nation" and engaged in a program of Westernization completely alien from the bulk of the population outside of the cities.

This is underscored by the fact that the land question, the main peasant demand, was closely linked with the development of a rural, agrarian Ukrainian nationalism. Because of the fact that the cities were never Ukraine-friendly, either before or during the Soviet era, there were always two Ukraines, the one looking outside the country, either to the USSR or to the West, and the other, inarticulate and disorganized, based in the countryside and demanding peasant control over land and a strong Ukrainian populist mentality, existing in skeletal form in Ukrainian national communism of the Kiev circle. This mentality has not yet found a voice.

Unfortunately, the only real stable source of rule in Ukraine since the days of Yaroslav has been under the Reds. Otherwise, Ukraine has been a foreign colony, either under the Poles, the Russians, the Austrians, the USSR or the IMF. This has meant the major anti-Russian parties in Ukraine are financed and equipped by the United States, the Russian oligarchs in exile, or the Old Money leftist foundations in New York, all in the name of "democracy" and "independence."

Ultimately, the urban stereotype of the ethnic countryside has been one of the country bumpkin; ignorant and useless to the building of "socialist Ukraine." Nothing has changed.

Around the world, the last refuge of the pathological hater

has been rural folk. In America, the major controlled media heap unspeakable contempt on the America farmer; “cracker,” “redneck,” “hick” and other dehumanizing names only permit a true cultural genocide to take place. It is no different in Ukraine, leading to a situation where the Ukrainian agriculturalists coming to the cities to find work very quickly sought ways to acculturate themselves to the new order, to self-consciously abandon their roots, again, leading to a distorted national mind and alienation from tradition. As far as the Church is concerned, here, more than in any other element in Ukrainian history, has the distortions introduced into Ukrainian life in the 20th century manifest themselves.

The attempt at autocephaly was stalled due to the farce of the “1921 Sobor” under Lypinski, eventually murdered by the NKVD. Nevertheless, this organization continued to grow under Lenin’s NEP, and reached an estimated 4 million members. Only here was there some return to a normal existence in Ukraine, and a limited recovery in agriculture. It lasted only as long as Lenin did.

Under Stalin, the Uniats and the UAOC (largely identical in faith, involving themselves in regular and uncanonical inter-communion, which has not ceased) were brought under the fraudulent “Moscow Patriarchate,” itself a creation of the Soviet state. Only the saintly Mstislav retained any legitimate succession. For the record, Mstislav was consecrated bishop by Bishop Dionysus of Poland, as well as Polykarp, both of whom were consecrated in 1913 at the Pochayiv Lavra by Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church, including the famed Blessed Metropolitan Antony (Khrapovitsky). Thus, while the Patriarch of Antioch assisted in the consecrations, Poland was still considered Russian territory.

Nevertheless, those independent Ukrainian Orthodox groups that derived from Mstislav are legitimate from a canonical point of view, and Mstislav is also responsible for consecrating the last legitimate Patriarch (to date) of Ukraine, Volodymyr, a catacomb priest in Ukraine, and a former inmate of the camps. Afterwards,

the synod fell to pieces, and no actual canonical life exists on Ukrainian territory. Other segments of this movement living abroad were brought under the Masonic Patriarchate of Constantinople, and hence enjoyed a canonical standing that, putting it mildly, was highly irregular. Only in a handful of Old Rite settlements in remote parts of the country did the Orthodox life survive, as well as in the catacomb churches. Nevertheless, the legitimate UAOC organization continued to function underground.

Making matters more complicated, the scandal of Andrei Pratskii further damaged the image of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church. Pratskii, an open homosexual, saw his flock abandon him when his patron, Gregory of Ukraine, died. Gregory either did not believe stories of about Andrei's perversion, or ignored it. Without parishes, Pratskii traveled the globe, consecrating bishops, creating the numerous illegitimate "UAOC" groups that exist today.

From a canonical point of view this is illegal, since one cannot be a bishop without parishes. Hence, most of the "Ukrainian Orthodox" groups in America and Canada derive from this faulty lineage, such as the "UAOC" in Cleveland (which, in turn, created "Patriarch Moisei") and the other assorted tiny "autocephalous" groups, and hence are in schism. The result is the almost complete lack of any canonical order in Ukraine, since the current "Patriarch Filaret" is a married man, and himself has created a schism in the country.

While the sins of bishops are not visited on the people (and good priests receive automatic jurisdiction when bishops behave like this), the result is chaos, and the Ukrainian factions in Western Ukraine are isolated. The bulk of the Ukrainian and Carpatho-Russian parishes in America are under the Masonic Phanar, and hence are themselves illegitimate. The Catacomb church and the Old Believers under Metropolitan Joseph maintain the faith whole and integral. The latter currently rules over 60 communities throughout the country.

In economics, politics and religion, Ukraine was transformed. Nowhere is this transformation more obvious than in the cities

themselves. Within eastern Ukraine, the population of urban industrial centers more than doubled in the first 20 years of the USSR. Major economic dislocation in Ukraine from both the civil war and then the purges later caused millions of Ukrainians to abandon the agricultural life and join the filthy and dangerous industrial centers in Kharkov and elsewhere. Furthermore, the failures of collectivization also increased this exodus, leading to a situation where cities became overcrowded, disease-filled and where work was plentiful, but wages were barely existent.

Even as Stalin's plans developed in the cities, more and more labor was needed, and Stalin began to force farmers to the major industrial centers both within and without Ukraine. By 1930, Ukrainians went from 2% or 3% of the urban population to over half. As a result of Stalin's most desperate need at the time—literacy, specifically, technical literacy—the Ukrainian population became more literate and more mobile.

Ukrainians began to identify with their social betters in the dangerous, alien and exploitative environment of the industrial cities. Many began to speak Russian because it was not the language of the country idiots but was the language of the literate, the technicians, the wealthy party members and the managers of the new plants. And as always, the state of radical disorientation that the cities usually give to new arrivals just heightened their suggestibility to new influences, for better or worse, with the added problem of a massively increasing population, which in turn depressed wages and living conditions to an intolerable level.

There is some theorizing in the literature here that the acceptance of industrialization, and the "culture" it created in the cities is itself an acceptance, for lack of a better word, of the USSR as a whole, since the two are rightly considered basically synonymous. The Soviets, in order to create a balanced economy, began major investments into Ukraine and other "regional" centers in the 1930s and after. There was an attempt to create an economy that took advantage of the essential foci of the regions that was able to extract the best performance possible given the location and natural endowments of the regions. Ul-

timately this was a failure, but it was the mentality that increased the level of GOSPLAN investment in eastern Ukraine. With this came a regular “upgrading” of skills, since the industry that was providing the new jobs was of a technical nature, and a large degree of literacy was necessary, which became a problem in that most of the new arrivals were illiterate.

What began to happen is that within industry in Ukraine, half-trained workers were running huge factories specializing in oil refining, mining, iron production, tractor production and all the complimentary industries that undergird these. The result was disastrous: tens of thousands of injuries and deaths on the job, absurdly shoddy production and regular plant failures. The coercive nature of Stalin’s incentives only exacerbated the problem. The city, as is often the case, became a death trap.

When the men were either starved in the countryside, maimed in the cities or simply not sufficient to fill the needed slots, Stalin suddenly became a feminist. Posters went up all over Ukraine showing muscular women holding pikes and shovels. Women were encouraged to “flee the family” so as to be “fulfilled” in building the “new Soviet economy.” The fact that no parallels are ever drawn with the same experiment in the United States is testament to the corruption in American academics. In order to depress wages and eliminate labor solidarity, the American government, along with the billion-dollar Ford Foundation, in the 1960s created the “feminist movement.” As American wages continued to climb, capital needed methods by which the rates could be more competitive relative to Korea, Germany, Taiwan or Malaysia. Feminism and open immigration were the cure.

According to Japanese statistics (these should be used to avoid any American bias), middle-class earnings peaked at 1973, and began a (real) decline afterwards. It is not an accident that this is precisely the era when feminism became mainstream, and when immigration began to increase at huge rates since the repeal of the older immigration laws in 1964. As women entered the workforce in huge numbers, wages naturally declined in real terms. Some statistics show a gradual growth in

household earnings, but this is easily explained by the increasingly common two income household, a situation that only benefited capital in that more and more workers were now competing for the same jobs.

American wages skyrocketed in the 1950s and 1960s, leading capital to worry about “competitiveness.” Several solutions were implemented in the 1970s: feminism, open immigration and outsourcing, and all of this became increasingly necessary during the American credit crunch of the late 1960s. In the 1960s, American management became unable to control skyrocketing wages (cf. Rosenberg’s *American Economic Development Since 1945*) and unions were able to reassert themselves. Hence the development of “feminist theory” and open immigration. It is precisely at the time of the 1970s where American capital and the state were openly debating the nature of American relative decline to the Newly Industrializing Economies, that feminism became mainstream, and women entered the workforce in large numbers to be “fulfilled” and “empowered.” In a recent review of Rosenberg’s book, Gene Smiley writes:

The 1970s were also a time of “economic and political stalemate” according to Professor Rosenberg. Unions made gains in achieving higher wages leading to a growing gap between union and non-union wages. However, increasing legal and illegal efforts by employers led to declining union membership. Attempts at reforming the rules of labor-management relations, guaranteeing family incomes, and having government ensure that everyone who wanted to work had employment by having government become the employer of last resort were met by the strong opposition of business interests and were defeated or watered down. There was a stalemate in welfare reform and equal employment opportunity and affirmative action were turned into zero-sum games. Professor Rosenberg argues that the 1970s showed that the only way out of the stagflation morass was to promote economic growth and reduce the competing claims on economic production.

In Ukraine in the 1930s as well as in the U.S. in the 1970s, capital was becoming desperate. Workers were making huge gains in wages and benefits, and unions were demanding more comprehensive employment policies, including but not limited to lifetime employment and universal health care. This is the only rational reason as to the mainstreaming of feminism, integration and open immigration. These all occurred simultaneously, and, as a result, cannot logically be considered coincidence. These movements in American political life were designed to destroy labor solidarity and depress wages. And in this they succeeded, with no end in sight.

This digression was necessary to show the extent to which Stalin's model was universalized, where "social movements" come into existence not to make life more "humane," but rather to solve glaring social problems (as seen by the state), the labor shortage in Ukraine under Stalin, high wages and union demands in America. The movements were identical in rhetoric and aims. Under Stalin, resistance to the state led to execution or the gulag. For American males, resistance to arbitrarily imposed child support orders is prison. Women are encouraged to take out "protective orders" on non-violent men that require no evidence to obtain. Men are then sent to prison in droves for the slightest misplaced word or phrase.

The other method Stalin used to fill jobs that has its parallel in America is immigration. In Stalin's case, less skilled positions were to be filled either through forced immigration to the cities, or in using peasants as part-time unskilled or semi-skilled labor. The peasants, working part-time and then tilling their fields, were exploited, had a high rate of death and injury on the job and had the highest rate of absenteeism due to alcoholism and other issues. In the Ukrainian cities, alcohol became the drug of choice, and Stalin was faced with a deteriorating health crisis in eastern Ukraine. As a result, these new immigrants worked mostly in the most dangerous sector of all, the mining sector, which also could function with the least amount of skilled labor in contrast to oil refining or iron production.



XXXXXXX the Soviet regime forcibly deported and resettled hundreds of thousands of kulaks from Ukraine to the northern regions of Russia and the Urals. In the 1940s, following the occ

Ukraine began to reject the Bolshevik experiment in the only way they could: labor slowdowns and refusal to work. The situation in the Ukrainian cities by 1935 was desperate. Alcoholism was decimating the new arrivals from the countryside. Labor was clearly not ready for their new jobs, and shoddy production and the constant missing of quotas were the result. Most research at this time focuses on the purges and the genocide in the Ukrainian countryside.

Few deal with the equally abhorrent situation in the cities, where the genocide was just as effective. The “assembly line” style labor, adapted from America, and Henry Ford’s substantial influence on the party were rejected by the peasantry, who rightly viewed this sort of work as mindless. There is a clear hostility to the Communist Party among the new arrivals, and,

as a result of all this, "Ukrainian" industry failed, while "Russian" industry, i.e., industry dominated by Moscow, developed quickly. In the US, mass male suicides, drop-out rates and homelessness are a form of pathetic resistance against the system.

In addition to the newly minted "feminist agenda" and the importation of part-time peasants, the Kosmonol was also mobilized to form "labor armies" to take up the slack. In addition, the increasingly large concentration camps were also doing manual labor, though most of these were outside Ukraine. As the labor situation in Ukraine grew more grievous, work was now packaged as "patriotic." And young school boys were given days off to work for a week or so in the mines and factories as part of their "education."

The fact remained, that, as far as Moscow was concerned, the Ukrainian peasantry was proving themselves intractable and unassimilable. They were viewed more and more as counter-revolutionary. In the US, the mass of underemployed males is seen as a dangerous tinderbox of counterrevolutionary aggression as well. Mass immigration, paid violent protests at all resistance gatherings, hate speech laws and judicial arbitrariness are means the system is developing in response.

As the 1930s drew on, the complaint became louder and louder that in Ukraine the party was becoming "infected" by "non-party" elements. This complaint derives from the fact that the new influx of native Ukrainians into the city, when successful, became party members and hence created a situation where the "Ukrainian party" was actually becoming Ukrainian, rather than the Soviet Party in Ukraine. There was always to be a sizable faction of the CP-USSR that rejected the idea of a "Ukrainian party." The complaint was formally based on the idea that since these new members from Ukraine were just peasants a generation ago (or less), they are not schooled sufficiently in party dogma. Since they came from poor farmers, the party concluded, they must be "bourgeois, nationalist kulaky." The party was concerned that the old party cadre, those active in the Red army occupation, were being diluted by these "non-party" elements.

The urban party, mostly of Jewish origin, were ordered from Moscow to create an intensive propaganda campaign among the peasants in and out of the cities. The failure of this ham-handed drive is one of the reasons for the purges in Ukraine and the forced starvation, and the resultant liquidation of much of the peasantry. It should be noted that even in rural districts, the party was still well over 50% Jewish, and hence, Ukrainians were alienated from it.

The fact remains that the Communist Party, either of Ukraine or the USSR, never succeeded in penetrating the countryside to any significant degree. The party's support derived from a thin column of Jews and Russians in urban areas. Hence, the party was correct—this ethnic divide meant that being Ukrainian meant being "anti-party." About the only Ukrainian the party trusted was a small group of Ukrainians who were highly skilled and well-placed in the economy. However, it became clear that this tiny segment normally did not stay Ukrainian in a cultural sense for very long.

What began to develop is a "Judeo-Russian" Marxist alliance against the "bourgeois, Ukrainian kulak" that will develop throughout the 20th century. It was the nationally conscious Ukrainian peasant that had the greatest chance of posing a substantial political threat, so the Kulak idea was invented. This only means that party functionaries were protecting their investments and source of income. Labor was never the point and rarely entered into the conscious mind. Labor was a tool for their ends and nothing more. By bringing the Ukrainian into the city, he was to be neutralized as a threat and rendered sans-identity and hence, harmless.



Caption: 40 words

CHAPTER SEVEN



COMMUNISM & POLITICAL TERROR

Trotskyism, Stalinism & the West in Revisionist Perspective

In Russia before World War I, there was little support for revolution. Russia since the time of Tsar Alexander III had the most progressive labor legislation in the world. Foreign capital, not Russian, dominated the small Russian bourgeoisie and was not trusted by St. Petersburg. Peasants before World War I owned almost 95% of the land, and more were emigrating to the lush parts of southern Siberia where the government offered free land and tools. Third, the peasants were taking advantage of the state peasant bank that offered free loans and training for all peasants and communes (Goulevitch, 1962)

Russian taxes were the lowest in the world (per capita), and Russia was almost totally self-sufficient in everything it needed. There was no real "nobility" in 1914, since the remnants of that older class were in such debt that they could not function. It is also true that nobles were the least likely to support the crown, contrary to longstanding prejudice. The nationalist Union of the Russian People (the Black Hundreds) had a membership of 600,000 despite the open condemnation of Sergei Witte and the condemnation of the state. The Union demanded free education and the expropriation of all remaining noble land. The Bolsheviks

never cared about “labor” in the sense that “labor” refers to the working people of the empire. The Bolsheviks defined “labor” so broadly that it became meaningless. They did not believe it themselves. The Bolsheviks held “labor,” defined above, in utter contempt. Again, this is contrary to longstanding myth. Industrial growth was averaging about 15% a year since 1861, and the wages of labor were also going up rapidly (Goulevitch, 1962).

Under Alexander III, the revolutionaries of all stripes were in despair. Revolution was not coming to Russia as laboring incomes continued to skyrocket, especially when the cost of living was taken into consideration. Russian prices remained very low while she enjoyed a huge trade surplus. On what basis could a revolution take place, let alone a Bolshevik one? Fortune favored the Bolsheviks with Russia’s entry into World War I, an entry that was opposed by large portions of the Russian right (Goulevitch, 1962 and Mironov, 2010). In a statement that is both simple and correct—itself a rarity—had there been no Great War, there would have been no revolution.

Striking to this author is the weak links by which authors have tried to turn Stalin into a “rightist.” That Stalin was backing an egalitarian agenda sits uncomfortably with the typical leftist university professor, so the agenda was hatched some time ago. Authors such as Nicholas Timasheff, Frederick C. Barghoorn, Zvi Gitelman and Roman Szporluk have made the argument that Stalin was a “typical Russian nationalist” in various ways. The arguments are very weak. First of all, to connect any reference to “Soviet Patriotism” to Russia in any way is bizarre. It would be like connecting Napoleon III to Louis IX. One came on the corpse of the other. Secondly, there can be no Russian nationalism without the Church. She sits at the center of all Russian culture and all that makes this form of nationalism what it is. Since this was not part of the agenda in the USSR, it is a parody. The worst one, almost an open mockery of history, is that of Jewish activist in the Bund, M.I. Lieber (Goldman), who, suspicious of Lenin’s lack of solid Jewish roots, saw him as a “neo-Slavophile” (Kara-Murzha, 2011: lec XIX).

Marx's students Lenin and Stalin, however, used terror and violence for two purposes: a) for the sake of gaining and maintaining power in a time of chaos, and b) to manifest the communist concept of power by destroying enemies and creating structures such as central planning, re-education camps and total party dominance over politics and all life. The Tsarist "Okhrana," the very small police service used against the occasional revolutionary, had about 1,000 people in exile in 1900, and most escaped. Only a handful were at hard labor. This seems quite weak given the tens of thousands killed by leftist terrorists at that time. By the end of the Civil War, the Cheka had 250,000 already behind bars (Prefobrhzhensky, 1977).

Stalin is not just the fulfillment of Marx and Lenin, but of modernity more generally. Joseph Stalin is the world's most violent dictator. He ruled the USSR through the traumatic 1930s and the reconstruction project of the late 1940s. Dying in 1953, his influence will be discussed for the rest of Russia's earthly existence. No paper can deal with the literature on Stalin, regardless of the length or obsessive qualities of the researcher. No research on such a person could ever be totally objective.

In his speeches and articles in 1923 and 1924, Stalin consistently argued that the party should be considered as a living organism. In what amounted to a rudimentary theory, Stalin believed that the party had an inner division of labor, the most important of which being the differentiation between rulers and ruled, the apparatus and the members. Despite this stratification the party should act as a united "whole." Its "weldedness" and "closedness" were achieved by "self-activity," the participation of all members in party work and discussions on policy. Only thus could the ranks truly be tied to the common purpose. Thus the party lives. But discussion must contribute to "unity" only; hostility toward the apparatus was unacceptable. Discussion, moreover, had to result in a lack of ambiguity—in one common will among all members—for the party was an organism that had only one will (Ree, 1993: 54).

Nothing here is different from Lenin. In fact, it sounds a bit like Miss Rosenberg's criticism of Lenin's "hyper-centralism." Lenin writes:

The force of habit in millions and tens of millions is a most formidable force. Without a party of iron that has been tempered in the struggle, a party enjoying the confidence of all honest people in the class in question, a party capable of watching and influencing the mood of the masses, such a struggle cannot be waged successfully (Lenin, 1999: 49).

Again, Lenin is not referring to the working class. He's referring to his political allies. In his definition, Jacob Schiff, millionaire financier of the Bolshevik movement, was "working class." For both Lenin and Trotsky, "workers" did not refer to the real men in the factories. Most of the time, they loathed and feared them, and labor responded accordingly. Rather, it was a mystical justification of the "party" that was to mold cadres that were to support the centralization of production and the destruction of religion. Then would they become "workers."

Trotsky states, pulling no punches, "One method consists of taking over the thinking for the proletariat, i.e., political substitution for the proletariat; the other consists of political education of the proletariat, its political mobilization, to exercise concerted pressure on the will of all political groups and parties" (quoted from Seymour, 1978).

The only problem is that they are both identical. Education is identical, especially in the context of the times, of creating an artificial "unity" through terror. Lenin says in "One Step Forward" that "The Party, as the vanguard of the working class, must not be confused, after all, with the entire class." This is the nature of Rosa Luxemburg's criticism. Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin, again, did not disagree. Trotsky says in his *Terrorism and Communism* on the party:

The exclusive role of the Communist Party under the conditions of a victorious proletarian revolution is quite comprehensible. The question is of the dictatorship of a class. In the composition of that class there enter various

elements, heterogeneous moods, different levels of development. Yet the dictatorship presupposes unity of will, unity of direction, unity of action. By what other path then can it be attained? The revolutionary supremacy of the proletariat presupposes within the proletariat itself the political supremacy of a party, with a clear program of action and a faultless internal discipline (Trotsky, 1920, ch 7).

This is as harsh and centralizing as anything Stalin ever said. Endless citations to this effect can be brought out. The attempt to distinguish the three founders of the USSR must have another source and origin, since facts, theory or policy cannot account for them. Lenin purged the party quite often, though not as spectacularly as Stalin. He states this clearly in his (1922) "Dual Subordination and Legality." He writes in 1922:

I come to the categorical conclusion that precisely at this moment we must give battle to the Black Hundred clergy in the most decisive and merciless manner and crush its resistance with such brutality that it will not forget it for decades to come. The greater the number of representatives of the reactionary clergy and reactionary bourgeoisie we succeed in executing for this reason, the better (from Pipes, 1996: 152-154).

Quoting Lenin from 1905 is useless. Only when he has political power can his understanding of the party or terrorism be understood. Lenin's constant complaining that he lacks the men to accomplish his will shows that he was working with a state that was only barely forming.

Stalin is not known as a theoretician, but as a ruthless politician. The same can be said for Trotsky and Lenin. Lenin was just better educated. Theory for Stalin was a means of justifying policies long in place. Lenin and Trotsky were no different. His "organic" theory of the party is of particular interest not because Stalin was converting to political Romanticism, but because this sort of "natural" and "organic" trope was the outward justification for his ruthless politics both within and without party circles. Stalin's concept of a unified party was the same as his

view of his personal dominion. In other words, Stalin wanted a party that was totally subservient to his personal views on industrialization and relations with the West. Again, no communist who mattered disagreed.

As much as his policies involved excessive use of power, such as execution of perceived enemies, most of his policies led to the mechanization of the Soviet economic system. The real revolution was that the Soviet system, in cooperation with Western capitalism, transformed Russia from an agrarian to an industrial economy. Socialism adopted the capitalist myth of linear progress based on this same development (Alexandrov is important here for manifesting the myth skillfully). However, Lenin, not Stalin, built the first concentration camp on the White Sea as early as 1918.

For every step in the direction of industrialization, the human sacrifice was great. This of course, is not unique to the USSR, though it is in terms of scale. The very fact that one can say Stalin “improved” the condition of the Soviet Union is itself a problem, since there is no clear argument that moving away from the “backward” agricultural life does anything but increase the misery and regimentation of the population as a whole. The additional fact that much of the money and expertise in the development of heavy industry was American and European also challenges the myth. The fact that Hitler did the same in Germany after the hated Versailles treaty hurled him to power should be taken more seriously. Hitler and Stalin were similar in this respect: they both equated national success and prestige with a) a centralized state and b) an obsession with transferring labor from the farm to the factory (cf. Meek, *entire*). Even more significantly, both ideologies were based on the Darwinian notion that economic entities remain in contention, and that which system or firm can adapt the more rationally and quickly is justified in destroying the competition.

This industrialization did not lead to greater incomes. In fact, the USSR never achieved the rates of growth registered in the late imperial era, nor its pre-war advanced labor legislation. Using 1920 as a baseline (i.e., 100%), real economic growth in

the USSR is greatly uneven. In 1937, the Soviet GDP was 86% of 1920. Due to the war, it had fallen to about 50% in 1946, but the war is not the only cause. In 1940, it was 78% of the 1920 economy. Only in 1954 is there anything above 1920, that year registering at 119%, almost all of this American (Sutton, 1973).

Industrialization permitted the Soviet elite to accumulate more power than ever before. Totalitarianism, in its strict definition, is only possible under modern industrialism. Heavy industry was significant since it led to the Soviet Union being named as the world's second largest economy not long after the Second World War. This empowered the USSR to eventually manipulate hapless and cynical Western politicians into permitting his absorption of eastern Europe. The US, ultimately, entered World War II to make the world safe for Soviet totalitarianism.

In early 1927, there was a critical shortage of grains in the Soviet Union. Stalin's endless abuse of the Russian and Ukrainian peasant destroyed Russia's agriculture. In the late 19th century, Tsarist Russia was feeding the world, and had become not only one of the world's most significant economic powers, but also showed the possibility of total autarky. Famine was caused, in the final analysis, by the deliberate funneling of all resources into industry.

The peasantry was sacrificed for this New Atlantis. Stalin used "natural" disasters to destroy what he considered to be his main problem: Ukrainian nationalism, especially since its mentality was peasant-based. Yet again, Western capitalism came to the rescue and granted both free and purchased grain to the "enemy."

It is a mistake to say that "Americans feared Bolshevism" or some other such meaningless nonsense. Very few Americans, including in history departments, had any idea what "Bolshevism" was. There were almost no Russian language programs in the U.S. until the 1950s and later. Russia was and is a black spot on the knowledge of Western intellectuals. Little has changed.

Normally, Stalin accomplished his justification of terror though a pathological deformation of historical fact, especially when it comes to his supposed closeness to Lenin. In general,

Trotsky argues that Stalin was a neurotic personality that saw power as a good in itself. That Marxism was an expedient vehicle for this is mere coincidence; any ideology would do. Therefore, Trotsky argues, it is Stalin's mind, not his policy, that deserves extended treatment.

Tucker (1992) contends that to understand Stalin, his manifest mental illnesses should be the first step. Given the sheer size of Tucker's book, only a few areas can be summarized. Primarily, Stalin was a man obsessed. Power does not satisfy. The greater the power, the more enemies; the more enemies, the more power one requires. His obsessions were many and included the desire to be considered Lenin's moral compeer, the desire to be seen as an intellectual and the desire for the world to see the USSR as messianic (Tucker, 89-90; 170 and 560ff).

The messianic idea revolves around Stalin being viewed as the "hero." The dictator portrayed himself heeding the popular cries of Russia, a woman in distress, and rescuing her through the sheer force of his will and the immense depth of his mind.

Tucker's real conclusion is that Stalin's mental state could be best described as a pathological self-loathing that required constant flattery to maintain even a precarious balance (Tucker, 620ff). However, when reading Tucker, narcissism seems to be the proper diagnosis. Stalin had an inflated sense of importance, but one that was easily injured. Stalin's overarching obsession was that no one realize he had no right to power. Hence, masochism alternated with self-idealization.

Trotsky's biography, on the other hand, is an attempt to debunk the invented history Stalin was imposing on the country. Stalin claimed a far greater role in the events of 1917-1921 than history allows. Stalin, in Trotsky's mind, was a minor figure in the revolution and, therefore, had no claim to be Lenin's successor. Trotsky states:

In what did Stalin's own theoretical work express itself? In nothing. All he did was to exploit his fellow-traveler theorists, in the interests of the new ruling caste. He will enter into the annals of the history of "thought" only as

the organizer of the greatest school of falsification. ... Official "theory" is today transformed into a blank sheet of paper on which the unfortunate theoreticians reverently trace the contours of the Stalinist boot (Trotsky, 1937: int).

Tucker's analysis of Stalin's rise to power makes an essential distinction, one that should be used more in political biography: the difference between intelligence and cunning; the difference between rationality and deviousness. Stalin showed no intelligence, defined as the ability for sustained conceptual analysis. His writings were either plagiarized from Lenin or worthless. The same could be said for Trotsky as well.

Cunning and deviousness are a matter of animal instincts. Animals seem highly intelligent in the ways they hunt, but they are operating from instinct, not conceptual distinctions. In a telling statement that almost sums up the entire book, Tucker writes: "Stalin's mental world was sharply split into trustworthy friends and villainous enemies—the former being those who affirmed his idealized self-concept, the latter, those who negated it. People around him were in greater peril than many realized of slipping from one category to another if they spoke or acted ... in a manner that triggered his hostility" (Tucker, 164).

In terms of more practical history, Tucker spills a huge amount of ink on the 17th Communist Party Congress of 1934. Lenin died in 1925, but Stalin had still not totally consolidated power. While most party members performed the proper homage, the voting for party secretary was not unanimous. About 120 votes were against him from a plenum of 1,966. Kirov, a longtime Stalin ally, had electrified the party and seemed a possible competitor. Tucker holds that at this moment, something snapped. Stalin was never the same.

Of the total plenum at this congress, well over 1,000 were eventually sent to the forced-labor camps, as Khrushchev later announced (Tucker, 248). Stalin's reaction was to refuse to give a speech, since, coming after Kirov, this would have been more embarrassing. Stalin demanded not just homage, but total unanimity, which alone could satisfy his narcissism. Soon after,

the purges began. He hired L. Beria, Yezhov and Nikita Khrushchev to run his security apparatus.

This meant that he rewarded devious rather than intelligent behavior. Party members were uneasy at such choices, and even uneasier at the developing cult of personality, where massive photos of Stalin, often depicted with Lenin, turned up everywhere (Tucker 262). In 1935, Stalin delivered a speech that was to kick off the entire purge movement. In it, he stated that "... it is impossible to build anything enduring with such human materials, composed of skeptics and critics. ..." (Tucker 266). He, of course, is referring to opposition within the party (Tucker, 253).

The heart of the book is in the process of Stalin's rise to absolute power. Stalin was already head of the party by 1929, but this was not sufficient. He needed a) a total purge of anyone suspected of disloyalty, b) to be sycophantically venerated and c) to remake the security system so as to root out anti-Stalin elements at all levels. The result was that the narcissistic personality that showed itself in the mid-1920s turned into an all-consuming colossus. Since the opposition was very rapidly decimated, all who were left realized that survival meant the most humiliating abasement in front of the Great Architect.

Tucker interprets historical events as manifestations of different elements of narcissism, self-doubt, self-hatred and low self-esteem. The problem is that social forces and objective political requirements are not seen as autonomous but as functions of Stalin's illness.

Stalin was not paranoid. His actions were deliberate and well considered. He did not believe in conspiracies against himself (Tucker, 59ff). He knew that his enemies were not "Nazis," "Hitlerites," "kulaks," or "CIA stooges." He did want to conceal his actions from the party, lest the scam be exposed. In Stalin's mind, it did not take long for excuses to turn into truths.

Little by way of political results are mentioned. The issues of Russia's industrialization, the destruction of the peasantry and the endless rebellions and famines are discussed, but not as autonomous events. While Tucker seeks to give a complete picture

of Stalin in power, he gives policy as a set of images distorted by Stalin's preoccupations. Tucker's interesting analysis fails because there is no reason to see a difference between Stalin the violent revolutionary and Stalin the violent dictator. One might use psychological categories here with no problem but not to justify any alleged "change" in his mentality.

In Richard Coombs's (2008) book on the USSR, he writes on Stalin:

This self-generated, doctrinally based "mega-imperative" to mobilize, intertwined with the ruthlessness and paranoia of Stalin's personality, was the prime motivational force behind Stalin's remarkable attempt to construct a totalitarian system in which essentially all resources, human and material, were marshaled to accomplish his goals. This grandiose conception of governance—Volkogonov has termed it "sacrificial socialism"—served as justification for perpetuation of a single, all-powerful political party, a centrally controlled "command" economy, forced collectivization of agriculture and resulting mass starvation, regimented industrialization, an extensive system of prison camps and forced labor, strict controls over mass media and information from abroad, and a pervasive system of regime informants and secret police (Coombs, 148).

Coombs is correct, and yet, he fails to see how this derives directly from the mechanistic view of the universe so important to the early Enlightenment and modern industry. To say that labor is "forced," from the Soviet point of view, is nonsense since free will does not exist. All is mechanism, including the human brain and human culture. There is no coercion possible because, as Lev Shestov wrote many decades ago, nature itself is totally coercive, mechanical and necessary.

It is unfortunate that Coombs's work is marred by the trendy neoconservative desire to connect Stalin with "the Tsars." He argues that Stalin re-cast the Nicholevan "Orthodoxy-Autocracy-Nationality" idea within a materialist view. He writes in a shockingly absurd passage:

Stalin radically changed the content of the natural order described by Russian Orthodoxy and perpetuated by the Romanov dynasty. The pre- and post-1917 orthodoxies were mutually exclusive in substance, yet the functional notion of individual subordination to enlightened central authority, and the absolute nature of that authority's conception of the spiritual and political universe, were common to both (Coombs, 149).

The error here is on multiple levels. First, Coombs is (understandably) confused by the fact that the Petrine regime of total secularism and materialism was very similar to the pseudo-scientific mechanical and "Enlightened absolutist" theories of modernity. Absolutism is the creation of the Enlightenment designed to use state power to destroy the remnants of "superstition," which is another word for the belief in an extra-mundane universe (i.e., Christianity). This was the explicit desire of Peter I, the German oligarchy in the mid-18th century and, worst of all, Catherine II. In the 18th century the Orthodox Church was purged, its property secularized and its law openly mocked by Peter, Biron, Peter III, Catherine II and Alexander I. By the time Alexander III sought to rebuild this traditional authority, it was too late, since the elite had long since looked to London rather than Moscow for education.

Another level of error is that the state in Petersburg was large but extremely weak. Nicholas I developed his "infamous Third Section" with a grand total of 16 employees. At the height of the revolutionary terror under Nicholas II, it had about 3500 employees. Its purpose was to monitor both the bureaucracy and the upper classes who had traditionally been the promoters of all things modern, Western and leftist. The Tsarist state was invisible to the average townsman or peasant, and the same Enlightenment that led Stalin on his rampages informed that of the Enlightened Absolutism of the 18th century, which hollowed out the Church and, in its place, brought in Western Masonry and liberalism. About the only thing that did not have coercive authority was the Russian Orthodox Church, and the only insti-

tution that had no serious propaganda arm was the crown.

Worse, Coombs states: "Tsarist political culture—in the form of attitudes toward mobilization, plus conceptions of orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality—permeated and conditioned (to use Julian Towster's term) the entire Stalinist conception" (Coombs, 153).

Now, much of this has already been flayed, but a factual error has appeared. There was no "Tsarist political culture." Certainly, there was a "culture" of the urban elites, the Old Believers, the Cossacks and the peasants, but "Tsarism" had no culture of its own under the Petrine Leviathan. That Peter openly called himself a revolutionary should give the historian a clue on why that might be. Prior to Peter one can certainly make such a claim, but the Petrine state did not physically move to the far north for fun. He was an extreme, occult revolutionary and did not hide this.

The final level of error is that the "Tsar" did not rule. Beside the fact that "rule" did not mean the same in Old Russia as it did in the West, the bureaucracy that provoked Nicholas I's Third Section ruled the country in the name of the Tsar. The alienated bureaucrat, so ably mocked by Gogol and Dostoevsky, was the last group to show loyalty to the Tsar and saw the state in Petrine in utilitarian terms. However, regardless of gaffes like this, Coombs's work is useful and shows the relation between Lenin and Stalin as a matter of degree.

Leon Trotsky, of course, seeks to argue that Stalin was an anomaly while failing to distinguish his views from Stalin's in even minor matters. Trotsky's own obsession with terror and his personal belief that he alone had the right to interpret Marx makes him anything but a reliable source. Trotsky, more specifically, wants to show that he and he alone, in the early years of the USSR, had exposed Stalin for what he became. With a flair for self-dramatization, Trotsky depicts himself as bravely standing up against the tyrant with no thought for his own well-being.

The basic argument in Trotsky's work is that Stalin operates as a parasite on the labor and investment of others. He accuses

Stalin of total dictatorship, making alliances with the “bourgeoisie” and “conciliating” with party enemies (cf Trotsky, 1937, esp. ch. 8). Terms such as “bourgeois” and “conciliation” have no stable meaning when used by party members. The “bourgeois elements” in theoretical Marxism are the owners of capital. For Trotsky and Stalin, they refer to any opposition, including anarchists, socialists different from Bolsheviks, peasants, other Bolsheviks, most workers, most socialists and clergy.

“Conciliation” was a term used by Trotsky and Stalin as a synonym for treason; it was about making alliances with non-communists. It was a catch-all term justifying the later liquidation of those thought to be political competitors. Therefore, his argument is strange and complex: Stalin is both too violent and too lenient; he is both a fanatic and a compromiser; he both attacks the bourgeoisie while representing it. It seems that Trotsky’s aggravated state of mind is affecting his logic. His own evidence tries to prove both sides and, as a result, fails entirely. Given the nature of the USSR, it stands to reason that factions would develop. The only real issue is who gets what slice of the economic pie the Russian and Ukrainian peasant worked to create.

Trotsky argues several things simultaneously: first, that the bureaucratization of the party is a distortion of Lenin’s mentality and policy. Second, that this same process of regimentation destroyed the best minds in the party. Third, that the bureaucracy, a faceless machine, was the perfect vehicle for a narcissistic tyrant who both did and did not want to be associated with such violence while, finally, those who remained were flunkies, to be charitable (Trotsky, 1937, fwd). This author, for one, refuses to accept that Trotsky believes his own accusations.

Trotsky can make no claim to objectivity: He was a victim of Stalin who exiled him, ultimately to Mexico, and eventually had him murdered. The most severe problem with Trotsky is that, as a man having no power or responsibility, criticism is easy. There is every reason to argue that Trotsky would not have done anything differently, nor Lenin. The fact is that Stalin had an operational bureaucracy ready for action, while Lenin did

not. This is the primary difference between the two dictators. Trotsky's command of the Red Army during the Civil War showed him far more ruthless than Stalin, since he openly hated Russians and Ukrainians, workers or no.

Trotsky was as remorseless as Stalin. He saw "bourgeois elements" everywhere and retained a belligerent policy of liquidation of "class enemies." Trotsky's speeches show an extremely violent approach to the creation of the USSR. All of the "Old Bolsheviks" were violent men, seeking the annihilation of their enemies. There is no reason to believe that any of them would have proceeded differently from Stalin. This is Trotsky's fatal flaw.

Trotsky's speeches in 1917-1918, which he includes in his biography of Stalin, show a man with the exact same tendencies as his old nemesis. Trotsky shouts in a series of debates at a 1917 Congress of the Bolshevik Party:

[Our enemies] protest because they are bourgeois through and through in their psychology. They are incapable of applying any serious measures against the bourgeoisie. They are against us precisely because we are putting into effect drastic measures against the bourgeoisie. Nobody can tell now what harsh measures we may yet be compelled to apply. The sum total of what [our enemies] can contribute to our work is: vacillation. But vacillation in the struggle against our enemies will destroy our authority among the masses (Petrograd Soviet, 1917).

In this paragraph, Trotsky builds his rhetoric: First it is "serious" measures, then "drastic measures" and finally "harsh measures" against his enemies. As his anger builds, so do his promises. This passage shows many things. First, that Trotsky had no problem playing the tyrant so long as "bourgeois" elements existed (which, of course, is what Stalin used to justify his own measures). Second, that a bureaucracy was needed to destroy his opposition and third, that more "harsh measures" will be required in the future. This latter gives Trotsky the same "blank check" Stalin gave to himself. At this early stage, Trotsky was accusing Stalin of being too lenient with the opposition.

His later accusations waiver from his being too harsh, on the one hand, or using coercion against the wrong people for the wrong reason (Trotsky included), on the other.

Trotsky therefore undercuts his own argument. His biography is an ideological analysis of Stalin, arguing that his Leninism is weak. The nature of Trotsky's accusations shows a mind as unbalanced as Stalin's. His speeches are violent, with lurid representations of what is in store for "class enemies." Later, he charges Stalin with "bureaucratization." How did Trotsky propose to demolish the "class enemy" without a security administration?

Trotsky was equally as vicious as Stalin. He took peasant children and raised them as Red Army soldiers. He killed the families of those deserting to the Whites. His support of the worst forms of terror during the Civil War were not hidden from his readers. In a passage from his 1920 work on terrorism, he writes:

The severity of the proletarian dictatorship in Russia, let us point out here, was conditioned by no less difficult circumstances. There was one continuous front, on the north and south, in the east and West. Besides the Russian White Guard armies of Kolchak, Denikin and others, there are attacking Soviet Russia, simultaneously or in turn: Germans, Austrians, Czecho-Slovaks, Serbs, Poles, Ukrainians, Roumanians, French, British, Americans, Japanese, Finns, Esthonians, Lithuanians. ... In a country throttled by a blockade and strangled by hunger, there are conspiracies, risings, terrorist acts, and destruction of roads and bridges (Trotsky, 1920, ch 4).

This passage alone would take books to properly refute. The "Americans" did not attack anyone during the Russian Civil War. There was no blockade, as American food aid was fairly continuous. Worst of all, the final sentence aptly describes the strategy of the left from the death of Tsar Alexander III onward. Of course, the point of it all is that endless terror will always have a justification. Trotsky calls this "revolutionary violence."

When applied to Stalin, it was "terror." Terror was used by Lenin right up to his death. As the bureaucracy required for this grew, with Trotsky's blessing, it developed into a systematic terror machine. Stalin created the NKVD, which just absorbed the Cheka, an institution of extreme political subjugation blessed by the old Bolsheviks to a man. The NKVD merely systematized the Cheka and gave it a more regularized structure. The OGPU (which was the party police) and Cheka were consolidated, and soon, they all were consolidated into the KGB, an empire unto itself. Their condemnations of Stalin were mere play-acting.

Trotsky's essential idea was the exaltation of the Jewish secular elite over the goyim, or the "cattle." That his faction was almost exclusively Jewish is dismissed as a coincidence and ignored. He was so ethnically obsessed that his entire view of Marxism had the Jewish element as its foundation in the same apocalyptic fervor as Moses Hess. Whenever there was a contradiction between a communist and a Jewish idea, the latter always won.

From the first beginnings of the Red forces, Trotsky's ethnic nationalism appeared over and again. The Reds had no relation to the land and were solely based in the cities and comprised almost exclusively of the Jewish middle classes. The national communists like the Ukrainian Borot'bist movement was anti-statist and agrarian. In fact, the Communist Party under Trotsky was so urban and so cut off from the land that their definition of "taking" or "occupying" an area just meant the surrender of its cities.

Trotsky's poorly disguised war against the peasant in Ukraine was called the "anti-Kulak movement." The "kulak" referred to any opponent of the regime without regard to income or possessions. Trotsky's typically diabolical and brilliant plan was to connect Ukrainian nationalists with the kulak movement. The question was an ethnic and not an economic one: On February 22, 1920, Trotsky and Lenin stated that "nation" and "kulak" were the same. Trotsky is reputed to have said, "I will decide what a Ukrainian is." If this is not genuine, it still is an apt summary of his policy.

Terrorism and Communism also made it clear that the peasant was not an actual person, but only potentially one. Further, in calling human rights “an imitation of Christian spiritualism” he made it clear that the slaughter of peasants was grounded on his Judaism. As in other works, Christian peasants were “lazy animals, those who fear the initiative and pressure; the peasant is sick; a herd and the absence of personhood.” His Judaeo-centrism is shown by the peppering of his writings with epithets such as “Pharisees” and “Philistines.” It is his Jewish nationalism alone that makes him the “good guy” of the “Russian” revolution. In the same work, he states, mocking Kautsky:

War, like revolution, is founded upon intimidation. A victorious war, generally speaking, destroys only an insignificant part of the conquered army, intimidating the remainder and breaking their will. The revolution works in the same way: it kills individuals and intimidates thousands. In this sense, the Red Terror is not distinguishable from the armed insurrection, the direct continuation of which it represents. The State terror of a revolutionary class can be condemned “morally” only by a man who, as a principle, rejects (in words) every form of violence whatsoever—consequently, every war and every rising. For this one has to be merely and simply a hypocritical Quaker.

Robert Service argues that Trotsky was the architect of the terror and was the most virulent of the Soviet leaders in this regard. In 1922, Trotsky, in giving the order for the Church’s destruction, stated, “Take great care that the ethnic composition of these [famine relief] committees does not give cause for chauvinism.” In other words, they must not look too Jewish.

Trotsky was not in the least interested in “workers” or the mystic “proletariat.” He was paid by both Jacob Schiff and the Germans. He lived in a mansion in the Bronx while writing for mainstream, leftist Jewish newspapers in Brooklyn. “Production” for him just meant the constant enrichment of his faction of the party. The party simply transferred all wealth to itself. Working conditions deteriorated and never returned to their Tsarist level.

No concern for any reforms benefiting labor were contemplated.

Trotsky was no Marxist. Marx based his vision on the notion that humans naturally seek to work and transform their environment. It is only that historical forms of this have been for the interests of others and hence the work is alienating. Trotsky makes a blanket, non-historical analysis of human nature:

As a general rule, man strives to avoid labor. Love for work is not at all an inborn characteristic: it is created by economic pressure and social education. One may even say that man is a fairly lazy animal. It is on this quality, in reality, that is founded to a considerable extent all human progress; because if man did not strive to expend his energy economically, did not seek to receive the largest possible quantity of products in return for a small quantity of energy, there would have been no technical development or social culture. It would appear, then, from this point of view that human laziness is a progressive force (Trotsky, 1920, ch. 8).

The non-Marxist statements there are many. Speaking of these variables without reference to history shows their non-Marxist origins. The phrase “economic pressure” is pregnant, as is “social education.” That the love for work has been based on “social education” is baffling, since he is referring to pre-Marxist regimes. Further, this statement rejects that technology is about profits or exploitation but comes from the “laziness” of “people.” Famously, Trotsky states:

While every previous form of society was an organization of labor in the interests of a minority, which organized its State apparatus for the oppression of the overwhelming majority of the workers, we are making the first attempt in world history to organize labor in the interests of the laboring majority itself. This, however, does not exclude the element of compulsion in all its forms, both the most gentle and the extremely severe. The element of State compulsion not only does not disappear from the historical arena, but on the contrary will still play, for a considerable period, an extremely prominent part (*Ibid.*).

Trotsky speaks with a forked tongue. He is precisely arguing that compulsion is needed to force labor to “work in its own interests.” Juxtaposed with other comments, he is not referring to pretentious phrases such as “class consciousness,” but compulsion is needed because workers are lazy and indolent. Their interests are not important. Hence, his views on terror, human nature and his role all join together.

Perhaps the most damning facts about Trotsky and his Jewish comrades was their personal fortune. Trotsky and his allies took goods from the workers and sold them on international markets. Trotsky’s two personal bank accounts in the USA were totaled at \$80 million, while in Switzerland, he had 90 million francs. Igor Bunich reports that Moisei Uritsky had 85 million francs, Felix Dzerzhinsky had 80 million while Ganetsky had a personal account of 60 million Swiss francs and 10 million dollars. The communist movement was not about labor. Soviet emigre Ivan Bunich writes,

Kuhn, Loeb and Co, who through their German branches supported Trotsky’s take-over in Russia in the autumn of 1917 with 20 million dollars, were later, in a half-year period, given 102, 290, 000 dollars in return. (*New York Times*, 23rd of August 1921.) That is to say, everybody involved in the conspiracy made enormous amounts of money from the sufferings of the Russian people (Bunich, 1992: 82-83).

Stalin’s overriding psychological motive was to destroy anyone who could expose this fact. Same for Trotsky and the rest. While that is a simplified motive, it is essentially accurate. Power was not enough. They needed total power, especially in 1925-1927, when the bureaucratic machinery had reached a point where total control was no longer theoretical. Totalitarianism can exist only in the modern world because only there did the scientific and ideological mechanisms exist for its implementation.

Stalin might not have understood how it worked, but he knew how to operate it.

There was certainly nothing anti-Leninist about Stalin and his approach. Lenin was as bloody as Stalin, but the former did not have command over a substantial bureaucracy in 1924. Neither man valued human life, especially since the Marxist idea was that man was nothing more than a bundle of nerve endings with no soul, freedom or purpose. With that sort of reductionist approach to the individual, sacrificing several million in the initial industrialization drive was not a major moral problem for either socialism or capitalism, which, by the late 19th century, accepted Spencer's view of the human being (Joravsky, 1977).

To counter this unexpected phenomenon, Stalin accelerated the collectivization of agriculture, something favored by both Lenin and Trotsky. This led to the development of agriculture in the countryside and the consequent realization of increased food production in the Soviet Union (Haugen, 2006), though this would continue to be the weak point in the Soviet economy, leading the West to bail out its "Cold War enemy" numerous times. As early as 1902, Lenin wrote:

Lenin [Lenin states rhetorically, speaking of himself] takes no account whatever of the fact that the workers, too, have a share in the formation of an ideology. Is that so? Have I not said time and again that the shortage of fully class-conscious workers, worker-leaders, and worker-revolutionaries is, in fact, the greatest deficiency in our movement? Have I not said there that the training of such worker-revolutionaries must be our immediate task? Is there no mention there of the importance of developing a trade-union movement and creating a special trade-union literature? (Quoted from Draper, 1990).

"Fully class conscious" is a euphemism. It refers to "workers" that support the party and believe that it is identical to the "working class." This view is identical over all major theorists of the Communist Party in the USSR. Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin were identical because their agenda was.

We Communists shall be able to direct our economy if we succeed in utilizing the hands of the bourgeoisie in building up this economy of ours and in the meantime learn from these bourgeoisie and guide them along the road we want them to travel (Lenin's 1922 Address to the 11th Congress of the Communist Party).

Stalin's infamous "socialism in one country" made little sense from the Marxian point of view. Bukharin and many others created a cottage industry out of condemning this odd conception. Bukharin, among others, held that Russia was incapable of being autarkic and could not be the world's sole socialist country. Socialism was, by definition, an international movement, and Russia needed the help of many other sympathetic countries to assist in the building of socialism. Quoting from Zinov'ev some years earlier, William Korey writes:

Thus, Zinov'ev found it necessary to gear his polemic to proving that (I) economically, a complete socialist society could not be achieved in Russia, and (ii) even if it were feasible, inevitable military action by capitalist states against the Soviet Union would bring the unfinished structure crumbling down (1950: 257).

Certainly, there was nothing in the Marxist canon that said anything about this sort of autarky. Oddly again, the continued agricultural and technical aid to the USSR from Western governments was an open secret to all who bothered to look. Leninist ideology held that the "capitalist powers" would try to destroy the USSR, not profit handsomely from her. Still, the huge American presence in Soviet industry remains a topic bizarrely verboten among specialists in the Soviet economy.

Hilariously, Lenin would believe that Western politicians and military elites were somehow "aware" of what Bolshevism was. Convinced that they were "threatened," Lenin created numerous "plots" that the West was creating against the Worker's Paradise. The "Envoy's Plot" was the creation of Trotsky, having no relation to the West at all. Of course, the West wanted to

profit from the building of socialism and had not the slightest ill will towards Lenin. His obsession was in part reflective of a cognitive contradiction that state capitalists in the West supported the state-capitalists of the East. He never was able to grasp why the West was so interested in building "socialism." Lenin, believing himself to be a "rebel" while taking a small fortune from Western elites, had to invent "plots" lest he go insane. Lenin would not permit the idea that he was a pawn in a broader game to ever enter his mind. Without any opposition from the state-capitalist West, he needed to invent it.

The broader point, however, is that Stalin was able to pursue "socialism" in an environment where even the capitalist powers were willing to aid in the development of this new "experimental" economy. The Cold War must be revised considering the major American investments in the USSR, both pre- and post-Stalin (cf. Carley and Debo, 1997; Lonsdale and Thompson, 1960; and Erickson and Hayward, 1991).

To consolidate his powers, Stalin began to increase the powers and the scope of the Soviet Union's intelligence. This move saw intelligence agencies being set up in many major countries in the world. This included France, Germany and the United States of America. Stalin knew that this was the only way he could overcome potential enemies of Communism. The intelligence gathered from these countries was going to be of importance especially when the Second World War began.

Trotsky unwittingly confirms this in his *Terrorism and Communism*:

The reasons enumerated above are more than sufficient to explain the difficult economic situation of Soviet Russia. There is no fuel, there is no metal, there is no cotton, transport is destroyed, technical equipment is in disorder, living labor power is scattered over the face of the country, and a high percentage of it has been lost to the front—is there any need to seek supplementary reasons in the economic Utopianism of the Bolsheviks in order to explain the fall of our industry? On the contrary, each of the reasons quoted

alone is sufficient to evoke the question: how is it possible at all that, under such conditions, factories and workshops should continue to function? (Trotsky, 1920: ch. 8).

Tongue in cheek, he says "the Soviet government was obliged to re-create it," apparently out of thin air. Realizing the absurdity of his position, he retreats to the explanation that the USSR suddenly became an industrial power because of the party's "intimate connection with the popular masses." This, indeed, fixed the fuel and steel problem.

Just before the beginning of World War II, the Soviet Union had tried to form an anti-German relationship with France and Britain. This proposition was, however, denied by the two countries and therefore Stalin led the Soviet Union to create another strategy by negotiating a non-aggression pact with the Germans. This ensured that Germany, which at the time was growing rapidly, traded with the Soviets. On first of September 1939, Germany attacked parts of Poland thereby starting the Second World War officially. The Polish military was about four times the size of the German, and Hitler's claim that the Poles had fired first are somewhat credible. The highly nationalist Polish military government was probably more national socialist than the German party was. The fact that Poland had a sizable Germany minority was not exactly lost on the Warsaw nationalists. The agreement between the USSR and Germany led to the acquisition of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania by the USSR, and they became a part of the Soviet Union (Lee, 1986). It is rare to hear that Stalin's simultaneous attack on Poland from the opposite direction started the war, but Stalin was an ally of the capitalists.

The "Cold War" began immediately after the death of Stalin. While there was substantial disagreement over the eventual fate of central Europe, the United States continued to trust "Uncle Joe." Veterans returning home to the United States were absolutely convinced that they had won the "good war" and had the uncanny ability to reject any stories about Stalin's death camps. Soon, Stalin was to finance "anti-imperialist" movements

in Korea and Indochina, and the veterans of the “good war” became even more patriotic as their own actions bore fruit in the Third World.

Victory in World War II consolidated Stalin’s power and helped create the image of the “battler against fascism.” Victory in a war of that scale cannot be underestimated as a source of legitimacy (Alexandrov, 2008 and Haugen, 2006 are both useful here in laying out more detail in this complex topic). In addition, using the assets and expertise of Western elites to rebuild the socialist economy created the illusion that Stalin was orchestrating the recovery effort.

On the ethnic front, the right wing in eastern Europe was slaughtered or sent into exile. Operation Keelhaul, orchestrated by Eisenhower, send thousands of Slavic anti-communists back to Stalin. Several major Ukrainian nationalists were murdered after the war, making the Ukrainian resistance within the USSR all the more difficult. NKVD units were deployed to other countries with the sole motive of eliminating any possible opponent. Yet, American capital continued to pour into the “enemy” land (Naleszkiewicz, 1966; see both the conclusion and introduction) and gave the poorly endowed Soviet experiment an artificially long life.

Stalin has fared a bit better in Western texts than Hitler has. It is socially acceptable to intone that Stalin industrialized the USSR, but “at a great cost.” It is not socially acceptable to say the same about Hitler’s Germany. Stalin’s treatment might be reduced to these realities: a) American academics had a love affair with Marxism that has still to be ended, b) Stalin won, Hitler lost, c) Marxism was always more interesting theoretically than National Socialism, d) Hitler’s treatment of his political opponents was of the “wrong” groups. No one really knows anything about Ukraine, but we all know about the Jews.

Certainly, the genocidal rhetoric of Himmler was identical to that of Ehrenberg. Stalin’s crimes were worse, and Stalin had even less time to commit them than Hitler did. There is some good reason to hold that Hitler was genuinely popular, until

maybe 1943, but Stalin's popularity cannot really be measured. If the size of the Soviet camps is an indication, then it might be that Stalin was loathed, and yet, victory can build a "legacy" like nothing else. Had Hitler won the war, maybe American academics would be filling the coffee houses with national socialist views rather than international socialist ones. True—Hitler did pass many laws protecting the rights of his workers while Stalin did no such thing. Stalin experimented on prisoners as Hitler did. Stalin committed genocide, as did Hitler. Stalin was surrounded by psychopaths, as was Hitler. Really, there is no difference except that Hitler lost.

There is no reason to believe that Stalin, regardless of Lenin's own late views, was any different than Lenin. Stalin continued Lenin's earlier policies. Lenin was different only in that he simply had a weaker country to work with. Lenin's Cheka were no less ruthless than Stalin's NKVD (Murray, 2011). Trotsky was more vicious than either of them, but the longstanding refusal to see him in anything but idealized form needs to be explained. Stalin created a massive empire from the eastern border of China to Romania. The Soviets backed Syria, Iraq, Angola, Mozambique, Cuba, North Korea and even India for a time. This is no small achievement.

However, capitalism being what it is, did not see an enemy in Stalin, just "another way of doing business." When the USSR sought to move into Western trading areas, the "Cold War" almost became hot. Ideology was not the problem, but the creation of a "new world order" could only have one hegemon. The Soviets' dependency on American grain in the 1970s is well known, which, by itself requires some analysis.

One way to deal with this is to say that American capitalists were simply more powerful than the state and, at least since the Civil War, have always been. It is normal to assume that states are the most powerful actor in a specific territory and political language always seems to reflect this. When a government is utterly dependent on firms such as Boeing, Northrop and Con-Agra, not to mention the banks that underwrite "public" debt,

then that government is merely the coercive arm of capital. The combined weight of all the technical, agricultural, financial, chemical and computer giants in America can be contained by any state. It might be that the government (that is, the state) simply did not have the resources to control everything in America in the way that Moscow was able to. Moscow could experiment on the camp population without a domestic murmur. In the US, Abbot Laboratories needed a different method. (Lee, 1986; this work was used to gather the information in this analysis. It does not necessarily agree in every detail with Lee or Meek).

Stalin "created" an industrial empire through forced labor, foreign investment and a large population. Terror cannot create economic growth, but it can mobilize the resources needed to maintain it. Tsarist Russia was also industrializing rapidly. Stalin tested the limits of liberal tolerance, forcing the issue whether or not there were any limits to state power if the aims of this power were "human equality and dignity." Marxism and Leninism, in the name of human dignity, slaughtered tens of millions in North Korea, Russia, Ukraine and China. Cambodia was China's instrument as Vietnam was Russia's. The defeat of Hitler might have saved the lives of millions, yet those deaths occurred instead in the East rather than the West.

Modernism ushered in a new civilization based on the technological domination of production. It also ushered in a technototalitarianism that both Hitler and Stalin used to their advantage. You cannot have one without the other.



Tikhon Caption: 50 words

CHAPTER EIGHT



SOVIET IDEOLOGY, WESTERN DELUSION & THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH IN THE USSR

The topic here concerns the use and abuse of Patriarch St. Tikhon (Bulavin) by both secular and Orthodox writers. The problem is that the usually non-critical approach of Western “scholars” on this subject lead to absurdities when it comes to Soviet methods. Since the left cannot use deceit, St. Tikhon must have truly accepted the Soviet state. The analysis of some of “Tikhon’s writings” that have “come down” to us gives a glimpse into the manipulation of words, language and names that lie at the heart of all propaganda.

Tikhon remains significant because he was a powerful voice against the Red takeover in the middle of the Civil War. His position was anything but enviable: divisions in his own Church, a ruthless Red enemy, White forces whose ideology was non-existent and a country that had been brutalized into insensitivity. When Tikhon accepted the office of patriarch in 1918, he was the first man to hold that title since 1701 when Peter I abolished the office of patriarch. Moreover, Tikhon also knew it was a death sentence, since the dissolution of Russian society was al-

ready far advanced. In such times, the only winners are those with the least amount of scruple.

As bishop in the United States between 1898 and 1907, he also held American citizenship for a time and was familiar with English. In 1898, he was made bishop of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands. His see was moved for a time to San Francisco and eventually to New York City.

The issue here is the Soviet approach to the Church and its reception both domestically and in exile. St. Tikhon condemned the Bolsheviks in no uncertain terms in 1918, accusing them correctly of creating war, division and daring to speak in the name of the "people."

GPU documents dated October 31, 1922 strongly insist that Tikhon is to be fought. Part of the means to do this is to create sectarianism and sow dissent in the Church itself. This was repeated in another document dated one year later. There was a time when speaking like this would get the writer banned from all academic cocktail parties for being a "conspiracy nut." Yet now, it's public record, and the cocktail party set now speaks of it as if they believed it all along. This is the way "nationalists" work, after all. June 13, 1928, the GPU recommends increasing support for sectarian groups, specifically the Doukhobors.

The first "document" from "Tikhon" is dated June 16, 1923. This is a poor example of propaganda that does improve in later years. This document is easy to show a fake, largely because it is made up of ideological clichés used by the lower level functionaries of the new Marxist state. For example, "Tikhon" is supposed to have said that his opinions could not be helped, since he "was the product of a monarchical society." That phrase alone is so packed with error that it would take a book to refute. Most irritating is the neologism of a "monarchical society" which does not exist. The crown refers to the state, not social life.

Of course, there is the obligatory acceptance of all state action against "Anti-Soviet" elements in Russian life. Worst of all is the absurd error that the "Whites" were identical to "royalists."

Of course, even a cursory glance of the writings of the major leaders of the "White" factions show a dedication to Kerensky and the basic Cadet position. The very reference to a "White movement" is absurd, since there was (historically speaking) never any such a thing. The writing is stilted and bureaucratic. This did not prevent the majority of "Russia experts" up until the late 1980s from accepting it without criticism (Pipes, 1974).

As time goes by, however, the propaganda gets more sophisticated and on occasion almost incoherent. "Tikhon" seems to be more than one person, and it is quite possible that the resulting hodgepodge of ideological posturing is the result of bureaucratic disagreement as to what the "Russian people" are or want. For example, on July 1, 1923, "Tikhon" is said to have written a condemnation of the Renovators and foreign involvement in Russian religious life.

Tikhon did actually say this. However, he is also supposed to have said that the "White monarchists" are to be condemned, as well as the Karlovci Synod, soon to be known as the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (sometimes in Exile). This seems to be inconsistent, largely because the Synod of Metropolitan Antony was certainly royalist; the Whites were anything but. It is silly to believe Tikhon would make such an error.

Another missive was issued in Tikhon's name on the 15th, again condemning the Renovators, while the August 23 offering also adds the "monarchists" to this list as well as the laughable sentiment that the USSR is "from God." These three missives read precisely as a clumsy way to add authenticity to the writing by including a condemnation of the Renovators. The GPU had rejected this idea by then anyway. Mentioning of the "Polish interference" in Russian life is predictable, since this was at the conclusion of the Polish-Soviet war. Rejecting these on those grounds alone is quite certain.

Now, after saying that the New Calendar cannot be imposed by the state or the synod without the full consent of the faithful, "Tikhon" is now (that is, September 30, 1924) "saying" that the "New Calendar should be immediately imposed." The

clumsy writer says that there “is great support for the calendar change” among “Russians.” The smoking gun is the statement that only “ignorance and fanaticism” is keeping “Russia” from accepting this “bold reform.” That American and English “historians” accepted this garbage as “historical documentation” for decades shows just how much the typical academic is to be trusted.

One of the bigger issues in this field is the famed Testament of Patriarch Tikhon from April 7, 1925. This writer has very good reason to dismiss it (or most of it) as poorly written propaganda, but slightly better than the GPU’s earlier attempts. This requires lengthy quotations from this document:

Coming to power over Russia, representatives of Soviet authority in January of 1918 issued an edict guaranteeing the complete freedom of Soviet citizens to believe what they wish in religious affairs. This means that the principle of “freedom of conscience” is enshrined in the Constitution of the USSR and it provides every religious group, and including our Orthodox Church, with the right and freedom to conduct its religious affairs in accordance with the requirements of their conscience, so long as it does not violate public order and the rights of other citizens. Because of this, we write to the archpastors and pastors of our flock to fully accept and acknowledge the new order of things, the Workers and Peasants government of the people. This government has been welcomed by the people. It is time to realize the Christian view that “the destiny of God’s people are being built together” and accept everything that has happened as an expression of God’s will. We will not sin against our faith and the Church by not meddling with these issues. We will permit no compromises or concessions in the area of faith and its civic expression, and we should be sincere with or respect for the Soviet government as an expression of the common good. We should adjust our church life to the new order of state and, in so doing, condemn every group that opposes this new order and any campaigns against it (Gubonin, 1994).

This can be found at the beginning of this Testament, and is a now common mixture of different factions putting this together within the Communist Party. The job of the scholar is to know both the ideology of Marx and Lenin, as well as those who were promoting it in the USSR. Once that is understood, the clichés in these missives are easily exposed as second rate versions of official propaganda.

A serious problem among the Anglo-American liberal cognoscenti is that the majority are not conversant in the details of philosophical writing or the ideological spectrum of the Soviet Union at the time. Since philosophy, theology, politics, economics and history are artificially separated, using one of these disciplines exclusively cannot help but lead to a distorted view of things. Marx has to be understood in detail (and in context), and then the malformations of his doctrine by lower level functionaries makes more sense (and is more humorous to read).

Understanding the technical vocabulary as it wound its way from Marx to Lenin is essential, since these clichés are little more than very bad summations of this transmission. Worse, very few “Russian experts” have the slightest clue about the Orthodox Church, and hence, most of their analysis on the matter is useless, albeit well intentioned.

“Tikhon” continues:

The public acts of our Orthodox communities should not be directed toward politics, which is completely alien to the church of God. It should be directed towards the strengthening of the faith, to fight the enemies of Orthodoxy: the sectarians, Catholics, Protestants, Renovators, atheists and all like them who use all their energy to attack Orthodoxy. The enemies of the Church have resorted to all kinds of deceptive acts, using violence, coercion and bribery in their effort to harm our church. Today in Poland, 350 of our churches have been reduced to just. The remainder were converted to the Roman faith or merely shut down. The Polish government has also engaged in the persecution of our clergy there (*Ibid.*)

While in the same document, the tone here has changed. First of all, the Church in Russia has normally defined “politics” as the daily grind of elections, party factions, backroom deals and bureaucratic ladder-climbing. It certainly does not deal with questions of justice or ethics. While these have political implications, they are not essentially political questions. In this respect, the writer here is correct. On the other hand, if by “politics” the writer means “opposing the Soviet state,” then it’s a deliberate manipulation of words. Given the circumstances, it is most likely the latter.

The tone changes, secondly, when the polemical and random comments about the newly revived Polish state comes up. The Soviet-Polish war ended in the Spring of 1921, and it delayed the establishment of Soviet power in large parts of Ukraine. Third, the most important aspect of Orthodoxy in Poland is not even mentioned: the establishment of autocephaly for the Orthodox Church in Poland from the patriarch of Antioch.

St. Tikhon erred in his condemnation of this canonical erection of an autocephalous Church, but his strong opinions on the matter are not even mentioned here. Refusing to explain what Churches are being closed (the Polish Church, the ROCOR or his own) the entire section is highly suspect. However, a low-level bureaucrat writing this would most likely be far more cognizant of the recent war than this canonical issue. Tikhon would have no doubt been quite the opposite. The section is randomly inserted, vague and totally irrelevant to what Tikhon had already manifested as his interest in the issue.

The worst can be found here:

Our enemies, forever trying to separate us from our beloved children entrusted to us by God, spread false rumors that we are not free to practice the faith and function as a church. We have full rights to preach the word of God, have full freedom of conscience and reject the fantasies of the enemies of the people who claim that we cannot communicate with our flock. These claims of our enemies are lies and fabrications and we denounce them. There is no power

on earth that can interrupt our patriarchal work. In fact, we are optimistic in our future and will succeed. We humbly ask you—our children—to continue in the work of God so as to be victorious over the sons of iniquity (*Ibid.*)

The comical problems here are too many to mention. First, St. Tikhon did not write like this; the GPU always used that sort of language. The key words are “denounce,” “fabrications and lies,” “fantasies” and, of course, “enemies of the people.” There is only a rare GPU document of this era that does not contain some of this sort of rhetoric. In addition, the saccharine phrases such as “beloved children” and its cognates are precisely what an atheist would imagine his stereotypical clergyman would say.

In July of 1923, “St. Tikhon” stated that he “strongly dissociates himself from both foreign and domestic monarchist and “White Guardist” counter-revolutionary movements.” Of course, this is clumsy propaganda, and is really the product of the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union in a case concluded on June 16, 1923.

At the same time, Metropolitan Peter (Polyansky) privately spoke of such coercive messages and stated, “Please do not pay attention to that; these are done for internal reasons. People we know on the inside tell us about the horrid conditions the Patriarch is forced to endure; and he feels powerless to escape. He might publicly say to submit to the Soviets, but always privately tells us to reject it, since it is an atheist regime dedicated to the destruction of the Church.” Comments like these can be taken at face value, or might even be an admission of ignorance.

E.A. Tuckov wrote that Tikhon was in regular correspondence with the Synod Abroad, and that the OGPU chief A.H. Artuzov believes that this is being carried out of the country by the Finnish and Latvian diplomatic couriers. The real problem in this era is to distinguish between Tikhon’s own words and that of the Reds; also, to distinguish Tikhon from allies speaking in his name, as well as statements made under extreme duress. The masterful ability of the GPU to use half-truths and double-meanings is legendary, but it seems that talent was not used on Tikhon. Nevertheless, it might be impossible to come to a com-

pletely certain conclusion.

The response was typical Soviet: They arranged the murder of Tikhon's brother Jacob, one organized by Tutchkov himself. The Regime then spread rumors that it was Tikhon himself that pulled the trigger, but at the same time, that it also might have been a "fanatical White Guardist" that would require a massive purge of the Church to avoid.

On February 15, 1930, Metropolitan Sergius (Stragorodsky), who in 14 years will be made patriarch, gave a press conference to Soviet journalists. A year earlier, Sergius gave almost the identical answers to foreign journalists. In answer to the question, "Does there really exist in the USSR persecution of religion and in what forms does it manifest itself?" the poor metropolitan stated:

There has not been any persecution of religion in the USSR. Due to the Decree on the separation of Church and State the profession of any faith is fully free, and is not persecuted by any state organ. Moreover, the last resolution of the TsIK and SNK RSFSR about religious organizations of 8 April 1929 completely excludes even the slightest semblance of any persecution of religion (Boobbyer, 171).

And in answer to the question, "Is it true that the godless are closing churches, and how do believers relate to that?" he stated:

Yes, it is true, some churches are closing. But the closure takes place not on the initiative of the [state] power, but on the wish of the population, and in certain cases even at the decision of the believers themselves. ... This news [attacks on clergy] does not correspond to reality in any way. It is all pure speculation and slander, completely unworthy of serious people. Certain priests have been called to account not for their religious activity, but charged for various anti-government activities (Boobbyer, 172).

The term for "conscience" "*sovesty*," is more than just an ethical voice in Russian; it justifies assent to a course of action. It is the meeting of the heart and the mind, that entity where cog-

nition and feeling come together. It is the whole body as one. Its similarity to the word “soviet” (*sovesty*) might well have been chosen on purpose.

One of the more laughable claims is that the “West” supported the “Whites.” This is nullified by so many facts that it would entail a book by itself. First of all, upon Kolchak’s mass retreat into Entente territory, the British authorities condemned Kolchak and stated that if he wanted relief aid, he would have to disband its entire army. Then the British flat-out refused to assist the Whites, demanding that they return to Russia.

It is occasionally retorted that France recognized Wrangel’s state and accepted all White refugees. Yet, this has no relation to anti-communism, but rather that Wrangel had the treasury of the Russian empire stowed away in Swiss banks. Since so much of the capital in Russia was owned by the French, this was seen as a “tribute” or a premium to begin repaying debts the Reds had repudiated with impunity. On the other hand, the immigration law in France was amended to say that even a traffic ticket or mild citation was sufficient to repatriate.

It is almost universally unknown that, in the refugee camps in the Balkans and Germany, the authorities forced all to liquidate their holdings at bargain-basement prices in exchange for any food aid while in exile. In Turkey, a separate market was established called the “Bazaar from Russian Refugees’ Property.” Starting in 1924, France, Germany and Italy banned all Russian doctors, accountants or lawyers from working within their borders. In one of many insults to Russians, the Versailles Conference did not recognize the Imperial Russian delegation regardless of the fact that millions of Russians died fighting Germany.

The “capitalist” West was far more effective than the Cheka in destroying the Russian opposition. The Russian emigration was penniless and powerless, as the White army was disarmed, dissolved and hounded out of existence through poverty and employment. This is certainly a strange way for the West to deal with anti-communists. Doesn’t money talk? At the same time, millions of dollars of investment and aid money from these

same powers was pouring into the USSR. Francisco Franco came under Western sanctions while Stalin was receiving aid and investment. To believe that the West was nothing if not pro-Marxist, statist and pro-Soviet can only come from constant repetition, as it can have no other source (Arato, 1978).

The pro-Bolshevik idea in the West continues to bear fruit. Absurdly, the academic establishment goes orbital when nationalist groups are conjectured to have “collaborated” with the Germans. Implied here is the idea that Stalin was a good man unjustly attacked by Hitler.

Further, that a suffering, bleeding and weak people have the luxury of these cosmopolitan and conformist moral principles shows the level of thoughtlessness to which American historians have now descended. In an almost knee-jerk reaction, “collaboration” is granted the most vile condemnation, while working with the Soviets is seen as heroic almost without exception.

It is common to claim that Stalin ordered the opening of many churches. This is false. In the first-class work of Kalkandjewa, she says:

Parallel with Decree No. 1325 of November 28, 1943, which allowed the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR to reopen Orthodox churches, Molotov ordered Karpov not to grant such permissions without the preliminary sanction of the government. In the period 1943–1945, believers submitted 5,770 requests for the opening of churches, but only 414 of them were granted (p. 184).

Her work comes from the opening of the new Kremlin archives, only recently unsealed, and is anything but flattering to the ROC. However, to his credit, Sergius did reject Stalin’s request to permit married bishops. On the other hand, it became very clear that ecumenism was part of the Soviet illusion of religious freedom. The first group were the naive Anglicans. The bishop of York at the time was Cyril Garrett, who headed the mission to the USSR.

Their reluctance to serve with Orthodox clergy did not come from any rejection of ecumenism, but due to the undying hatred

of the English for Russia. However, his subsequent book *The Truth about Religion in Russia* was as idiotic as could be imagined. He argued that the only reason the Church was liquidated in the 1920s was its support for the monarchy. Now, under Stalin, the Church is “reborn.” The BBC aired this as well, creating a mini-series that romanticized Stalin as the “religious leader” of the Russian Church. The MI6 also beamed it into Eastern Europe so as to prevent any rebellion against Stalin.

Metropolitan Benjamin Fedchenko (d 1961) is an important transitional figure between the world of Tikhon and that of Sergius. His views came to typify the basic position of the accommodation of the “Russian Orthodox” bishops and the Soviet state. He defended the Moscow Patriarchate’s submission to the USSR shortly after the death of Tikhon. He argues that the Red forces created a consolidated state that was irresistible. The Church had no choice but to accept it. He says that the Reds came as a chastisement for the sins of Russia, hence, it must be recognized and accepted. Ultimately, this was the view of Metropolitan Sergius.

Bad kings of Israel were not repudiated by the Temple authorities, but this begs the question. Part of the reason why they were bad kings—e.g., Jeroboam II—was their purging of the Temple and murder of the prophets. Hence, this is assuming the consequent. From this argument for Old Testament “submission” Metropolitan Benjamin concludes that all power is from God. Itself question begging.

More seriously, Benjamin argues that strict canonical order is not possible given the chaos of the war and its aftermath. Making detailed canonical arguments—as many opponents of the Patriarchate do—makes little sense given the lack of law in general as well as the inability to communicate or gather relevant information. Overall, history is in God’s hands, including Lenin. It is impossible to understand the inner workings of his mind, especially under such horrific conditions. In basic spirituality, he was quite traditional and was the defender of the Optina tradition far into the Soviet period. The fact that he argued that humanity

is in a constant state of degeneration since the fall, the accommodation to the USSR is necessary. The human element will no longer support anything else but power and materialism.

Similarly, Innocent of Kherson argued that the Reds forced the Church into an existence apart from social life. This is a form of cleansing—the Church tries to sanctify social life, not reorder it. This is a rationalization in that the Church has always been at the center of everything social. The state has no social rights in Orthodox thought except in carrying out the inner meaning of theology. From the prophets to St. Paul to Joseph of Volog, the Church has been the very content of social laws, not the state. Claiming that “the Church is not a social force” is a weak and desperate rationalization, not a theological opinion.

Worse, he argues that the mass murder of Orthodox people is a “cleansing and purging” of the Church, and hence is justified. In the process of this “purging,” he argues, Russia has been unified and centralized. The Reds are no different than the Mongols, Turks or Crusaders in this regard. To believe that Lenin did not do any good at all is absurd. To his credit, he did not reject the ROCA but sought a balanced accommodation with it. Both men did not believe the USSR would last long. Both believed that even if it did, it would soon lose its revolutionary character and become nationalized.

While Sergius’s Declaration of July 1927 is often quoted, it is rare that the entire paper is read. What makes the Church of the Soviet period distinct from all other forms of torment before it is that he identified the Church explicitly with the body of the USSR. From his Declaration:

Every blow directed against the Union, be it war, boycott, or simply murder from behind a corner, like that in Warsaw, we acknowledge as a blow directed against us. Remaining Orthodox we remember our duty to be citizens of the Union “not from fear, but from conscience,” as the Apostle has taught us (Rom 13:5). And we hope that with God’s help, by your general cooperation and support, we shall resolve this matter (quoted from Boobbyer, 170).

By claiming that the body of the Church is identical to that of the state (or the Soviet idea more generally), he is making an ontological statement striking in its content. Even if Sergius was promised freedom for priests in exchange for his words, he did not have to go this far.

Making a mockery of the whole process, the foreign journalists, once they got a hold of this, printed it as fact, without research or even approaching the exile community in all Western major cities.

It is almost laughable to argue that Western policymakers and diplomatists knew anything about Marxism or Bolshevism. Only in the post-World War II era did the West undertake any serious study of Russia, and this is largely worthless. For the Western world, there was nothing inherently immoral about demanding equality, though the Reds were concerned with no such thing. A strong state sector is not only acceptable in the West, it's Western policy. As far as Western capital was concerned, the USSR was no threat, but the result of a huge wealth transfer from the former capitalists to the party. It mattered not who was controlling the wealth, only their willingness to let the West profit from it. That they did. There is no evidence whatsoever that the West was ever threatened by the USSR on ideological grounds, or that any significant figure among Western policymakers knew what Bolshevism was (Tucker, 1971).

St. Tikhon was not dealing with an isolated USSR, but also a Western-backed Red state that soon became a playground for Western capital. Tikhon was dealing with materialism and globalism, not "Marxism." In early 1919, the Entente demanded a rapprochement between Red and White for the sake of maintaining a buffer against a defeated Germany. Fedchenko helped negotiate the very unpopular Brest peace treaty, which, if anything, signaled the inability of Russia to fight for the West.

The Entente wanted to use the Czech POWs as well as the "ideologically reliable" Whites to recreate the eastern front at the end of the war. This was somewhat realistic in that the Czechs

needed little prompting to fight the Germans and Austrians.

Great Britain early on rejected the White movement due to its "Great Russia" position. That was a threat to British colonialism in Central Asia, East Asia and the Middle East. While the Reds were awash in weapons and cash, the White forces were almost always out of ammunition. The latter received no aid, and the few rifles sent to them were inoperable. The result was that the British sought to unseat Denikin, while Germany saw Red Russia as a useful ally against the West. Since the Bolsheviks would assist the "revisionist powers," Germany became heavily invested in the new USSR.

It has often been argued that "religion" was persecuted in the USSR. As in the West, "religion" is a code word for "Christianity." However, in the book *Religion, State and Politics in the Soviet Union and the Successor States* (Cambridge UP, 1994) John Anderson cites official and non-official statistics that say otherwise. The height of Khrushchev's repression of Orthodoxy was between January of 1958 to the year of his overthrow, 1964.

Anderson's statistics deal with the numbers of institutions closed, mostly parishes, from all denominations. In this period of time, the Orthodox Church, the sole target of the repression, went from 13,430 parishes (many opened due to Stalin's interest in the war) to roughly 7,500 in 1964, a reduction of half. Almost all of this was accomplished through the command of the regime through the synod.

The other religious groups saw only token repression. The Roman Church saw the reduction of their 1,244 parishes to 1,046, mostly in the West and the Baltics. This is a decrease of 16%. The Lutherans gained a parish in this period, going from 451 to 452. Jews saw a few closures due to the Zionist connection, going from 135 synagogues to 92, though the sect was officially sponsored in the far east. Buddhism—not a religion but a philosophy of life—was not touched at all. The Mormons were not touched, and the sectarian Molokans likewise. Baptists and Old Believers saw a few closures, though the Old Believer statistics cannot be accurate given their long tradition of never



Nikita: 40 words

reporting their existence. Muslims saw about 100 mosques closed, a 22% decrease for them. All other sects saw no repression whatsoever (Anderson, 1994: 55).

Many of the non-Orthodox closures can be explained through specific motives: Islam to control the Central Asian republics, the Jews for Zionism, and the Armenians for nationalism. These were not religious issues at all. The Orthodox were destroyed for being Russian and Orthodox at the same time, a deadly combination under the materialist and Darwinian Marxists. One of the most painful episodes of this period is the behavior of the "Russian Orthodox Church." Reading Anderson's detailed analysis, it becomes clear that this sectarian group was little more than a transmission belt for Soviet demands. One example is both humorous and vile.

In 1960, one of the strategies to destroy Orthodoxy was to remove priests from any close connection to the parish. Seven

months later, the Moscow Church called a “sacred synod” at Zagorsk, where they decreed that priests were to be removed from any social or financial aspect of Church life. All they did was take the KGB order and pasted it into a “Church document.” This tragic and comic episode was a daily event in the Soviet Union.

CONCLUDING NOTE

The author is not judging the clergy. The threat of camps, starvation, torture and the destruction of their families was very real. They had seen it for themselves. Their fear was reasonable, and they conformed to the state rather than be frozen to death on the White Sea.

Most Americans, the author included, would likely have done the same rather than risk their wife, children and parents being sent to the Taiga. To hear comfortable, suburban Orthodox in America condemn the “traitors” and “apostates” in the Soviet Union is enough to cause severe blood pressure issues. They would all have waved the hammer and sickle if their Volvo was threatened. They would have sold their priest up the river if their credit score might go down a point. The Church at the time had no validity. Their personal decisions, however, if they were truly Orthodox and not just bureaucrats, are understandable and rational.

In 1975, Fr. Gleb Yakunin and the lay scholar Lev Regelson addressed the Nairobi meeting of the World Council of Churches (WCC). This organization exists solely from corporate donations from Western firms. Their speech to the group was ironic. They asked why this body piously condemned every injustice in the world—real or imagined—except one: the persecution of the Orthodox Church in the USSR. They received no answer except a swift condemnation from the “Russian Orthodox Church” present there. Yet for all this, the party complained about an Orthodox revival as early as 1970 and, worse, that the new generation of believers were far better educated than earlier.

Even the best of scholars remarks that “Western pressure” influenced the Soviet policy on religion, yet they are incapable of providing any real documentation. When Jews were forbidden to emigrate to Israel, the U.S. Congress erupted in indignation. For the Orthodox, the collective yawn would force a blackout due to the excess of carbon monoxide in the air. The fact that the WCC was the “religious wing” of corporate America generally negates any claim that the “West” was anything but supportive of Soviet policy in that respect. When it was clear that the Orthodox in Russia were advocating “nationalism,” the crushing persecution by Andropov was met with barely concealed nods of approval.

The otherwise excellent book by Anderson argues that “detente” was the cause of the Soviet easing up on persecution. He suggests that detente was about lowering “Cold War” tensions, and thus, reducing the execution rate of the Orthodox was a means to show “good faith.” The truth was that detente was the Soviet plea for some space and greater aid. Their economy was struggling and, as always, Western corporations struck deals with Moscow for lower grain prices. Chief among these corporate financiers of the USSR was Archer-Daniels-Midland, one of the main companies financing the WCC.



Caption: Field and Nikita: 40 words

CHAPTER NINE



THE COLD WAR

Grandiosity and Rhetoric as a Diplomatic Confrontation Between Two Factions of the Ruling Class

The Cold War refers to an era of political and military tension during the period of 1948 to the end of 1991. The war is described as “cold” since there was no actual or large-scale fighting against the opposing states except through proxy armies. The U.S. lost tens of thousands of men in Korea and Vietnam while the Soviets lost men in Afghanistan. Thus, “cold” might not be the best description.

This section will argue that the Cold War is best understood as a matter of two empires fighting over trade organization rather than ideology. Both empires sought dominance over the globe rather than just a limited area such as a state or region. Foreign policy and diplomacy were two extremely important ways this battle was carried out. In fact, diplomacy was dominant here largely because the U.S. was heavily invested in the USSR, which is a fact curiously omitted from mainline histories of this era. Empires at war are not usually investing in the other’s

economy. As argued in Paul Dukes's *The USA in the Making of the USSR*, there could be no "evil empire" without massive cooperation between the two powers.

The Cold War involved the entire globe. Almost all the world's peoples took part in the Cold War, either directly or in a supportive role. What makes this "war" unique is that, since the two empires did not directly fight one another, diplomacy rather than physical violence was the preferred mode of battle. The Third World, much of which became independent during this era, was forced to base itself around allegiance to one pole or the other, often playing them off against each other for the sake of greater concessions. For the first time, the peoples in the Third World were able to shift the focus of a conflict.

After World War II, the world was divided into spheres of influence between two empires with different social systems, but systems that were more alike than distinct. Though Marxism as such was not the issue nor the cause of the Cold War, this huge state-led monolith of the Soviet Union was an alternative trading bloc to that which was (directly) controlled by the U.S. The Soviet Union sought to maintain and expand the "socialist camp," led by a single center based on the Soviet administrative-command system. In its sphere of influence, the Soviet Union sought the political domination of the Communist Party and, as a result, the introduction of state ownership of the basic means of production (which is the same as "private property"). Thus, the "ideological" component was over what entity would rule oligarchically over the empire: a political bureaucracy or an economic elite. Thus, "ideology" was not the cause of the war, and, as it turns out, the U.S. has mastered both.

The United States, a long-time ally of the USSR since World War I, sought a global order based around private corporations efficiently competing for profit. There, the consumer could "vote with his dollar" and support only those enterprises that served his interests. The USSR sought a state-run economy as a temporary situation awaiting the demise of capitalism and the institution of economic equality. Despite this difference between

the two systems, their systems had much in common. Both systems are based on the principles of industrial society, which required industrial growth, and hence the increase in the consumption of resources.

Both systems were materialist (metaphysically speaking) in that social progress is best defined in material terms such as GDP, technological innovation and scientific breakthroughs. Both sides accepted modern science implicitly and its practical application into technology. Both sides saw the Enlightenment as a positive thing and the Middle Ages as a time of “darkness.”

Both saw social organization as essential to justice, and both placed the state front and center in this organization. Both were highly bureaucratic and highly centralized. Both were obsessed with quantity: If it was not measurable in numbers, it probably did not exist. Both were involved in developing drugs for psychological problems and “medicalizing” dissent. Both fielded first-class internal security systems and external espionage. Both systems were oligarchies and both systems claimed the formal existence of rights and democracy. Both sides claimed to have interpreted the trajectory of history and had a tendency to reduce everything to economics (Stern, 205-206).

The U.S. and USSR were far closer than normally described. Ideology was never the issue, since many allies of the U.S. had fully statist economies. Corporate capital can profit in the USSR as easily as in the US, as hundreds of corporations invested in the USSR—such as General Electric and Ford Motors—can prove. It did not matter which force held capital, but rather the scientific acumen of either side that was the determinant of victory and hence, justice. The Third World especially developed a form of national socialism that stressed both the nation and state in economic development and the goal of material equality.

The immediate start of the “Cold War” was due to conflicts in southern Europe and Asia. For some time, Western populations were shown rosy views of Soviet industrial development. Since Hitler had been the main enemy, Russia was idealized, especially in its Soviet guise (Stern, 10-15). However, as

soon as it became clear that Stalin was interested in far more than defeating Hitler, the U.S. saw its potential global empire threatened. It was "Russian nationalism" rather than communism that was the threat (Sakwa, 164-168).

The front of the "Cold War" lay not between countries but within them. About a third of the population of France and Italy supported the Communist Party. This is easy to envisage since Stalin's crimes had been deliberately covered over for the sake of Allied Unity. That Western companies were heavily invested in the USSR is also an overlooked reason that ideology was not an issue.

In 1947, Secretary of State George Marshall announced that the United States was willing to provide financial assistance to the countries of Europe for their post-war economic recovery. Initially, even the Soviet Union was involved in negotiations for the provision of assistance, but it soon became clear that American aid would not be given to countries that did not hand over their economic records so as to determine their objective needs. While aid continued to flow to Moscow throughout this "War," Stalin refused to countenance the internal snooping of the Marshall Plan. It should be noted that Francisco Franco in Spain was not even considered for Marshall Plan aid due to the "non-democratic" nature of the state (Hogan, 189-200). Franco was forced to develop an autarkic economy, as was South Africa, while the USSR received billions in both aid and investment, more proof that "communism" was never the issue (Payne, 248).

The United States demanded political concessions in hopes of compensating for Roosevelt's explicit sanction of Stalin's colonization of eastern Europe. Under pressure from the United States, some communists were expelled from the governments of France and Italy, and in April 1948, 16 countries signed the Marshall Plan to provide them with \$17 billion in assistance from 1948-1952. Eastern European countries did not participate in the plan (Hogan, 55).

As the intensification of the struggle for Europe's future grew, Moscow needed to clamp down on the contacts her satellite

states had with the West. In 1949, most Eastern European countries came together in an economic union—the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

These events fixed the division of Europe so that in April 1949 the United States, Canada and most countries in Western Europe created NATO. Turkey was to join in 1952. The USSR and Eastern Europe only in 1955 responded by creating their own military alliance—the Warsaw Pact (Sakwa, 334).

In 1960, the Soviet Union was surrounded by American military bases (Zubok, 66). While vacationing in the Crimea, Khrushchev drew attention to the fact that even its beach was within direct reach of American missiles in Turkey. Khrushchev decided to put America in the same position. Using the fact that Castro had repeatedly asked the USSR to protect them from possible attacks by the United States, the Soviet leadership decided to install nuclear missiles in Cuba (Zubok, 143-149).

Now every city in the USA could be wiped out in a matter of minutes. In October 1962, this led to the Cuban missile crisis. As a result of the crisis, the world was brought very close to the edge of a nuclear catastrophe. The result was that a compromise was reached: The USSR removed missiles from Cuba, and the United States guaranteed Cuban independence under Soviet protection and, in addition, withdrew its missiles from Turkey (Zubok, 145-147).

During the period of detente (that is, the post-Cuban world), important agreements were developed on limiting the arms race, including agreements to limit missile defense (NMD) and Strategic Nuclear Arms (SALT-1 and SALT-2). However, the SALT agreements had a significant disadvantage. Limiting the total volume of nuclear weapons and missile technology, it hardly touched the deployment of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, either side could concentrate a large number of nuclear missiles in the most dangerous places in the world, not thereby breaking the agreed-upon total volume of nuclear weapons (Zubok, 184).

In 1976, the Soviet Union began to modernize its medium-range missiles in Europe. Soviet missiles were able to quickly

reach targets in Western Europe. As a result of this upgrade, the balance of nuclear forces in Europe was upset. It daunted the leaders of Western Europe, who feared that the United States would not be able to assist them against the growing nuclear might of the USSR. In December 1979, NATO decided to deploy the Tomahawk missile design in Western Europe. These missiles could destroy the major cities of the USSR, while the territory of the United States for a time would remain invulnerable (Bacon, 94-96).

As the security of the Soviet Union was threatened, Moscow launched a campaign against the deployment of new American missiles and was even willing to dismantle some of their nuclear weapons in Europe. Strangely, a set of "spontaneous rallies" against missile deployment erupted in Germany and elsewhere. The new president of the United States Ronald Reagan proposed in 1981 the so-called "Zero Option," that is, the full withdrawal of all Soviet and American nuclear medium-range missiles from Europe. The problem was that this did not affect British and French missiles aimed at the Soviet Union. Brezhnev refused the "Zero Option" (Bacon, 93-96).

As detente fell into memory, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 re-ignited the "Cold War." In retaliation, the U.S. planned economic sanctions on the USSR in 1980-1982. In 1983, President Reagan called the Soviet Union an "evil empire" due to its lack of democracy and the system of GULag camps that had become part of the Soviet economic structure. New American missiles in Europe were the obvious response. Yuri Andropov, a hardline reformer, stopped all negotiations with the United States (Zubok, 272).

Andropov could be a hard-liner and a reformer, since he was fully supportive of central planning, but, by the mid-1980s, the USSR entered a period of crisis. The purely bureaucratic economy could not meet the growing needs of the population as the wasteful use of resources led to a significant reduction in the Soviet standard of living, especially in contrast to the USA (Zubok, 272-276). Soon, Andropov and his successor Chernenko faced

a population that began to agree with Reagan (Zubok, 275-277). The USSR found it increasingly difficult to bear the burden of the "Cold War" while at the same time supporting allied regimes around the world and waging war in Afghanistan. More prominent and dangerous was the glaring technological backwardness of the USSR versus the capitalist countries (Levine, 3-9).

In these circumstances, President Reagan decided to quicken the pace of the USSR's destruction. The current estimate of Soviet foreign exchange reserves was a paltry \$25-30 billion. The USSR had to get additional financial injections from Western European banks, which is a strange way to "weaken" the USSR or fight a "war" with them. In 1981, in response to the suppression of the workers' movement in Poland, Reagan announced a series of sanctions against Poland and its Soviet sponsor (Zubok, 265-275).

Events in Poland served as another pretext for aggression, because this time, unlike the situation in Afghanistan, international law had not been violated by the Soviet Union. The United States declared the termination of the supply of oil and gas equipment to the Warsaw Pact, which again, suggests that the Cold War was not really a war at all. To threaten that the U.S. will no longer help buttress the Soviet economy seems a strange sort of threat. Much of NATO wanted to cooperate with their "enemy" over natural gas deliveries to Western Europe and rejected Reagan's approach. Because of this, Soviet industry was able to independently produce the pipeline delivery system to furnish the West with gas (Rutland, 129-134).

Reagan's crusade against the pipeline failed, as NATO decided that profiting the USSR was better than fighting it. None of this really mattered when, in 1983, President Reagan proposed the idea of a "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI), quickly parodied by the Western media as "Star Wars." This was a space-based system that could protect the United States against nuclear attack (Zubok, 292-293).

The program was implemented in circumvention of the ABM Treaty, though Reagan realized that treaties are signed due to national self-interest and not exactly eternal law (Bacon, 125-

127). The Soviet Union did not have the technical capacity to respond to such a system. Despite the fact that the United States had yet to perfect this ambitious project, the USSR was so sensitive to the West's scientific superiority that risking its imminent deployment was too much.

In March of 1985, a new general secretary of the CPSU was elected (by the party): Mikhail Gorbachev. In 1986, he proclaimed a policy of broad reforms known as *perestroika*. In November of 1985, Gorbachev met with Reagan in Geneva and offered to significantly reduce nuclear weapons in Europe in exchange for the abandonment of SDI. It is arguable that the moment Reagan said "no," the USSR was no more. Chernobyl, Afghanistan, American economic growth and the American dominance of the dawning computer age were too much. Gorbachev wanted more American investment in the USSR, which was the real background to Soviet "restructuring."

In the summer, both sides began to probe the possibilities for a "second Geneva," which famously took place in 1986 in Reykjavik, Iceland. Again Gorbachev offered large-scale reductions in nuclear weapons overall, but only in exchange for the abandonment of SDI. It became clear that the USSR was not negotiating from a position of strength. SDI became the issue, from which there could be no deviation as far as Moscow was concerned. To refer to a Soviet threat from this point on was just silly. Reagan gambled and won.

The U.S. faced some domestic opposition to the "Cold War" posture in Africa and Central America, but the financial position of the Soviet Union began to deteriorate for reasons not directly related to it. The economy of the Soviet Union depended on oil prices, which began to fall in 1986, the same year that the Chernobyl disaster seriously weakened the financial balance of the USSR. This made it even more difficult to reform the country's planning system and spurred more grassroots initiatives among the subject peoples of the Soviet Union. Both in Russia itself and in powerful nations such as Ukraine and the Baltic states, opposition to Soviet policy erupted to the point where accepting

them became a *fait accompli*.

The destruction of the USSR from 1989 to 1991 is historically unprecedented. Even in times of desperate warfare, empires the size of the USSR do not decompose overnight. Moscow disintegrated in peacetime and in a very brief time window. It is unprecedented also in that it was not predicted by those who are paid to make such predictions. In fact, the CIA and MI6 were claiming a strong and robust Soviet economy in 1988.

Part of the problem was progress—the economy became too complex. The greater the requirement for specialization, the less power parties and dictators have. Managers did not respond to threats. Rather, threats created scapegoating and dissimulation. This, however, was reaching the point of diminishing returns outside of a market. From 1955 to 1977, Gosplan says that unfinished construction went from 73% to 92% of all investment projects.



Caption: 50 words

CHAPTER TEN



RUSSIAN HISTORY AND THE MYTH OF THE COLD WAR

Western Capitalism as the "Builder of the Workers Paradise"

Since 1992, Soviet Communism was no longer fashionable. Major media signaled their friends that Stalinists were now "conservatives." The new threat is from "nationalists" who, as it turns out, were the same all along. The BBC hack-documentary on North Korea declared that country a "fascist dictatorship" on the "right of the political spectrum." Again, the same movement is at work: If the system is to condemn something, it must be rightist. Suddenly, communist, nationalist and fascist are the same thing. For historians, the problem is that communism was never the problem in American policymaking; nationalism was.

The Cold War is a myth. It never happened. This is fairly easy to prove by showing the billions of dollars the United States and Western Europe invested in the Soviet economy. There was no break in this, and at critical times, the USSR was bailed out by cheap grain sales from Archer Daniels Midland and other conglomerates.

As always, the mythic “Cold War” does have a grain of truth to it, but it has little in common with the “fear of communism” that policymakers neither understood nor feared. The problem was when the East sought to create a large, powerful trading bloc outside of Western control. Then—and only then—threats about “tyranny” and the “Red menace” could be heard. Even in those exceptional times, corporate America continued to irrationally invest in “building socialism.”

So it is not entirely surprising to read that President Ford refused to meet with Solzhenitsyn so as to not “prejudice” Brezhnev at a summit held later. Reagan did the same thing, only meeting with liberal dissidents like Sakharov (Kengor, 2010). Both presidents, ostensible anticommunists (but still willing to profit from Moscow), were willing to work with the Soviets but never “Russian nationalism.” This cries out for explanation. The Cold War was anything but a war. Russian nationalism was the target, not “Marxism.”

Sanctions have been put on Putin’s Russia that have never been advocated even at the height of the GULag system. The president of nationalist Russia has been the target of what Stephen Cohen calls “ongoing extraordinary irrational and non-factual demonization of Putin” from the West. No Soviet dictator was even remotely treated so harshly. A shooting war with Russia is a very real possibility. There was not a moment where even vociferous disagreement was possible with the USSR.

The West is broke, deeply indebted, bereft of leadership and slowly falling into poverty. Yet the main foreign-policy objectives of this country are to overthrow pro-Russian governments in Uzbekistan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia. At a low point in the American legitimacy, she is willing to risk a nuclear war for the first time in her history. Anti-war protests have predictably been silent, since the corporate behemoth only financed them when defending the USSR. There is no “peace movement” calling for negotiation with Russia just like there is no peace movement protesting the absurd Afghan war. The U.S. engages in provocative war games in Ukraine and Bulgaria with little do-

mestic protest. This never occurred during the “Cold War.” The “no nukes” groups no longer exist precisely at the time where nuclear war is very possible.

The U.S. defends the “integrity” of Ukraine today but accepted her absorption into the USSR yesterday. The U.S. sends agents into Ukraine to overthrow the government but refused to countenance the idea in 1956 or 1968. The U.S. military is lauded by left and right alike as heroic, superhuman and morally without spot. Yet, soldiers coming home from Vietnam were attacked physically by protesters at the behest of major media. The constant seems to be that fighting the USSR was considered a bad idea and officially rejected. A nationalist and non-communist Russia is a threat to world peace.

The Obama administration overturned the “trade embargo” on Cuba on December 17, 2014. The implication is that the U.S. was an enemy of Marxism and thus, the embargo was begun to force the left out of Cuba. Nothing can be further from the truth. The West built socialism, not only in the early stages, but throughout the Soviet experience. This dirty secret of Western economics is barely mentioned, let alone analyzed. In his 1985 work on Soviet technology, TW Luke writes:

The Bolsheviks stressed to Soviet workers, managers, and intellectuals the centrality of industry over agriculture in the NEP of 1921. Trotsky notes, “We [the Soviet Union] are in a process of becoming a part, a very particular part, but nonetheless an integral part of the world market. ... Foreign capital must be mobilized for those sectors of [Soviet] industry that are most backward.” ... These technological imports were to be limited because the Bolsheviks recognized the dangers of dependencies on the core, especially technological dependence. For example, resolutions of the 14th Party Congress in 1925 stressed the “whole series of new dangers” in Western trade and advocated domestic technical development to prevent the USSR from becoming, in Parrot’s words, “an appendage of the capitalist world-economy.” Still, as Sutton notes “the penetration of early Soviet industry was remarkable,

Western technical directions, consulting engineers and independent entrepreneurs were common in the Soviet Union." Even so, throughout the 1920s the Soviet state tightly regulated foreign access to suit its technological needs (Luke, drawing from Sutton 1985: 339).

Not only did the U.S. and Western Europe build the USSR, but they did so as their own populations were struggling. The West was so involved in building socialism that the 14th Congress, mentioned above, was concerned about the loss of Soviet independence. From the same article:

The impact of imported technologies differed from industry to industry and from region to region. In the oil industry, for example, they were vital. Petroleum exports in 1926-1927 doubled 1913 exports. Alone, they provided 20% of Soviet foreign exchange earnings: 'the importation of foreign oil-field technology and administration, either directly or by concession, was the single factor of consequence in this development (Sutton, 1968:43). While the overall imports of expertise and technology dropped in value from the 1893-1913 levels, the Bolsheviks' bureaucratically planned economy stressed the need for post-1918 imports to be directed toward cost-efficient and economically necessary production to fit the planned industrial program of the regime (Luke, 1985: 339-340, also drawing on Sutton).

The significance here is that the Cold War was a myth. No war features one combatant feverishly investing in building their opponent. Western capital was not anti-communist but saw the Soviet system as the perfect version of itself: a totally centralized economy run by experts from one source. Capital looked upon Gosplan with envy, as Gosplan was identical in its powers to the small group of financial conglomerates that control the U.S. economy in 2015. They approve or reject all investments, set targets, measure economic growth, dictate the amount of money in circulation, manipulate statistics and in all respects—down to the last detail—control the American economy with little reference to the market. Gosplan is no dif-

ferent institutionally or ideologically from the American financial elite, as not a penny is invested in the U.S. economy without their direct approval and control. Needless to say, the royalist and Orthodox emigre groups were infiltrated by both FBI and KGB, and rejected, often violently, from having any role in the global ideological realm. Had the West not subsidized the USSR, communism would not exist.

The propulsion systems for much of the Soviet navy and, significantly, at Haiphong Harbor were from American firms. Nixon and Johnson actively went out of their way to stop any move to stifle trade with the USSR, even in the midst of the Vietnam War. The Gorki Truck plant was shipping hundreds of vehicles a month to North Vietnam with the full blessing of the State Department. Of course, it was Ford's plant and it was largely staffed by Americans. Henry Ford created the Soviet automotive industry, especially in the development of trucks. His Gorki plant was also making rockets and other military equipment for the USSR without comment from the U.S. Soviet rockets were fired on Ford GAZ-69 chassis (cf. Sutton for the details on these).

In 1968, Fiat Motors created the world's largest automotive plant in the world at Volograd. ZIL was created by New Britain Machine Company. Nixon personally approved the Kama truck plant deal, the creation of an automotive and trucking plant creating 100,000 vehicles per year in 1972, which at the time was more than all U.S. automakers put together. The plant itself came to occupy 36 square miles, every inch created by the U.S. (Berliner, 1976; his *Innovation Decision in Soviet Industry* is a useful analysis of these inputs).

In Korea, the North Korean Army and China were using trucks made by Ford and tractors by Caterpillar. Soviet fighters were equipped with Rolls Royce engines sent to Stalin by the British automaker. As Anthony Sutton explains, it was the elite, including Maurice Stans, Peter G. Peterson, Peter Flanigan, Averell Harriman and Robert McNamara that created the infrastructure for constant and lucrative trade with the "enemy" USSR.

All evidence from the State or Commerce Departments has not been declassified. Only through insistent demands have these documents been granted to the public. It is highly likely that the unclassified papers from 70 years ago are largely detailed agreements between American capital and the "Soviet enemy." The Ural Steel complex that served as the heart of Soviet industrialization was 100% American. The McKee Corporation built the world's largest steel and iron plant in the world in the USSR:

Organization methods and most of the machinery are either German or American. The steel mill "Morning" near Moscow, is said to be one of the most modern establishments of its kind in the world. Constructed, organized and started by highly paid American specialists, it employs 17,000 workers and produces steel used by motor plants, naval shipyards and arms factories (U.S. State Dept. Decimal File, 861.5017, Living Conditions/456, Report No. 665, Helsingfors, April 2, 1932).

The 1932 KHEMZ plant in eastern Ukraine was created by GE and is 250% more powerful than anything GE had in the United States. Sutton writes:

Major new units built from 1936 to 1940 were again planned and constructed by Western companies. Petroleum-cracking, particularly for aviation gasoline, as well as all the refineries in the Second Baku and elsewhere were built by Universal Oil Products, Badger Corporation, Lummus Company, Petroleum Engineering Corporation, Alco Products, McKee Corporation, and Kellogg Company (Sutton, 1973: ch. 4; online edition, no page numbers).

The Federal Reserve Bank of New York sent \$1 billion in aid to Trotsky and the Red Army (*Washington Post*, Feb. 2, 1918). The first Five-year Plan had all of its military equipment built by American firms. Sergei Nemetz of Stone and Webber, along with Zara Witkin, supervised most of the military construction for the first two Five-Year Plans using American capital desperately needed at home.

Carp Exports supplied the Soviet Union with all its high-tech military parts. It was based on New York City. Electric Boat Company of Groton, Connecticut built the soviet submarine fleet with express permission of the State Department in 1939. Skoda Armaments of Czechoslovakia is a subsidiary of the Simmons Machine Tool Corporation of Albany, New York. Ball Bearings were built in the USSR by Bryant Chucking Grinder Company of Springfield, Vermont.

All told, 90% of all Soviet industry was created in the U.S. or Western Europe. By definition, there can be no Cold War. Capital does not require markets in order to be profitable. Once one rejects the formulaic division of the world into "Soviet" and "American" camps, all 20th-century history appears differently. One of the most telling quotes is from the Russian language work entitled *The Political History of the Russian Emigration*, written by S.A. Alexander:

Despite the growing popularity of the right wing in the emigre environment, it is only the leftists that found a response in Western governments. Most significantly, the leftists in exile were feted by the financial and industrial sector interested in trade with the Soviet Union. The "All Emigre Russian Unity" conference was called at the behest of American capital, and the Soviet financial elite were invited. Conferences subsequent to this were called by capital in Cannes, Genoa, The Hague and Lausanne (Alexander, c 1930).

While comments like these are fairly common in Russian, there is a very explainable refusal for Western myth-makers to believe that communism is identical to capitalism and the U.S. was not anti-communist, but rather anti-nationalist. There has never been an explanation offered that would give capital any reason whatsoever to fear the USSR. In a curious turn of events, after the Second World War:

As an ally of the victorious capitalist core powers, the USSR gained many unexpected technological windfalls in the aftermath of World War II. New technical inputs in weaponry, electronics, nuclear power, aircraft and chemicals were

expropriated from Germany and other Axis powers from 1945 to 1950. Allied lend lease equipment, especially heavy bombers and airplane engines, was also 'reverse engineered' from 1942 to 1953. The USSR dismantled and shipped home 25% of the industrial plant in the Western zones of Germany, along with additional industrial equipment constituting 65% of all motor vehicle production, 75% of all rubber tire capacity and 40% of all paper and cardboard-producing capacity in eastern Germany (Luke, 1985: 343).

This is extremely significant in that these patents were at least in part financed by American firms. They represent decades of research and millions of dollars in grants. Yet, Stalin brings them home without a peep from the West.

Between 1965 and 1985, the Soviet Union, Cuba, Vietnam and the rest of the Soviet Bloc was constructed by American firms. Alcoa built Soviet aluminum. American Chain and Cable created the machine tool industry. Ingersoll Rand built much of the heavy-duty transport infrastructure (under Automatic Production Systems, a shell company). Betchell created the construction industry. Boeing was heavily invested in Soviet aviation while building the bulk of the American air force. Dow Chemicals, DuPont and Dresser industries were competing to see who would build the more advanced Soviet chemical plants. IBM was helping create the more modern computer industry while Gulf General Atomic was helping put nuclear missiles together for the USSR.

Much of this was made easier by the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council, a pet project of Vice President Bush and Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige in the 1980s. Just a partial list of members include Abbott Laboratories, Allen Bradley Gleason Corporation, Allied Analytical Systems, Ingersoll Rand, International Harvester, Kodak, American Express, Archer Daniels Midland, Armco Steel, Monsanto, Cargill, Occidental Petroleum, Caterpillar, Chase Manhattan, Pepsi Co., Chemical Bank, Phibro-Salomon, Coca Cola, Ralston, Continental Grain Seagram, Dow Chemical and Union Carbide. All members of

this Council had substantial investments in the “Soviet enemy” and, through their philanthropic organizations, created the “peace movement.” (Erikson, 1991)

In 1985, the *San Jose Mercury News* reported confirmation from State and Commerce Departments that:

The most sensitive, state-of-the-art semiconductor manufacturing equipment went to the Soviet Union after first being shipped to Switzerland. Creed [spokesman for Commerce] said the material shipped to Cuba, and additional equipment the Cubans were unable to obtain, would have given them the capability to produce semiconductors and integrated circuits. The report stated that such trade was “illegal.”

Research into the existence of such a law has been disappointing. It would have made little difference especially since the technology had already been either granted or taught to the USSR by the U.S. Such an alleged “prohibition” would be absurd. It is very possible that, if there were laws concerning this trade, it would be very easy to evade, and the Justice Department (dwarfed by most of the legal departments of the companies above) would have to prove that the equipment could not be used for something else.

The U.S. Senate created hearings entitled Transfer of United States High Technology to the Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc Nations in 1983. Testimony from these hearings included William Norris, the CEO of Data Control Corporation of Minnesota, who had written in 1973:

We have offered to the Socialist countries only standard commercial computers, and these offerings have been in full compliance with the export control and administrative directives of the Department of Commerce. ... CYBER is a generic name denoting a line of computers. The least powerful model is the Control Data 6200 which is installed at the Dubna Nuclear Research facility near Moscow (Senate, 1983, archives, 61).

The State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR sealed a huge deal with Data Control in 1973. While openly

denying it in public, Norris and the Department of Commerce squashed all inquiries into the investment and aid project. The Soviets stated that Data Control will:

Build a plant for manufacturing mass storage devices based on removable magnetic disk packs with up to 100 million byte capacity per each pack. The yearly plant output shall be 5,000 device units and 60,000 units of magnetic disk packs (approximate estimate). It is expected that 80% of the plant output will be 30 mega-byte devices and 20% will be 100 mega-byte devices. ... To build a plant to manufacture line printers to operate at a speed of 1,200 lines per minute. The yearly output shall be 3,000 devices (approximate estimate). ... To build a plant for the manufacture of process control oriented peripheral devices, including data collection, analog/digital gear, terminals etc. The annual plant output for all devices, including data collection, is estimated as approximately 20,000 units (Sutton, 1986: ch V, dedicated to the Data Control Corp).

And if this is insufficient, we read:

To organize within the Soviet Union manufacturing of Control Data Corporation licensed remote communication equipment and analog to digital components for stand-alone use within technological process control systems. It must be kept in mind that such devices and components must satisfy requirements of both the Soviet Union and Control Data Corporation. Control Data Corporation evaluates that it can buy back approximately \$4,000,000 worth of these products. ... Control Data Corporation is prepared to assist the USSR in obtaining the financing needed to accomplish the above noted objectives (*Ibid.*).

From this eye-opening chapter by Sutton, the entire Soviet computer industry was created by American firms. In 1959, the Model-802 system was sold to the USSR from Elliot Automation Ltd., an English firm. This is part of General Electric, one of the major offenders in this category. European branches of U.S. firms were selling advanced computer equipment to the USSR

at roughly \$40 million per year (*Ibid.*).

During the Vietnam War, giants such as Union Carbide, General Electric, Armco Steel, Bryant Chucking Grinder and Control Data were just the wealthiest of American capitalists with regular deals in building Soviet industry. This was in 1973, and every bit of it was approved by Johnson and Nixon during the war. Thus, the war against Vietnam could not have been motivated by "anti-communism," but is likely the result of the fear in the breasts of American business that if China and Russia were to combine forces, the U.S. would become superfluous.

If the above seems impossible, then hopefully this section can put those fears to rest. The Western love affair with the USSR was shown to be overwhelming as early as 1919. The Rohrbach Commission in the U.S. Congress did not exist. Unfortunately, amateur researchers usually bite off more than they can chew, and this non-existent "commission" has been used as a club to beat revisionists over the head with for years.

However, the Overmann Commission was quite real. The facts unearthed led to a firestorm of denunciation by the State Department, the British government and academia. In a fit of total dishonesty, it is connected to "Joe McCarthy" regardless of the fact that it took place in 1919. There is good reason for establishment figures to condemn it in unison, since those testifying before the committee were major figures themselves. The fact that their testimony is censured from each and every history textbook on the USSR should give an indication of the quality of academic study on this topic.

Those testifying were Professor Harper of the University of Chicago, an eyewitness to the revolution before the Bolshevik takeover, and the head of the Methodist Mission to Petrograd, George A. Simons. The latter, while rejecting all forms of anti-semitism, says, "I have a firm conviction that this thing [the Red forces] is Yiddish, and one of its bases is in Brooklyn, N.Y." (Overmann, CR, 112; all pages come from the Report itself). He goes on to explain (113-116) that most of the Soviet activists he met with in Petrograd and elsewhere were Yiddish speakers

primarily. He also adds that the only reason the American delegation was unwilling to recognize Lenin was the Brest Treaty (118).

Then, R.B. Dennis, professor at Northwestern, had been living in Russia from 1917-1918 on a grant from the YMCA. Roger Simmons, from Hagerstown, Maryland, was in a Commerce Department Mission in the USSR as trade commissioner with the Red state, there for months in the transition period. His entire purpose was to help build the Soviet Union through grants and raw materials from the U.S. This puts to lie any "war" between the West and the USSR in its early stages (294). His claim was that the Bolsheviks were made from the "least desirable" social elements of the population. This was part of the reason for the reticence to invest in the USSR, since these were the lower-level workers.

He attended a huge business consortium taking place in Grand Rapids, Michigan where about 800 businessmen were deciding how best to begin investing in the USSR. He speaks of their "misinformed" admiration for the Soviet Union and the potential for profit there (304). In fact, a large part of the Overmann Commission was aimed at discerning the ideas of the American capitalist class relative to the USSR. Most of those testifying said it was positive.

Raymond Robbins was part of the Red Cross in Petrograd and elsewhere from 1917-1918. He describes the work of a William Thompson, a wealthy banker negotiating loans for the Soviet government. Moreover, he was speaking to the Red Cross about coordinating an infrastructure for an entire set of new newspapers supporting the revolutionaries. Thompson, a millionaire, used the Petrograd branch of the National City Bank. All told, Thompson used that branch to funnel about 12,000,000 rubles for the revolutionaries (not merely the Bolsheviks), which was, in 1918, about \$1 million. Part of the problem was that even motivated Americans had no idea who was who. There was a sense that there were left "revolutionaries," and that's where the bulk of foreign money went. The Red Cross

was granted about \$3 million monthly from both private and state sources in America to “interpret the revolutionary groups to the army and to peasant villages of how absolutely indispensable to save the revolution to keep the front and defeat the German militarist autocracy” (777).

Thus, the small fraction of information this author culled from the more than 2,000 pages of testimony here is sufficient to demonstrate that the history of the Red Revolution is largely mythical, and deviation from this fairy tale can and has been met with dismissal and ridicule.



Pasternak Caption: 50 words

CHAPTER ELEVEN



REMAKING REALITY

Marxism, Mass Society and Boris Pasternak's "Dr. Zhivago"

Few deny that Boris Pasternak's (1957) novel *Dr. Zhivago* was both intensely political and historical. It evokes nearly every concept in political theory in its often-disconnected sequences. The chances that such a novel is amenable to popularization in postmodern America are close to zero.

The original Pasternak novel deals with the Russian Civil War and the establishment of Soviet Marxism. Remaking this for the screen in 2002 is not entirely absurd. From 1914 to 1921 or so, Russia was convulsed. As if the senseless, elite-driven slaughter of World War I was not sufficient, the resulting chaos gave the only chance for that tiny, mostly Jewish, but lavishly funded clique later called the "Bolsheviks" to take power. Civil war was the inevitable result.

Since 1990, Russia has gone through a far worse convulsion. For the first time in cosmic history, about 80% of the Russian economy was liquidated as this colossal Bolshevik empire suddenly fell apart. Not only has this never occurred before—especially in peacetime—but it was also not predicted by those who get paid a lot of money to predict these things. How does an



Caption: 75 words

entire group of analysts, funded beyond reason, miss the imminent collapse of a massive, global empire? Even more, how do they keep their jobs afterwards?

Yet again, a tiny, mostly Jewish clique took power and, yet again, transferred Russia's remaining wealth to themselves. First, it was under the guise of "war communism" while the second, far more sophisticated, was under the guise of "the free market." This led to an oligarchy controlling a huge portion of Russian wealth. The big difference is that in this second instance, there was no war to bring this collapse about. It is historically unprecedented. This clear parallel serves as the context for this movie, but in watching it, you would never know it.

The 2002 movie, adapted by British mogul Andrew Davies, cannot be expected to grasp the finer points of Russian history and politics that Pasternak assumed his readers knew. Of course, the limitations of the film medium itself present problems. The difficulty, however, went far beyond that. Pasternak wrote several decades after the Civil War but still at a time when issues such as endless mass death and regular proximity to piles of corpses were not met with helpless hand-wringing.

The film forces the viewer to deal with the reality that the Russian reader in 1956 has little in common with the American viewer in 2002 or 2016. In fact, what was made clear by the film is whether or not literature, if it is meant to communicate complex and profound ideals, can ever be reduced to a movie of a few hours. When this film finally ended, the answer had to be no.

The film was extravagantly funded, featured an all-star cast, and used an array of special effects that a novel cannot imitate. Hence, the next point: Special effects is part of the destruction of a work of literature because it redirects attention to the non-essential. The issue is not making battle deaths seem "real," but what these deaths mean for Russia and the world.

What they mean is that modernity has broken almost all of its promises. The Enlightenment ideology said that religion was superstition, that absolutes are largely a fabrication and that, rather, the proper logical methods of science will permit the

advent of peace and plenty. They forgot to warn us that “science” and the “scientific establishment” are not identical. While solving many problems humanity did not know it had, the scientific method was also used to build more accurate weapons, poison gas, tanks and later, nuclear weapons.

While moderns might rhapsodize about the “independence” that the automobile brings, they must, at least implicitly, accept that the millions of deaths and mutilations on the highways are an acceptable sacrifice. Since Zhivago is a doctor and quite taken with modern ideas, the fact that men still act like sub-humans from Tokyo to Texas is an unmistakable problem for the modern viewer/reader. This contract—mass slaughter in exchange for feelings of independence on the road—says that the Enlightenment idea of man is false.

The concept of “mass society” is brought up again and again when films try to capture a novel. “Massification” is the idea that any object packaged for mass consumption must be focused on the lowest common denominator, since the profit motive requires that the largest market must be reached and convinced of this object’s use for them. With that in mind, this writer could almost hear Pasternak pound on the inside of his coffin lid as the screenwriter rewrote his complex vision.

The personal drama here is meant to parallel the political. *Dr. Zhivago* is a political novel. It is not accidentally set during the Russian Civil War. That Yuri is a doctor and Lara a nurse is equally deliberate, since healing, then and now, is precisely what Russia required. How one reacts to the movie seems dependent on two things: a) the viewer’s knowledge of the novel and, b) the viewer’s awareness of Russian history. Since mass audiences are assumed to have cognizance of neither, a producer can do as he pleases with both the facts of history and the facts of the novel.

The broader point is that war brutalizes a population. Moral focus is lost when death is everywhere and life is cheap. It is hard to believe that anyone in Russia at the time did not lose at least one close family member to the violence. The swirl of events that brings Zhivago to several women and political camps

is not of his own choosing. That he is driven from place to place immediately gives the sense of determinism and the old Epic formula. Events are more powerful than a single person. A single person, the “sovereign individual” of Enlightenment myth, is absolutely powerless, helpless and at the mercy of the nearest person with a gun and a relativistic moral code.

In Erlich’s (1959) article, he makes the argument (taken from others) that there is no clear “self” in Pasternak’s poetic or novel forms. The self exists just as one object among others that has no particular privilege over other elements of the world. The reality of civil war and the coming reign of death would certainly make this approach rational and almost function as a defense mechanism. Furthermore, the events in the novel cannot be attributed to any “self” at all, and these globally significant events drown the person in forces that even elites were incapable of controlling. The self could be buried because that was the empirical reality. It is one thing to say that the writer is taken by fits of inspiration. Here, the self is insignificant. It is quite another to say that—as a matter of social reality—the self was a disposable object of no real significance. In the case of this novel, both are true.

Clowes (1990) totally rejects that view, saying that in the novel under discussion here, events do not swallow the self but rather are just irrelevant to it. The real action is in how these events are used for the sake of personal moral renewal.

Reading the novel, it is fairly clear that Pasternak is rejecting the idea of a comprehensive, abstract ideology. An abstraction is an ideal, or the outline of one, and is formed with words and often sustained with emotion. Forcing it onto a population with its own traditional life required violence—and lots of it. The manifestation of an ideology in life has no relation to the ideal in its pristine state. In fact, institutionalization is not of the same ontological order as the idea. They cannot be compared in the same sense that strawberries can be compared with commodity futures.

The novel suggests that the events of the revolution and the Civil War preclude any hard and fast ideological labeling. Pas-

ternak shows Zhivago treating all comers because it is far from clear that every soldier in Trotsky's army is a fanatical Marxist ideologue. The abduction by the Forest Brotherhood, for example, shows that ideology is not at issue. Ideology, at best, might justify actions, but it does not inform them. Since the Reds won, the movie was able to show how ideals no longer exist once stump slogans turn into the daily administrative grind. The "Revolution" is depicted in the film as problematic, though not necessarily evil.

Revolution is a bad thing as such, not because Trotsky's forces won. When a faction comes to power by violence, those who are the most ruthless have the advantage. Since ruthlessness is that precise quality that wins wars, those who use it without regard to morality will take over the state. Worse, when the takeover is then followed by a desire to "transform" the society, the ideas presented in the novel then take on tremendous and profound significance. However, the viewer of the film will not know that.

The often-lurid scenes of death both in the novel and film generally give the impression that both Whites and Reds were equally guilty of evil. The obvious point was immediately raised: The Red movement used terror as a matter of ideology. It was the right of the Vanguard Party so as to destroy any challenges from the "bourgeoisie." Terror was not something "added" to Marxism; it was and is an aspect of its very essence.

Extreme forms of violence were not alien to the Whites, either, but to utter this seems unnecessary. All wars and all factions have this problem. However, the Whites did not use it systematically. It was not part of their ideology. This makes a gigantic moral difference. Christianity does not sanction violence, but it has been used by Christian elites on various pretexts. Christianity, as such, cannot be judged by the actions of Charlemagne.

Many readers, well versed in the time period or not, are not prepared for Pasternak. They are prepared for a movie that gives just enough serious moments for it to have intellectual credibility without forcing the viewer to confront anything too disturbing. The visual emphasis of movies cannot communicate

the non-visual, ideal purpose of political movements. Hence, characters are people exclusively, not bearers of ideas. This is a part of the medium itself, not necessarily a consequent of deliberate vulgarization.

Lara, for example, is raped and assaulted in the novel. Disturbing and depressing, it is not meant to focus attention on Lara, but on Russia as a whole. Russia has the same relationship to the 20th-century world order as Lara does to Komarovsky (whose character is well-played in the film by Sam Neill). The movie, however, makes this a personal tragedy rather than a statement of social ideas. This is the nature of the distortion that makes the movie elicit constant eye-rolling. The entire nature of the argument is lost when it is over-personalized.

Another example is that the women in Zhivago's life are the possible ideological outcomes for Russia. Traditional, sophisticated, peasant, idealistic and many other interpretations can be applied to different women, but their differences are not accidental. Pasternak is writing when the Bolsheviks were firmly in power, but that was not obvious in 1920, and especially not obvious upon Lenin's death in 1925. The options at the time were wide open, which might be why Yuri was so enthusiastic about the fall of the monarchy.

Clowes suggests that Tonja is a "conformist" heroine in that she seeks the preservation of the old order. Put differently, she has not the ability or desire to "change" with the advent of the reign of blood. This is a terrible interpretation: She is the opposite of a conformist, she is a rebel against the tyranny that is coming—the destruction of the self that anyone except ideologues could see coming. "Adapting to the new world?" Is she kidding? Anyone able to adapt to this "new world" is a pathologue.

Making her interpretation all the worse, she celebrates Lara for her early support of the revolutionaries. This is evidence of her non-conformity. Rather, it is more accurate to say that her thrall to Komarovsky shows that power is all she seems to recognize. This need not be a moral fault but a mere reaction to the present regime of anarchy that will soon lead to something

worse. Bolshevism does not recognize personality: Man is merely a bundle of nerve endings that elicit certain demands that a political system can meet or not. The existence or non-existence of such a "person" is of no moral import. Hence, the claim that there is such a thing as a "heroine" that can support the revolutionaries (that is, the Reds of the day) is a contradiction in terms. Bolshevism or materialist socialism—largely financed by Western capitalism—has no conception of personality, let alone "heroism." The very vocabulary she uses in this interpretation makes no sense.

More significantly, the essay by Silbajoris (1965) makes an argument that situates the entire novel and its relation to ideology. He says that "Even Zhivago's 'anti-communism' is best understood in terms of the same opposition between the poetic perception of life, which alone can touch the fountainhead of reality, and an unimaginative (and therefore tyrannical) official system which is irrelevant to the embodiment of truth" (Silbajoris, 20).

What the author fails to realize is that this is precisely the reason to fear the Reds. They are materialists. Corporate capitalism is identical in this respect: Both are vehemently anti-poetic, "official," bureaucratic and conformist in the most unnatural way. He makes the silly statement that "tyrants can easily be found under other names in other societies" (*Ibid.*). This is too glib because the tyranny of materialism has little in common with what liberals think tyranny is elsewhere. Only materialism had the temerity to reduce humanity to nothing, mere atoms in the void of no greater significance than the void itself. This is not tyranny, but far beyond: It is the denial of humanity.

The novel, and to a lesser extent, the film, express this idea. The Reds, it can be argued, took power for no other reason than they were the most cohesive. By the time the war ended, Russia was a dazed and brutalized people who were willing to accept any power so long as it stopped the bloodshed.

Death is the theme of the novel. It was not the focus of the film. Without much experience with death, especially *en masse*,

Americans are either repulsed by it or morbidly attracted to it. This is why the ending was changed in the film. Zhivago's demise, though with a reference to resurrection, cannot be permitted to stand. Postmodern audiences cannot process either death or resurrection. Both remain unreal. Instead of Zhivago's death and the dark dystopia of the Gulag, a maudlin scene is substituted that has not the slightest political, moral or literary value. The ending was symbolic of the entire movie: The contradiction between the pretentious desire to remake a "classic" with the inability to either understand it or communicate it. The audience is not prepared for Pasternak.



Caption: 50 words

CHAPTER TWELVE



NOMINALISM, ETHNICITY AND MASS SOCIETY

The Metaphysics of Civilization in the Poetics of Vasyl Stus

Moral self-determination is difficult. So is criticism and logic; they are discussed and piously praised until they are used. At that moment, they become oppressive. Vasyl Stus (1938-1985) is not well known in the West; in fact, he is not known at all. Part of the reason why is that he is a standing condemnation of the mass society from which poetic “celebrities” are generated. Vasyl Stus spent a substantial portion of his adult life in Soviet GULags and hence is known to only a few specialists. Worst of all, his focus—to a great extent—is how many benefits come from conformity. The GULag, in other words, is just a hypermanifestation of postmodern liberalism.

The poet is condemned to speak the truth in a world where “truth” is considered a superstition. Power substitutes for right and deviousness for intelligence. For Stus, this is the frozen, the “snow” that keeps the Regime functioning at the mass level. He writes:

You used to curse at me, but now you just reproach me.

So bitterly. In whispers. Because the ashen snow has swaddled everything. And shouting to our hearts' content would be a sin. The snow wishes to sleep. Accustomed to the ground, it forgot the path of blue that led from sky to earth. And let it sleep.

And let it sleep. Don't wake it up. No need to. This is a gathering of dreams. We can't feed nightingales with tales, but one of them survived a winter on such food, and dreams appear of nightingales' sweet lullabies. And when you raise your head—new buildings left undone are smouldering in their decay, like burned down castles. Only the crenels, or rather the windows, stand sentry in the dusk. The school construction plan was not approved?

Just as our love still lacks approval from the superintendent of works, the foremen, and from the cubic footage of both our hearts? (All citations are my translations from Stus's works: Stus, Vasyl 1994).

The color blue is part of the unique symbology of Ukraine, the oak is the strength of the nation. The candle is existential while the soul and its ability to reflect. Its shadow is bad faith. The nature of the Soviet state created an automaton. Not a person with memory or history, but a shadow, a grown man incapable of seeing the sky, the mass. "Accustomed to the ground," or the Masonic idea of being "on the level" is the "solidity" of routine. This is largely a delusion for most, though the energy to cut through it is rare. The Blue Sky is the hope for a free Ukraine, as her color for Stus is blue, and the sky that of freedom, the ethereal, the formal. Once this has been forgotten, all that remains is sleep; the horizontal, the "level."

This poem asks, how is it possible for truth to exist in a world dedicated to quantity? Even the "buildings," the symbols for administrative massification, are begun for the wrong reasons and remain undone. The life of poetic nature is confronted by rationalism; what was promised as liberation is little more than demonic death. Industry in Ukraine led to the mixing of peoples and a global outlook, which is death for small, vulnerable states. Love,

or the drug-like reality of attraction, is not quantified, not even defined. Yet when it is done for economic or social reasons, it becomes like the burned-out buildings representing the plans of humanity. One cannot plan the day without deviation becoming the norm, let alone an entire continent, and in every respect.

It might not be a good idea to wake these understandings and forces too soon. Honesty and singlemindedness might be overwhelming at first. Those used to small talk might suffer when bombarded with useful conversation. The mental effort might irreparably harm those who are not used to such substance, like rescued miners needing to wear sunglasses once rescued.

The nightingale has a long history in poetry; chances are Stus heard it first in Shakespeare (*Sonnet 102*) or *Ovid*. *Ovid's* retelling of the story of Philomela is not irrelevant since she was a victim of rape and mutilation like Ukraine. To be transformed into a "poetic" bird as a result and to take such uncommon revenge is not beyond the realm of possibility for the imprisoned Stus (cf *Metamorphoses*, IV, 424-600), especially since the context here is to "feed" on subconscious freedom or thoughts inchoate before waking. It might also be worth "Solovey," the root name of the Russian philosopher and before him, the historian. It's used in Russian as a translation of "Philomela."

Stus rejected fame in that any sick society promotes those closest to it. Success in modernity means vice, the deviousness that masquerades as intelligence. Paul Ticino was the symbol of this trade, freedom and integrity for plastic prestige. To become "successful" as a servant of the party can only appeal to those who have silenced conscience.

"The Great Stalin Died Too Early"—Stalin's lackeys are called "harem girls" seeing him as a god. Afterwards, the harem girls fought for power as to who would be oppressive next. In his "Monarchs" he writes:

Worthless, corrupt servants,
Gang (Banda) of monkeys for comfort,
To have that feeding, luxurious dining [*povecheryat*],
They feed [only] their subservience.

One need not be in prison to understand this. Those of weaker substance find it easy to make peace between the power that rules them and their own personality. The occasional compromise is easily dismissed and insulation from critics is fairly common, especially in the USSR. What makes the Soviet Union distinct is that it is a matter of life and death. The modern mass is the same, but the idea of "death" is more subtle (though probably far more damaging). In Soviet Russia, to compromise with the Regime was to be a communist, an atheist and a materialist. It meant to acquiesce in the imprisonment and torture of millions.

The artist suffers for the nation, regardless of their ability to understand what a "people" really is. The traitor works like a "monkey" for the sake of comfort and acceptability while the true patriot suffers, often condemned, slandered and rejected. That this often comes from fellow citizens is the worst sort of agony. Soon, as we read in Shevchenko, the occupied internalize their status and see themselves as "junior partners" in the imperial project. The aboulia, the mindless resignation deriving from psychological violence, is the greatest of social evils. The evils of unfreedom are taken as normal, or worse, as a positive.

Paul Ticino, regardless of his merits or demerits, was the symbol of bureaucratic art that might be technically proficient but unfree and useless. It's a symbol of the fear of pain and hence the fear of logic. Honesty brings death to a society ruled by oligarchy.

The burning candle, as well as a controlled fire, purifies the soul. Hope, prayer, righteousness comes from truth. The right path; the clear day; As long as a person lives, she feels pain and suffering. The Candle burning is also pain in my heart; pain is to be alive. Without pain, one is dead.

Fame would destroy inner freedom; despotism does not rule by guns and prisons, but by stress, pain and the use of social ostracism. Tyranny is never from the state; it's too clumsy for that. It comes from people and the mass. Mocking the Regime, he writes:

Bug-eyed art experts!

It is awkward for you in civilian clothes, it is very clumsy for you, when your neck is not choked by an officer's coat, when your feet do not feel the crease of the twill riding breeches. Bug-eyed art experts!

It is useless for you to test me: I know all of the circulating quotations from the patented classics, I explicitly decide the principle philosophical question: First there was matter, and then...What then?—you will not ask me!

And later there was awareness of the bug-eyed art experts, and later there were officers' coats, twill riding breeches, one word—eternal matter is only of twill.

I believe in your chrome-treated boots more than in Marx.
So how in the devil am I so unreliable?

The reference to "eternal matter" begins Stus's unpacking of the esoteric elements of totalitarianism, materialism and industrialization (all of which are closely linked). Those of us granted our walking papers from academia can fully appreciate these words. While conformism in academic circles is an undeniable fact of life, it's done without jackboots, and is thus far more effective. There was a time when criticizing Marxism openly made many of the tenured squirm. Most of all, the "patented classics" and sloganeering that substitutes for thought is often the difference between success and failure. Honesty, to repeat, makes no friends in a sick society. Matter is as far as East or West would go. Today in the West, materialism is taken far more seriously than it was in the USSR. Matter is god, since it is eternal and all-creative. The awareness of this universal category is an open contradiction that Stus uses to great (if unappreciated) effect.

"Circulating quotations" is a daily occurrence in modern academia in the West, where slogans and buzzwords of the pseudo-intellectual left which distinguishes a real "member" from the outsider, who is to be scorned without mercy. "Patented classics" is yet another first rate means of describing this immensely successful conformity: Citing the same "authoritative" texts is usually the difference between a publication and a dis-

missively quick joke at the faculty cocktail party. J.S. Mill in political theory is acceptable, but his far more talented critic, James Fitzjames Stevens, is not. The latter is not known; he's not read. This is just something one does not do at "that level." Dismissals and threats are fairly easy there. In the USSR, of course, the same occurs, except the punishment is much more dire.

Another distinction is more insidious: In the USSR, the conformist, unless he was a committed communist and Leninist, could not kid himself of his good intentions. In the US, not only can this conformity be easily rationalized, it today is identical with the field itself. In other words, academic political theory is precisely not to read Orestes Brownson and never to take Konstantin Pobedonostsev seriously. As standards fall and affirmative action continually passes emotional, incompetent and litigious women as "professors" this will continue to dominate what remains of any sort of academic criticism. Criticism itself is also reduced to the proper arrangement of authoritative texts, often totally incomprehensibly to those who are immersed in its world.

What is to be believed in is neither god nor matter, but the bureaucratic pecking order that magically confers knowledge, significance, money and success. Those to whom the world has been good cannot read this without either missing the point or becoming uncomfortable. It's a bit like the academic bureaucrat lecturing on Gogol and not realizing that Gogol is speaking about him! This is why we're unreliable.

Oh, timely death comes
as infected with happiness
and break the shackles

Freedom in the camps is death. The lack of freedom, that is, the regimentation of the body, leads the few to the total freedom of its rejection. The death of the world becomes liberation. In fact, the camp is far superior to this world.

Make me, O God, the noble collapse as the circle shuts;
 There remains one thing: death to save the internally free;
 free for themselves and for Ukraine
 Now foresaw in delusional
 Ukraine somewhere—there
 all—in Anton's flame
 here in the east; we go from it
 Good for her journey on which you will fall
 and friends—also fall;
 Prophecy fulfilled.

The circle is the daily grind; the monotony of the nominal universe and the life of the modern. Rationalism is merely binary code. "There" and "here" are used all the time to focus on the existential reality of the person; no retreat into the ego. This means the ballast has to be thrown overboard before there is freedom. No attachments can exist, since these will prevent any radical jump into the unknown.

Modernity has hijacked the language. As mentioned above, when immersed in a discipline, alternatives are easily dismissed and quickly rationalized away. Buzzwords denoting membership (such as the paradigmatic and paradoxical "diversity" which still remains undefined) will be used to threaten the easy life of the academic or institutional don.

To go "into schism" from it is essential. In prison, mentally separating from the good on the outside is needed. They must become indifferent. Only the retreat into the self provides some relief. The self is split from the not-self in the sense that the true, spiritual self (the heart in Skovoroda) cannot function in the USSR. Time is pain; the past is gone, the present flees and the future is unknowable without the past. The innocence of children is impossible to regain. Ukraine is foreign; home is unrecognizable.

This pain—like the alcohol of agony,
 like grief frozen to the crisp.
 Reprint the curses
 and rewrite the sorrow.

It has long been forgotten, what it is—to live.
 And what is the world, and what are you.
 To enter one's own soul
 is meant only for madmen.
 And you will still be furious a long time,
 still furious until you die,
 having felt your own steps
 upon your white head.

The world is split into the dream, the image, and the real. The mass are incapable of introspection because, first, they have no idea what questions to ask or what constitutes an answer; second, they are not driven by truth, but by self-interest (very broadly defined); third, they cannot see beyond pop-culture slogans and meaningless buzzwords; finally, about the only sort of introspection the mass man is capable of is largely confined to rationalization. This means that anything goes.

The leap at a time of mechanization is a way to overcome cause and effect: absolute freedom. The boundary between worlds cannot be crossed by the machine. This cannot be crossed by the mass man, either, largely because he thinks the machine is all there is. When one is in despair, he has nothing to lose; he becomes free. The mundane is deadly when it succeeds; only when it fails is there a chance. The point is that oppression is the only chance for the mass man, the victim of modern psychological repression, to actually learn something not connected to mere gain.

Stus writes:

The stinging winds relentlessly pervade
 this embrasure of fulfillment.
 Your naked voice, like a painful injection, is thrust
 into this whistling December noise.
 And wait awhile! And waiting is unbearable!
 And one more spring that splashes like a wave,
 one more oar-stroke and our black raft
 will beach itself. And there—the devil take it—
 and there—go on, reproach or curse at will. ...

I think that I do not live, and the other one lives in the
 world for me in my likeness. No eyes, no ears,
 no hands, no feet or mouth. Indifferent in your body and,
 bit of pain, and I live in darkness and twilight frozen
 I myself, there, in terrible pain.

The inner pain of unfreedom in Soviet Ukraine leads to helplessness, then despair soon becomes rage. At the same time, to not live is to only go inward. In a sense, the prison alone is the place where the normal grind is destroyed, even unreal. Life appears radically different. The worst of humanity either goes insane or becomes accustomed to the brutalization and adapts to it, either as victim or perpetrator.

Summon the lion within you and fathom
 The endless walls within the endless rage
 When ice-clad cries roar from corner to corner.
 Summon the lion within you and bellow.
 Let the black clawing roars surround
 This universal enclosure, leading your mind
 Into a fairy glade where memories prick like awns,
 Where the years are burnt stubble
 And where your woes, insatiable hyenas,
 Sharpen their fangs and claws for you.
 Summon the lion within you and rage
 Among the bolts, bars, and locks:
 The world is flowering with stubble
 And barbed wire.

In symbolism, the lion has a secular connotation as precisely this rage, but also as the warfare internally to both control it and come to terms with it. In prison, the enclosure ensures the system will never permit the lion to do much damage, so it is turned inward. The same gamble takes place: either it destroys or leads to a breakthrough.

The prison is a microcosm of the world. The only difference, especially in Soviet Ukraine, is that the bars and locks are less conspicuous. In fact, under Stalin and even until the 1970s, the workplace in the USSR—in the “workers state”—was dangerous,

dirty, violent and irrational. It was a prison in almost all senses of the term except that occasionally, one might have a family to spend time with for a few hours.

In the above passage, the lion is doing battle with memories, the constant reminders not only of one's present incarcerated state, but also the nature of the world, almost identical with it. One leads the lion into a "fairy glade" where formerly good memories are little more than acid-coated pills of misery.

Solid ground is death; it's the rule of matter and the mundane; both air and water are the alternative, the boundary between the nominal and the Real it refuses to see. Yet, terms like "desert" or "tundra" refer to the lonely life of non-affirmation. One cannot create a substitute world; civilization is materialization of dominance. God, in this human struggle, seems lonely, as is any manifestation of greatness; the great are to be isolated. "Materialized reproach" is the rape of this faceless world.

Solitude is the origin of the boundary; the ice melts, yet the depression is the cycle of Spring that will soon die into Fall. Alienation from the present reality is the start of freedom. Alienation in solitude (a healthy reaction to a dying Regime) is the first step; it gives hope. In his "A Sinner's Way to Paradise":

While crawling through the needle's eye—
you'll be scratched like a dog in the brambles.
Almost everything stays with your clothing,
almost nothing—with you.
On this side, narrowed down to a crevice,
a graveyard of souls, flayed and dressed.
On this side—plentiful motley,
and you—utterly bare. your shameful naked flesh.
In paradise they bound up with threads
Indignation appears in furrows,
and sorrow is furrowed. On this side you become as newborn,
straightened out, head to toe.
On this side—one measure for all.
Everything slithers.

The “needle’s eye” is a reference to Christ’s harsh conception of salvation in the Gospels. The “needle” is a mode of entrance into a walled city that was so small that only a single man on a camel could pass through. All extraneous items had to be removed. This was a clearly visible symbol of Christ’s mission to reject that which most men seek as the route to “happiness.” This, of course, is also what it stripped of the man in prison. “One measure for all” can only be a fact in a system where every possession or even physical attribute is stripped.

By saying that “almost everything stays with your clothing,” Stus is making it clear that possessions are no substitute for the personality. Most men, with their possessions taken (and this includes all honors and reputation), are rendered totally vulnerable: They are nothing. Your nudity is “shameful” because, outside of the artificial and plastic prestige of society, you as a man are nobody.

Weep, sky, weep and weep! Wash the unabated sea
Of thin-voiced waters and humidify the heart.
It seems it was just now, just yesterday
That a deathly shiver buried you alive.

Weep, sky, weep and weep! The past cannot be returned,
Today has been reduced to naught,
the future will not come.

Something weighs on the mind that can never
Be torn from the heart. This prison is a prison for prisons!

Weep, sky, weep and weep! Spill over your horizons
And let the stars fall from darkened skies!

Is there in this world a trumpet that will sound
A final blast to keep me from my resurrection?

Flow, water, flow and sweep me away from my weariness,
for eternities of bondage have crushed me.

High upland thunder, girdle the earth!
Pitch-winged cloud, bless me!

Lightning, send a message!

Hallowed be the world. The night is its companion.
So, water, flow forth! And you, misfortune, rage!

The sky is potential, freedom in spirit and truth. It is not necessarily manifesting truth but gives a glimpse as to its nature; it is not of this world. It is confronted by the "unabated" sea, the chaotic feminine. The sky weeps in that the language of Old Rus' is now tainted, nominalism has severed man from the sky, the scythe of materialism has reduced all to nothing.

There is no truth, just the power of those capable of imparting meaning. God rules over the world (lightning) while clouds (usually the Spirit) come to consecrate the world, but the one severed epistemology from its source and ground would not recognize it. This severance is the nature of modernity and its totalitarianism lies in the fact that once passion has been kindled against reason and against the transcendent, there is no return. The world will always seem hostile, distorted and chaotic once its ground is thought to not exist. Now, the mind cannot even consider the fact, so absolute and "blunt" is the nature of the "given." Even St. Michael's trumpet at the last times will not rouse those so victimized; since reality presents itself as absolute, such manifestations will be seen as "mental illness." So what is the result?

Through centuries our memory
has thirsted avidly for this:

To go perpetuated. To preserve one's self for trials;
for a role unplayed in life; for the fulfillment of the wish
to multiply by all the days to come the feelings that
remained unharmonized;
for the completion of experiments of ages, if not by one's
own hand, then by descendants (who will know what
kept us distanced from each other).

Oh, the shards of bitterness that oppress the heart!
You—less than human; and time—invented just for pen-
ances, to cleanse the lips from a defiling muteness, to have
communion with the primal word, the word that is unable
to extinguish a thirst precipitous—impetuous flight—that
lost its sting, and now it merely lures, and merely casts a
spell with its lost start and with its end foreseen.

You are a mutant.
 An untimely guest.
 Your age has met you much too late.
 And you arrived too early and only
 falsehood flourished in your heart.
 What have you become? And what can you become?
 Aren't you alone? Utterly alone?
 Like an accusing finger, a lament in the highest?
 To countervail is much beyond our strength
 for it encompasses both love and hate.

This is the eternal condemnation of the traditionalist. "To have communion with the primal world" is to connect oneself with natural law and the specific cultural forms that develop around it. You're a "mutant" because you cannot abide the standardization of modern life. To "preserve oneself for trials" is the very purpose of the nation. Nations are not random collections of individuals, but these are people united in language. "Language" is a broad term that denotes not just vocabulary and syntax, but mores, the universe of meaning that gives words any purpose at all. For small nations like Ukraine, their history is largely one of suffering. External pressure, foreign occupation and exploitation by larger states seems to be their lot.

Oh, slender-waisted poplar!
 You look like a sword but only from afar.
 You're no sword.
 You're just sorrow.
 You're a shout, stifled in the throat.
 From ancient times, storms, like prophecies,
 roar above you
 while you sway in grief
 and grieve along the tillage.
 Oh, sorrowful poplar!
 So many years you've grieved and keened!
 You have lamented, seagull-like,
 along the high road. You—a lofty farewell.
 You bowed to earth for countless ages

when your sons parted from you,
 and you waited, mute with sorrow.
 The wide world takes your sons. None come back.
 You are doomed throughout life
 to await their return in your loneliness.
 If they come—welcome them.
 If they don't—where would you be?
 Remain ever watchful
 with a rough tear between eyelashes.

Trees are noble elements, wood a tremendous fruit. It is ancient Ukraine. The poplar in particular is the nation. It is the folk, the ancient idea. This is an extension of the concepts above. "You bowed to earth for countless ages," is the lot of the small nation and, often, those who cannot be forced into any kind of mold.

Multiplied twofold, threefold, a hundredfold,
 you diminish. You deepen—and become deaf.
 Thus—don't rush. All will come in time,
 (because your thirsting roots still keep on growing?)
 The age soars unceasingly. Hey—yes!
 The hands—on the road, the feet—on the road,
 the mind and all your feelings—on the road,
 and with them, as a non-paying passenger,
 let's say, a stowaway—the heart, insatiable
 for roaming without end.

One of the essential concepts in Stus's poetry is that the self, the "I," is never an object. In the above passage, Stus is mocking the pretense of modernity: dialogue for the sake of more dialogue, while the Regime continues its misrule without serious opposition. The "road" is a very old icon for mystic initiation into the materialist halls of power.

Let's soar, oh, ship!
 You are bartered away by desires,
 one piece at a time. You lose yourself
 in the world that had encompassed you childhood,
 the threshold of the village home, grandmother's gifts,
 and mother's calloused earnings of each day.

A tiny lump, you sink into a bottomless abyss.
 Your world is bursting forth from brazen clarions
 (and every span of time—a golden circlet,
 and all the years the years—like golden trumpeteers).

This is one of the most profound passages in Stus's work. Of all societies in history, only Marxism and capitalism are based exclusively around the satisfaction of desire. The problem is that it reduces man to simply a bundle of desires, mere matter in motion that can be standardized and administered such that the bulk of these desires can be satisfied. One loses oneself when citizenship is given up for commodity consumption.

One excellent example of this failure is how Westerners have misinterpreted Gogol's "Old World Landowners." This is suitable here because Stus mentions the connection between tradition and "grandmother's gifts." The problem with all academic Gogol scholarship is that Gogol was mocking the pretensions of literary scholarship, especially in the conformist and bureaucratic machine of the American university. At the end of *Government Inspector*, Gogol confesses that it is the smug bureaucrat (whether in the private or public sector is not important) in the audience, the man who thinks he understands it all, that is primarily being mocked. Yet, even with Gogol's open mockery, the academics still try to "interpret" a poet who loathed their very existence.

Apart from the absurdity of culture-less, urban, underworked, liberal-elite academics having the gall to interpret a poet whose whole reason for writing was to destroy their pretensions, moderns cannot grasp even basic, simple symbols and arguments Gogol's readers would be fluent with. Whether it is the symbolism of *Vy* or *The Portrait*, the nominalist professor has not the mental, ideological or even ontological tools and vocabulary needed to even begin to make sense out of these poems. Instead, they search for the job-security of discovering all the latent "gender" and "sexual" issues Gogol was "repressing." Of course, Gogol was well aware that this deracinated class would try to discover what he did not say bereft of any understanding of what he did. Stus says precisely this about the academics of his own day above.

Old World Landowners is one of the most significant of Gogol's short stories. It is as far as human beings can get to a utopic existence. Perfection is not possible, but the elderly couple has come close. Rest is the state of man; the urbanite is constantly moving, the rural idyll is concerned with simple needs, the urbanite has no grounds to rank any needs, the couple in OWL sees joy in the tiniest thing, while the deracinated has trouble defining what a "thing" is and what it would mean for something to have such significance. Worse, the typical arrogant rhetoric of this class in the condemnation of their alter egos in the short story is odd given its polemical nature. This writer is polemical on a daily basis; they at least struggle to maintain some sort of ethereal, faux-neutral approach to literature. It is as if they realize Gogol has them, and they do not have the vocabulary to respond.

The connection with the Stus passage above is that it is very reminiscent of the typical academic butchery of OWL. In fact, given the reference to grandparents, it might be an explicit reference to the story. There is a very significant difference: Stus above is dealing with the modern nominalist. There are no simple joys since neither "simple" or "joy" have any real referent. Stus briefly shows the downward spiral where the simple joys of the old Ukrainian life quickly become mutated under the radiating gaze of commercial capitalism and materialist socialism: Desire becomes a creed to be manipulated.

He states that, once the memory of the grandparents, OWL-style life is firm, "your world" then takes it and makes something different out of it. Nominalism has no stable meanings, objects or referents, so there are no ontological grounds to protest. Youth, the time of innocence, of intuitive knowledge, will soon be destroyed in arbitrary concepts and neurosis. To make reference to two circles afterwards, as well as the trumpet (as if announcing the real ruler), shows that there is no end, no purpose but power. Youth is sacrificed to the Moloch of urbanizing neurosis and spiritual necrosis.

The broader point to this digression is that the camp liberates the spirit because this destruction is kept at bay. Certain Russian

nationalists give a grudging thanks to the USSR for keeping some Western acidic ideas at arms' length for some time. For all the suffering of the camp, the spirit, the mind and soul all have a new life to lead unencumbered by the daily life of the administrator.

Stus's hatred of nominalism is, of course, inherent in all poetry. Nominalism and poetry contradict each other essentially. For Stus, nature is the symbol, the poet is to see logos—the origin of the archetype—in both human and otherwise created nature. Since the modern nominalist, capitalist and socialist reject the very existence of such archetypes, the poet becomes easy prey to the propagandist, since one line is as good as another. Abstractions like “freedom” or “totalism” have no third entity to unify them in order to contrast them. The following lines in the same poem confirm this horrid end:

The woods and the sprites hasten towards the sound.
 Left alone in the trees, in the shadows,
 in the shards of people's sunny eyes,
 from morning grasses, and from the shimmer of stars,
 you turn away so that face yourself.
 And so unfathomably grows the heart!
 May the eyes drink all in sight. The ears
 perceive and hear. The scent inebriate
 and choose. And may the sun invade the soul,
 creating a whole world without horizons!
 And now, already lost among the stars,
 amidst the suffering you gladden sadness,
 amidst the sorrowing you give new strength to joy
 (and through remembrances surmise the future?)
 So many hopes are nested in the soul!
 So many golden hornets fill the breast!
 Thus—don't rush: your brow will bloom again—
 and you will weave a path with youthful steps.

This is life in mass society, life in the camp. It is salvation—suffering purifies and brings one to God and, often for the first time, to the real self. Without God, man is empty. When man is empty, he seeks to fill this chasm with whatever the Regime

offers. Today, it's commodities, fashion ideology and pretense. Then, it was "production" and the future utopia of the party elite. Stus knows better: He will never permit the blind to tell him that there is no sun, or the tone-deaf to condemn Mozart. However, to reach this, suffering is required or, more specifically, to be removed from materialism, whether of the East or the West. Modernity is bureaucracy, quantity and standardization: the self does not exist unless it's externalized in the images of the Regime.

Despair is the abyss, mentioned above. Frustration, loss of faith and hope is the pit; a hall, hole, pit, any empty, dark space is abandonment. The opposite is the sky, hope. One becomes deaf since what is "real" is what is useful. It is what "society" or some other abstraction has seen fit to name for you. The transcendent ground for anything is gone, so one can do nothing.

"Desires" have destroyed innocence. The truth that is often only available to children becomes the victim of power, "production" or quantity. He writes elsewhere:

What is the unity of souls? and truth?
 And trust? And what is friendship, and what love?
 They are habits in stasis. Fossilized
 astonishment, extended into ages,
 ... no more than this? And what of empathy?
 and what of self-bestowal—instead of
 self-preservation? What of the heart-cry?
 these generous sparks of self-awareness—
 are they merely mute reflections of spiritualities,
 hoary with grief? isn't so? Say—isn't so? Say—that
 we entrust ourselves exceedingly to that which until now
 has not been named,
 but which already demarcates its essence
 on boundaries of madness? In truth?
 It seems—tranquility has stiffened out,
 congealed—and, like cast iron, will not bend.
 (a fortress of faith, so to speak). And we—
 go on and bow our foolish little heads
 and rejoice. Heaven deprives us not of its bounty.

Deprives us not.
 You say—a son; I trust—a son! When dusk
 begins to peek around the corner at the gate—
 I bow my head over the bedstead
 and my soul, my glances, my lips, go
 towards the place where, like a pitcher of milk,
 my little son rocks in his cradle,
 starting in his sleep. ...

"Self-preservation" is the death of humanity. It lies at the root of capitalist and socialist ideologies. It is the essence of Darwinism and the politics of empire. This is the boundary between "madness and truth." Madness can only exist when images are taken for reality and, worse, when those rejecting the image are themselves condemned as "insane." The nation, the Church, the sobor—these are the unities based on "self-bestowal." Darwinism takes the decay of the Enlightenment idea of the egocentric, isolated atom of the Leviathan and makes it a "scientific truth." It justifies industrialization, oligarchy, empire and "progress"—everything the elite wanted to hear in the middle of the 19th century in Western Europe. It is the ideology of Babylon.

Against it stands the Orthodox nation. The root of this is the unity of symbol, language and referent in a single unity, Sobornopravna. The folk tradition is the first step for the poet and prisoner in unlocking this. The poet, the oppressed, marginalized struggler, can see logos in the symbolic world of the agrarian life, which manifests the historical suffering of Ukraine. Modernity rejects this and puts mechanization in its place. Isolation and depression are the only consequence as moderns, suffering under nominalism's Saturnalian tyranny, grope for a lost Eden that exists in the collective unconsciousness. It cannot be given verbal or symbolic identity given the total lack of appropriate cognitive structures in the modern mind.

His "little son" is the real victim: The intuition of Eden is condemned as "primitive." Childhood is merely a stage where the human unit is prepared for a life of toil ending in meaningless death. Such an idea is shown in this excerpt:

That building, which was wakened by distress, or which the edges of a cry of secret alarm ascended, languidly submitted to the embrace of snowy startled soil and threw itself into the flow of time, abandoning itself to restless currents.

Then sought relief and comfort in exhaustion and listened closely to the pricked-up groves that stole behind the traces up the mountain.

The shriveled arms and hands of limping pines were hesitant to brush against him, fearful as if he were a syphilitic. Tufts of autumn clouds released an arid drizzle to unify aloud the consonance of wooded lands, whose paltry consolation was capable of turning back the threats.

The building is an icon for Babylon, the tower so closely connected with modernity. The restless currents are the aimless, constant and pathological motion and energy of the modern worker, where quantitative growth is the only final purpose (especially in the USSR). In the camp as the factory, exhaustion is welcomed since it shuts that part of the brain down that might shed light onto one's plight. Ignorance is everywhere because it is easy. The flow of time is alienation. God sees things as a single, undifferentiated object, the "Eternal Now" of the theologians. Time is proof of human sin, since imperfection requires action, and this implies time and change. Stus's symbolism throughout his corpus is unmistakable: The camp is just as much the product of Darwinian materialism as the factory or abortion clinic.

In this passage, a glimmer of hope is seen in the "consonance" of clouds, rain and the forest, all ancient symbols common to Ukrainian folklore. Of course, in Soviet Ukraine, this is a cold comfort, since the rain is probably poison, but it is part of this evocation of a "secret alarm" that only the sensitive feel. It is an imperfect copy of a long lost idea. Stus writes in another poem, *Streams*, from 1968:

... rent the partings just like the atlantes of slagheaps
and barrows full of coal tailings rend and rip through ar-

teries and veins; something tore at the breast ... the boundaries of earth—otherworldly deflections into hell—freely admitted the soul as their very own). You are the limit. A shard of ageless strife for a shatterless fall. You are a hollow of earthly moan: The world is turning cold and chills our callow palms with swirling snow. You haven't changed. Neither years nor care have worn you down. You are as mute as a mirror—the mirror that reflected your fleeting likeness, etching it forever into the gloom.

Stus's referent could be any number of people, though a "mother" is one. The earth requires sacrifice when it is constantly exploited for more and more power though technology. This is war, disease, totalitarianism, industrial accidents and all else that civilization engenders as it grows into an empire. There is a price to pay for these neurotic demands placed on Mother nature. She is mute: Nature is not truth or meaning, she is mere protoplasm that will soon change once the next rung in the evolutionary ladder will be reached. Darwin did not believe in "species" despite the title of his most famous book. Those were terms of convenience that have no real meaning except as a collection of extremely slow adjustments to pain. Science in its modern guise is nominalist to its core, and hence universals like the prototypical term "species" cannot exist except as verbal identifiers of a complex process. If this is true, then there can be no human or "self," either.

The death of the Mother mirrors the Promethean "killing of the king." In a powerful indictment of industrialization, he continues:

You are—Mother (an amphora of your bitterness)—your
 distant son falls into the grass
 by a mountainous crossroad, and the grass will grow nur-
 tured by his hardy peasant's weeping. ...
 Do you remember that night? the great night?
 and somewhere near a stream in Ural mountains and
 pines (those that may be called a pine),
 and silence (just barely grown in saplings green).

often reject concepts as being too arbitrary and fragmentary. Memories are problematic

because the archetypal nature of their form cannot be easily translated into modern, nominalist language. Realities such as Plato's Forms, St. Augustine's seminal reasons or Jung's archetypes cannot be apprehended by moderns except by mutilating them. Yet, this is both the "silent alarm" and the "memories" that are being unpleasantly evoked by the burning of Russia, the forest and the soul by this psychoneurotic drive to industrialization and empire.

In his 1968 poem, he confirms his metaphysical allegiance to Eden. The "secret alarm" is a reference to human devolution. Eden remains in the collective unconsciousness: From our birth we take upon our soul the great primeval sin:

Perforce, we will atone for it, and our fervent penance will be done through memories and dreams (what will the everlasting fledgling do when something frightens him: that which roams about and speaks of Lent?)

All faults of our ancestral souls from neolithic times, indeed, have penetrated our hearts replete with sins. Don't touch this heart, don't touch this heart, for it will ooze, and blow a blast of blinding fumes that have collected in the gloom of ageless caves, and cloud your view with it. From our very birth the soul in us longs painfully for that, which sleeps apparently, but truly teaches, and exhorts, and then commands: revenge, revenge! Requit for the silenced shame! (and makes revenge our only aim, and makes us headsmen in exchange).

From birth we take the great primeval sin upon ourselves. The day that swiftly spreads its wings will lay upon us like a heavy burden.

(The evil one bewildered you, and turned your friendship into thrall).

By icy bounds you were subdued, and all desires were your fall. The dawn of a new age arrives with darkling Mesozoic souls...The epoch crushes ancient faults and mankind stifles as it strives for Eden, without hope. ...

His conception of the heart is not dissimilar to the patristic notion, not to mention Skovoroda's. His evocation of something like the Jungian archetypes suggests here that their "location" is in the heart: the center of the person (that is, opposed to the ego, the social man). He also suggests that sin has a sort of Lamarckian means of getting passed down from generation to generation, obscuring the divine "seminal reasons" of our collective subconscious.

When the heart is "touched," it gives off "fumes" as if it's a factory of sorts. It pollutes the person. "Ageless caves" is certainly a Platonic reference in that it is isolated from light and therefore knowledge. Less clear is the nature of this "revenge." The archetypes are present but are clouded. The soul yearns for its home in Eden, immersed in uncreated energy, but our present life distorts it. "Shame" is silenced. The modern project, broadly speaking, "liberated" the individual from that which prevented its expression in the past. Shame was, as Solovyev argued, the foundation of this moral self-discipline. Once it is silenced, it must come out in other ways.

The horror genre in literature, as E. Michael Jones argues, is one way that this "return of the repressed" reappears. Jones's *Monsters from the Id* makes the argument that modern man (that is, we living today) do not have the cognitive means to express the older, traditional constraints on human sexuality in particular. Given this, the negative results of its lack of inhibition cannot be fully understood by a society dedicated to rejecting these constraints. The result is horror, almost always connected with a sexual act. The cliché is that the virgin never gets killed. There is a reason for that. "By icy bounds you were subdued, and all desires were your fall," Stus writes, making a very similar point. Our drives, stemming from a disordered soul, had at one time been repressed by this "icy" discipline. Now, without it, it must come from the external authority. The self fails because it is reduced to a bundle of passions chaotically demanding satisfaction. Modernity then, whether socialist or capitalist, focuses on exploiting the lower desires and denying the existence of any other.

One of Stus's most important metaphysical ideas is that oppression forces the mind to think in binary terms. The binary is separation: the number 2, or the demonic severing of heaven from Earth, grace and the soul, or word and meaning. The modern has no conception of 3, since this is the nature of the content-saturated Universal that modernity has denied. Man is progressive or regressive; there are reactionaries and revolutionaries; the self is confronted with the group; there is the regime and the "backward"—these are the unsolved puzzles of modernity since the Symbolic concept of 3 cannot be admitted.

There is hope. Stus gives a blueprint of the journey:

... It was a time of geographic discoveries;
 the day unfolded like a magic cloth,
 and I beheld the first of many dawns;
 when taking my first steps I multiplied
 myself twofold and more,
 and saw a hundred suns like fuzzy bumblebees,
 and rubbed two stars for flinty sparks,
 My palms bloomed with petals of the heart,
 and trustingly I came to know the land.
 My primer was—remembered to this day—
 a miner's settlement with all its warmth.
 So I recall—my happy mother leads me by the hand.
 She leads me past the orchards
 where apples fall with muffled sound, and fill
 the silence thus (red apples, nicknamed "gypsies").
 Why were they always red, the apples
 I was given as a child? So that I'd smell
 the fragrance of the earth and human blood?

The return to sanity is a journey. The "geographic" is the re-discovery of the nation, the ethnos which had been subject to genocide under the Soviet. This is underscored by "self-multiplication." The nation, at its best, eliminates the boundary between self and other: A common language, faith, law and history are manifestations of unity that meld people into an organism that has a life and personality of its own. Under oppression, the sim-

ilarity of the victims and their status is a self “multiplication.”

“Trustingly, I came to know the land” is another expression of this same notion. His “mother”(land) shows him apples, the produce of the people. Apple symbolism in Ukraine is highly complex. They are often symbols for autumn, and hence age, maturity and knowledge. Since he was given them as a child, they might be symbols for the wisdom that the ethnic culture preserves in the Church, folktales and poetry. Furthermore, apples in Russian folk tales are a symbol of health. In this case, it might be the psychological health of a unified nation, the fruit of this togetherness being psychological and economic health.

The road back to the “apple” or to health is geographic. It is to learn the wisdom of the mother(land) and the earth (the agrarian life, the folk). Stus was a strong Ukrainian nationalist (in the ethnic sense) and hence the geographic nature of this knowledge and its resulting health is very significant.

In an almost overwhelming condemnation of modernity and industrialization, Stus remains optimistic that there is a route back, but only when the real leaders, the poets, the truly noble, have suffered enough:

Someday we'll weary of perpetual strife and we will want
to sleep, and thus escape the withering awaiting without
hope. Admit the truth: you are the vanquished one.

Remember? so very bright was the beginning,
with tolling bells heavily resounding against
the thatched roofs,

Weeping willows piously swayed over the pond,
and the whirling day smelled as tartly as a green walnut,
untimely cracked.

Thus vibrated childhood through the veins.
The tolling bells rolled like ripened plums,
you twirled a fiddle-stick so brazenly—
just like an ancient goliard, who left the school
and swapped his grammar for a roving life.

Oh, Lord! so bright was the beginning!
The roads began to bark like village dogs, while sunrays

twinkled on a pool of songs,
 and your white form became a triangle of hope,
 a little vessel, lost among the waves.
 The eyes took in a hundred suns,
 and then a hundred birds over the tepid pond.
 The pine trees blazed with black and yellow shimmer.
 The guelder-rose, blooming by the fence,
 appeared so white, that just a fleeting glance—
 no more than a quick look—could give frostbite.
 And all you needed in this life was trouble.
 You sought misfortune. And was it worth your while?
 You asked for it.
 You thought that youthful strength and the ancestral
 thews of serfs will not bend down no matter what.
 Remember it?
 And now all this is gone. It left the heart like faithful dogs
 will leave a burned-out home.
 And you have disappeared with all of it.

Socially speaking, the above passage is programmatic in understanding Stus's agrarianism and traditionalism. The simple life of the village is no "irrational romanticization," as modernists say, but was woven within the ascetic teachings of the Christian life. Modern liberals cannot fathom a time where rest was seen as superior to motion, and desires were few and limited. "Such backwardness!" they might intone. The nomad, or so it seems, is the force that sought the village's destruction.

Who would seek misfortune? In this writer's view, it is incorrect that humans naturally desire pleasure and peace. Men often deliberately inflict pain on themselves and others. The profit-seeking aliens in the cities demanded higher profits, faster ships and larger armies, and the permanently unorganized countryside was the "protoplasm" to get the job done. The hundreds of thousands that died in the construction of industrial society—or the tens of thousands just in the construction of Petrograd!—are seen as a needed and legitimate sacrifice for the "conveniences" men have today. How many are maimed in auto



Caption: 75 words—workers in the gulag

accidents every year? This is also an acceptable sacrifice. Moloch still lives as paganism is just this contempt for human life.

After all, if man is nothing but a bundle of disordered drives, then distinctions among people serve no purpose, and there is certainly nothing sacred (or even interesting) about human life. Darwin justifies this battle and the carnage it leaves behind. Colonialism and empire, or so it is asserted, were justified by an appeal to religion. The truth is that these monstrosities were usually justified as “progress.” Traditional religion was being purged at home, meaning it was not used as a justification abroad. Whatever religious symbolism once marginally justified a commercial empire, it certainly was not the patristic consensus, but the meaningless deism of the Darwinian protoplasmic soup. The Reformation helped jump-start the empires of Antwerp and

London, built on the cultural corpse of secularized monasteries and plundered cathedrals. "Progress and civilization" were the vaporic justifications for empire.

It was not Holy Russia that colonized Ukraine, but the Petrogradian bureaucracy and its banking establishment that sought to "bring civilization" to the goyim in the Ukrainian countryside. So why did Stus's ancestors seek misfortune? Because to preserve profits, city elites and their love of luxuries, the worker needed to be controlled, foreign markets secured and massive bureaucracies erected. Mass death, immense productive capacity, advances in health and medicine and constant war were just some of the results.

There are many reasons why Stus remains unknown and almost totally untranslated. First, as a victim of the GULags and a nationalist, he has no place in liberal, postmodernist America. Secondly, he is proof that commodity consumption is not needed for happiness. Third, excessive concern with the GULag victims will take attention from the Holocaust survivors and hence can only be dealt with in small doses. Finally, Stus's real target is mass society, and the "cultural" stagnation, standardization and uniformity of "liberal" societies that have long dispensed with any meaningful sense of self and have instead focused on the individual. Stus, like so many other political and literary writers of the first rank that suffered under Marxism, is just too inconvenient for Western elites.



Caption:60 words.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN



FAITH & TRUTH IN ALEXANDER SOLZHENITSYN'S *ONE DAY IN THE LIFE OF IVAN DENISOVICH*

This story is well known, as is its author. Alexander Solzhenitsyn used the character of Ivan Denisovich Shukhov to describe the daily life in the GULag, or the “corrective labor” camp system of the former USSR. As an Orthodox believer, Solzhenitsyn deals with the questions of faith and belief within the context of an officially atheist and materialist system.

The story itself is not complex, mirroring the religious and “ideological” interests of the author. Like Solzhenitsyn himself, Ivan was imprisoned on the charge of working for the Germans during World War II. Both the author and Ivan were prisoners of war in Hitler’s Germany and thus were seen as inherently contaminated by that regime. Both men were innocent, and in the story, Ivan is sentenced to a decade of imprisonment. In the GULag system, this almost always meant forced labor.

As the title indicates, the story transpires over a single day. Given the harsh climate and arduous physical labor without proper nourishment, Ivan awakes quite ill. He is not on time for his work detail, so he is sent to clean the front guard’s quarters.

Ivan is concerned with his daily food ration, which is quite understandable under this regime. It is meager, but, when so confined, it becomes the sole reason to live. It is this obsession with food that serves as the foil for the religious elements in the novel.

His work detail is a 25-member squad, the 104th labor unit of the system. The informal leader of this group is Tiurin, assigned to this role quite possibly because of his excellent work ethic. The system here relies on "elite" prisoners to discipline the rest, and these "elite" are rewarded with power and the ability to receive food packages from home.

The very fact that the issues of belief and truth emerge in such a regime is not difficult to grasp. When confined and treated harshly in this climate, the prisoner can focus on one of two directions: either he can focus on his stomach, or, given the fact that all elements of normal life (and even their humanity) has been stripped from them, they can focus on God, the spirit and in what true happiness consists.

The nature of labor is worth noting only in that it suggests the rudimentary elements in a healthy community. The detail is administratively seen as a unit. This means that when a project is left undone, or accomplished poorly, the entire unit is punished, even if it is clear that one member is at fault. The positive element of this is that labor is rationally and fairly allocated so that each does his share. Punishing the whole unit forces each member of it to watch each other. This is a form of coercion but also a means of generating cooperation. As it turns out, this solidarity can backfire on the camp guards since it builds a sort of camaraderie that can turn against the system.

Faith does not really become an issue until the second half of the novel. Ivan uses a semi-mocking tone to play with the foreman of the work detail. This man, while often fair, is clearly an atheist, calling believers "savages" and "stupid." Playfully, he says to the captain that the moon, when in its "new" phase, cannot be seen. He torments the captain with half-joking comments like "So, if you can't see it, how do you know it's there?"

Behind this banter is a serious point. All perception is based

on faith. There is no proof whatsoever that what our senses report is really “out there.” It is just as easy that it register what our brain generates or, worse, that it is a mere virtual world controlled by some sinister power (Bloom, 2001, 8-9).

The prisoner Alyoshka is the main figure where faith is concerned. His main quality is that the faith he possesses makes him the better-off prisoner. The Scriptures he carefully hides keeps him resilient in the face of impending death. Importantly, he does for others, often without any expectation of reciprocation. For the camp system and the USSR in general, he is a remarkable character.

Near the end of the novel, the issue of faith takes center stage. Ivan states, “Thanks be to Thee, O God, another day over!” His bunk-mate Alyoshka, a Protestant, a rarity in the USSR, kept a New Testament in the camp. The Bible he keeps is, in fact, a hand-written copy, which makes it easier to hide. He kept it in a small crack in the wall near his bunk and is well aware of the punishment such contraband will earn.

Upon hearing the above prayer, he states to Ivan, “There you are, Ivan Denisovich, your soul is asking to be allowed to pray to God. Why not let it have its way, eh?” Ivan responds, “Because, Alyoshka, prayers are like petitions—either they don’t get through at all, or else it’s ‘complaint rejected.’” Then Alyoshka remarks, “That’s because you never prayed long enough or fervently enough. That’s why your prayers weren’t answered. Prayer must be persistent. And if you have faith and say to a mountain, ‘Make way,’ it will make way.”

Don’t talk rot, Alyoshka. I never saw mountains going anywhere. Come to think of it, I’ve never seen any mountains. But when you and your whole Baptist club did all that praying in the Caucasus, did one single mountain ever move over?

To that rejoinder, Alyoshka states:

We didn’t pray for anything like that. The Lord’s behest was that we should pray for no earthly or transient thing

except our daily bread. 'Give us this day our daily bread ...
 . We shouldn't pray for somebody to send us a parcel, or
 for an extra portion of *skilly*. What people prize highly is
 vile in the sight of God! We must pray for spiritual things,
 asking God to remove the scum of evil from our hearts.

Ivan then relates a story about the priest at the parish in Polomnya, apparently the wealthiest person in the region. The response of the locals was to charge him for services (he mentions "roofing") more than an ordinary client. He relates that the priest was forced to pay alimony for at least three women and the priest, according to Ivan, was living with his "fourth family."

The author narrates: "Poor devils. What harm does their praying do anybody? Collected 25 years all around. That's how things are nowadays: 25 is the only kind of sentence they hand out." This aside from Solzhenitsyn furthers the idea of the book, that the camp system can rescue man from the insanity of war and materialism. It does this by and through total dehumanization. When one has nothing, one either dies or turns to God.

Finally, Ivan says that God is not the problem. What he refuses to believe in is the afterlife based on rewards and punishment. The Baptist prisoner then switches the theme to the nature of freedom. He states that to be in prison is not a terrible thing, especially since one can have the time to search one's soul. Apart from the world and its daily cares, the prisoner can focus on what little he does have. It forces the poor soul to attach itself to God since nothing else remains.

One of the more remarkable passages comes soon after this. Solzhenitsyn narrates: "Alyoshka wasn't lying, though. You could tell from his voice and his eyes that he was glad to be in prison." It is there where the soul is exposed. Without physical pleasures, what else is there? This is one of the main theses of the novel. In the outside world, the daily grind becomes the sole concern. One's freedom quickly evaporates as one is trying to climb some institutional ladder or impress someone with power. On the other hand, the camp is about survival. It's about being cut off from even the smallest forms of freedom that show themselves

in the urban grind. The camp also holds out the promise of death, often violent or painful. In this case, the spiritual aspects of the GULag begin to show (Klimoff, 2007, 74-78ff).

The essential truth of faith in this novel is that Alyoshka's handwritten New Testament is the most effective means of keeping some dignity under this regime. Regardless of the materialist ideology of the USSR, which is the origin of the GULag, God still exists, still cares for man and still sees all human beings as his own. Dignity is impossible under materialism, since that ideology can only see human beings as bundles of nerve endings to be manipulated. One is as good as another, and the death of one is meaningless. It is just the "spark" animating a hunk of flesh going out. There is no more moral content than that (Pannekoek, 2003, 80-89).

To conclude, the novel is straightforward about matters of faith. The camp is humanity under extreme conditions. Only there is the soul forced to make peace with its own coming death. Ivan himself is not inherently atheistic but seems to maintain a "folk religion" that has no grounds in clericalism or institutionalism. Yet, the Scriptures are an "institutional" form of religion since it is written down and permanent, so the two elements come together in Ivan at the end of the novel.

Ivan might well be the symbol of the demoralized human soul under this regime. All materialist regimes, communist or capitalist, create this overworked, cynical type only concerned with what he can see or hear. It is Alyoshka, a symbol of the Scriptures rather than Protestant theology, that awakened this element of the human soul in Ivan deadened by war, materialism and the camp.

The awakening of this spiritual side of Ivan's mind is in Alyoshka's clear self-sacrificial nature. He is constantly giving parts of his ration away. Ivan finally does this—by giving a biscuit to Alyoshka. A biscuit is a valuable thing under such conditions and giving it to another represents a severe form of deprivation. This is the road to inner peace and, in reality, making the camp bearable.



Caption: 60 words

CHAPTER FOURTEEN



FINAL THOUGHTS

These words are being written several days after Donald Trump was elected president. As promised, George Soros and Goldman Sachs are financing a violent, nationwide protest movement. Donald Trump faced endless and blatant voter fraud. He faced vote rigging and violent voter intimidation. His own party rejected him. He survived four assassination attempts. The media fully admitted they were refusing to cover his campaign objectively. The press promoted myths and stories knowingly as truth. Daily he faced lies, myths, distortions, slander, hate, threats, venom, crime and violence. He was forced to run a marathon with a 50-pound weight on his back and still came in first. This makes it the largest, most substantial mandate in recent memory.

As a result of Trump's massive mandate, the left is demanding civil war. Death threats against whites are occurring daily. All American major cities have seen protests, refusing to accept the election outcome because their candidate did not win. Cries for violent revolution are heard daily, and President Trump is receiving hourly death threats. The American press is, as always in cases like this, either silent or covering for the criminals.

Why do I mention these events? Because the left has always behaved like this. From the French revolution on, they've lived in a fantasy world. They demand that the entire world be remade

to conform precisely to their conceptions of it. My doctoral dissertation, *Science, Ideology and Reason: Michael Oakeshott's Critique of Modernism*, was about this very same phenomenon. Oakeshott writes in his famed essay:

Rationalist politics, I have said, are the politics of the felt need, the felt need not qualified by a genuine, concrete knowledge of the permanent interests and direction of movement of a society but interpreted by "reason" and satisfied according to the technique of an ideology: They are the politics of the book. And this also is characteristic of almost all contemporary politics: Not to have a book is to be without the one thing necessary, and not to observe meticulously what is written in the book is to be a disreputable politician. Indeed, so necessary is it to have a book, that those who have hitherto thought it possible to get on without one, have had, rather late in the day, to set about composing one for their own use. This is a symptom of the triumph of technique which we have seen to be the root of modern Rationalism; for what the book contains is only what it is possible to put into a book—rules of a technique.

Here, the point can be found in the proper definition of the term "paranoid": the belief that the world must conform to my moral schema if it is to be "repaired" from its current state. The problem is that this imposition is impossible. Words and ideas cannot be put into practice, and certainly not immediately, without tremendous resistance and imperfection. An ideal, once made a ruling notion, is immediately debased.

The leftist of all sorts believes that the abstract conceptions of man, that "we're all equal" or that "all mankind is rational," is literally true. Of course, these words are vague and imprecise, and have more to do with the speaker than the reality he might envisage. Ideology, as Russell Kirk defined it, is hampered by precisely this idea. It is cataphatic in that it actually believes that the words and concepts it uses can be "acted out" on the daily basis. This is to say that political systems—that is, real, functioning systems—can be judged according to unreal,

ethereal conceptions. Tsar Nicholas II was criticized according to an abstract conception of democracy at the federal level. He was not contrasted with the democracy of the United States or revolutionary France as it functioned at the time.

This is the sleight-of-hand the left has used for a long time. Marxism is a fraud on many levels. Primarily, it is a fraud because it seeks to criticize a functional system from the point of view of an idea. This is what Michael Oakeshott is referencing above: The “book,” or the ideological blueprint, is more important than people.

The point of my dissertation was to explain how Oakeshott can be used to explain political violence. There is no question, regardless of the mercenary motives of the elites, that there were plenty of leftist idealists in the communist and social democratic parties in Russia. It was precisely these who were purged later on. As Dostoevsky parodied in *The Possessed*, these idealists are so termed because they thought that the ideals can, with sufficient force, be instantiated in the lives of ordinary folks. Political violence rewards the most vicious and the most devious, making violent revolution a very delicate thing, Oliver Cromwell setting the standard in that regard. The very vices that create a successful revolutionary are the very worst traits for a political leader.

Political violence is precisely that gap between the ethereal idea and its daily hypostasis in the world. “Permanent revolution” can best be defined as the constant war against reality, the very definition of “paranoia.” This is essential to understanding the USSR.

History was defined by Marx to be simplistic, as a set of imperfect economic systems eventually accumulating the necessary capital and knowledge to give birth to communism, or the full and total use of technology to free man from all forms of want. In the 20th century, it was stated by the revolutionaries that it was time for the Vanguard to form and to bring Russia and the world to this state. This Vanguard were the Enlightened ones that understood the plight of labor more deeply than labor itself. Given that belief, all they did was, *ipso facto*, in the interests

of the “working class.”

This belief leads to absurdities no book can adequately summarize. One of my favorites, mentioned more than once in this set of essays, was that it led to billionaire banker Jacob Schiff being termed one of the “proletariat” while the impoverished, rural parish priest in Ukraine was termed a “capitalist exploiter.” The reader cannot assume that Marxism—or any ideology—uses words in their conversational sense. For Leninism, “worker” had nothing to do with income, livelihood or skill. It had to do with ideological connection.

Oakeshott’s quote above explains the mental apparatus that creates these absurdities. If the world has been reduced to exploiters and exploited, then those revolutionaries are such only because they assist the latter against the former. In turn, all who are a part of this must be part of the worker’s movement and hence the working class. The “kulak” issue showed this absurdity at its height.

Leftism is best typified, as Oakeshott has stated, by a rationalist political doctrine. Whether the classical liberal nonsense about the free market in a vacuum or the rioter threatening the lives of Trump supporters or Electoral College delegates, the behavior can be explained by the frustration they have with the world refusing to bow to their naive conceptions.

Writing in *Modern Age*, Jude P. Dougherty opines,

When Marx as a member of the Communist League was commissioned with Engels in 1847 to draw up a summary statement of socialist principles, elements of the socialist movement were well underway. Although socialism was a widely discussed theoretical topic, it was up to that time merely a collection of insights and perceptions, still shapeless and inchoate. The resulting systematization became the *Communist Manifesto*. The *Manifesto* itself refers to the writings of P.J. Proudhon, Claude Henri St. Simon, Charles Fourier and Robert Owen. A half-century later Lenin was to write, “The theory of socialism grew out of the philosophic, historical and economic theories that were elaborated by the educated representatives of the propertied

classes and intellectuals." The working class, Lenin was convinced, is unable to develop a social consciousness on its own. It must be "impregnated" with this consciousness from without. For Lenin this requires not only the unwitting cooperation of an intellectual class but the effort of persons engaged in revolutionary activities as a profession.

This is a skilled summary of this book, seen in the abstract. The USSR was never about the working man. The typical member of the "Russian Communist Party" was Jewish, non-Russian, privileged, urban and bourgeois in all respects. Not only did he care nothing for the working man, he knew nothing about him. Worse, he even hated him since the Jewish element added a dash of venom to his allegedly idealistic crusade for the workers' well-being. That they slaughtered millions of workers, peasants and small shopkeepers is quite consistent with their mentality. The Russian worker was violently oppressed under socialism, real socialist institutions were destroyed and a handful of urban elites made off with the lifeblood of centuries of Russian and Ukrainian labor. To this day, the typical professor of "Russian history" in the USA will wax eloquently about the "ideals of Marxism" and the "legacy of Lenin" as if these are some great moral goal to be struggled for.

Erich Fromm writes in 1961:

Suffice it to say at the outset that this popular picture of Marx's "materialism"—his anti-spiritual tendency, his wish for uniformity and subordination—is utterly false. Marx's aim was that of the spiritual emancipation of man, of his liberation from the chains of economic determination, of restituting [sic] him in his human wholeness, of enabling him to find unity and harmony with his fellow man and with nature. Marx's philosophy was, in secular, nontheistic language, a new and radical step forward in the tradition of prophetic Messianism; it was aimed at the full realization of individualism, the very aim which has guided Western thinking from the Renaissance and the Reformation far into the nineteenth century (Fromm, 1961).

This nonsense is still assigned in American universities as “scholarship” on Marx. The errors are so many that they must be ironic and therefore willful. Marx did not believe in spirit nor did he believe in human freedom. Marx was an economic determinist since, once you reject spirit, determinism is all that remains. “Uniformity and subordination” are, unfortunately, the inevitable result of a violent revolution where the victors seek to remake and reconstitute all aspects of life from the family to the mode of dress to the daily grind of a people. Marx’s doctrine, when put into practice, does exactly this. Fromm cannot insist that failed experiments of his fashionable ideology don’t matter because they were not “real socialism.”

Where does Fromm get the conception of “wholeness” or “harmony?” These are universals radically rejected by the scientific approach of Marx and the “individualism” to which Fromm correctly makes reference. These universals are radically incompatible with not only Marx but the entire Enlightenment tradition that Fromm, again, correctly references above. These are buzzwords, intellectual shtick to cover over decades of violence.

The USSR was never about labor, the West never fought it as a “socialist entity” and it was always and eternally the creation of capitalism. Western elites created it and traded with it vigorously. The fact that Dr. Fromm, Dr. Marcuse and thousands of others found gainful employment in the U.S. media and academia throughout the 20th century proves this point well. The preface to Dr. Fromm’s books, as with Herbert Marcuse, thanks the Rockefeller Foundation for its generous grant of money to bring their socialist work about. This book, among other things, has sought to make it plain that Marxism and Leninism have been financed by big money from day one. The reasons for this have been made plain. The more puzzling aspect of this is determining why academics refuse to deal with these issues or ask these questions?

The “Cold War” is long over, so why continue this charade that “the U.S. fought Soviet socialism for decades?” It goes a long way in explaining the pressures the average professor is

placed under. This is not to suggest his job is difficult; it most certainly is not. It is to say that it is a tightly controlled environment where social standing means much more than truth, criticism and insight. Teaching ability—speaking autobiographically—can lead a good professor into trouble. It is one of the few professions where satisfying the “customer” is not rewarded but is held in utter contempt. The professoriate cannot be treated as other jobs are. To do it well is to gain the eternal scorn of your peers.

The university professor, especially if he is a white male, lives in terror. He fears that every word, every step is being scrutinized for traces of “sexism” or some such totemic sin. The USSR did not know this level of totalitarianism. Professors have been dismissed and lives ruined for the most laughable misunderstanding, while incompetent teachers and genocidal maniacs (such as Harvard’s Noel Ignatiev) are rewarded handsomely.

The result is that the white male professor will overcompensate to guard his privileged position at the university. He will become the most radical feminist the world has ever witnessed. He will scream and denounce the slightest deviation from what he thinks the official line is (which is always changing). His office door will be festooned with those comics and stickers he thinks will ensure he is accepted by the school’s power brokers. Still, he realizes that all it takes is a slightly offending joke or even a gesture to bring international media attention upon him. His career will be over.

The point of all this is to show the intensity of the ideological pressure on the male university professor. He may not touch on topics that might even indirectly lump him in with a “basket of deplorables.” The term “conspiracy theory” fills him with dread, even though the entire point of historical analysis is to uncover the true nature of power and how it operates. If power operated out in the open, then there would be no need for either political science or history. Knowing this, the young professor realizes that it is only a “conspiracy theory” when the wrong people are seen as having power. If this is done, then precisely those people men-

tioned will come down on him, destroying his reputation and proving the “conspiracy theory” true.

Destroying narratives that support the leftist agenda in general will not be accepted. Publications will not be forthcoming, and the reputation of the professor will suffer. Once excluded, he cannot hope for tenure. Tenure, decided upon only by other tenured professors (rather than students or alumni), is granted for those who “fit in.” It is certainly not granted on the basis of actual critical skill. This author knows this for a certain truth. No search committee or tenure committee cares about how students see the professor or how skilled he is as a lecturer. They care only for quotas and ideological uniformity.

These essays have detailed the deep corruption in the American mind, especially its intelligentsia, but to then connect the noble, leftist professoriate with corporate America is to commit several sins at once: It says professors are part of the ruling establishment, it says they are financed from external sources and hence are not independent, and, finally, it says that what they teach is mostly mythology. This author sincerely hopes you understand this.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR




Matthew Raphael Johnson, Ph.D. is the former editor of TBR. He's well known as a historian and writer specializing in the Russian Orthodox tradition and the fight against globalization. He completed his Ph.D. at the University of Nebraska, writing his dissertation on Michael Oakeshott's critique of modernity. He is best known for being the voice behind the Orthodox Nationalist lecture series on the Voice of Reason and the Radio Aryan networks. He holds a doctorate in the history of political philosophy from the University of Nebraska and has taught at several universities. He is also proud to say he's been fired from every one. Matt resides in Franklin County, Pa., where he teaches and writes on Russian history and politics. he is originally from Union County, N.J.

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